Constitutional income. Do you have any?

[Cigarlover]

Definition of income.. I really hate posting the case law here because that opens this up for Snoop to come in with a wall of case law trying to overturn these decisions.
And we go around and around in circles. Snoops declares we are all slaves after the 16th was passed even though slavery was outlawed.

Snoops the problem with you and the case law you provide is you claim the lower courts overturned the higher courts but in your words it is just the lower courts interpretation of the higher courts which makes it all ok. I disagree. But, since the higher courts are now in the pocket of government, we will never get clarification from them. It's also obvious that congress has no desire to provide clarification or simplification of the tax laws. They like things just as they are. 350 million slaves with income as defined in an ordinary sense of everything that comes in, as being taxable.
I read your case law snoop. I understand what you are saying with it but I still don't agree with it although to your credit, it makes your case if you understand income to be everything that comes in.

"As has been repeatedly remarked, the corporation tax act of 1909 was not intended to be and is not, in any proper sense, an income tax law. This court has decided in the Pollock Case that the income tax of 1894 amounted in effect to a direct tax upon property, and was invalid because not apportioned according to population, as prescribed by the Constitution. The act of 1909 avoided this difficulty by imposing not an income tax, but an excise tax upon the conduct of business in a corporate capacity, measuring, however, the amount of tax by the income of the corporation, with certain qualifications prescribed by the act itself." - Stratton's Independence. LTD. v. Howbert, 231 US 399 (1913)
“Whatever difficulty there may be about a precise and scientific definition of 'income,' it imports, as used here, something entirely distinct from principal or capital either as a subject of taxation or as a measure of the tax; conveying rather the idea of gain or increase arising from corporate activities." - Doyle v. Mitchell Brother, Co., 247 US 179 (1918)
"Brief as it is, it indicates the characteristic and distinguishing attribute of income essential for a correct solution of the present controversy. The government, although basing its argument upon the definition as quoted, placed chief emphasis upon the word "gain," which was extended to include a variety of meanings; while the significance of the next three words was either overlooked or misconceived. "Derived from capital;" "the gain derived from capital," etc. Here, we have the essential matter: not a gain accruing to capital; not a growth or increment of value in the investment; but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value, proceeding from the property, severed from the capital, however invested or employed, and coming in, being "derived" -- that is, received or drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and disposal -- that is income derived from property. Nothing else answers the description." - Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 205 -206 (1920).
"...there would seem to be no room to doubt that the word [income] must be given the same meaning in all of the Income Tax Acts of Congress that was given to it in the Corporation Excise Tax Act, and that what that meaning is has now become definitely settled by decisions of this Court." - Merchants Loan & Trust v. Smietanka, 255 US 509 (1921)
"In determining the definition of the word "income" thus arrived at, this Court has consistently refused to enter into the refinements of lexicographers or economists, and has approved, in the definitions quoted, what it believed to be the commonly understood meaning of the term which must have been in the minds of the people when they adopted the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution." - Merchants Loan & Trust v. Smietanka, 255 US 509 (1921)

 

[Cigarlover]

Hello, Cigarlover, my old legal scholar friend,

You are still, by far, the most literate, the most educated ,the most analytical and the best critical thinker on GIM2.

Nobody else even comes close.

That is a fact.

Are you and I cool now on the "legislative intent" argument as it relates to "nonresident aliens and foreign corporations" under chapter 3 when compared to the entirely different "legislative intent" on "citizens and residents of the United States" under chapter 1?

All My Best,

Snoop

Thanks Snoop. I am reviewing it.. Been busy and lots of ketchup to do. :). Just playin with words there. LOL. It'll be a few days before I can agree or rebut what your saying but I am looking into it. :).

 

[michael59]

I object., your honor.

now i'ma gona have to whatch that mooovie...shit my things 2 do list is ever ex-spanding

 

[snoop4truth]

Definition of income.. I really hate posting the case law here because that opens this up for Snoop to come in with a wall of case law trying to overturn these decisions.
And we go around and around in circles. Snoops declares we are all slaves after the 16th was passed even though slavery was outlawed.

Snoops the problem with you and the case law you provide is you claim the lower courts overturned the higher courts but in your words it is just the lower courts interpretation of the higher courts which makes it all ok. I disagree. But, since the higher courts are now in the pocket of government, we will never get clarification from them. It's also obvious that congress has no desire to provide clarification or simplification of the tax laws. They like things just as they are. 350 million slaves with income as defined in an ordinary sense of everything that comes in, as being taxable.
I read your case law snoop. I understand what you are saying with it but I still don't agree with it although to your credit, it makes your case if you understand income to be everything that comes in.

"As has been repeatedly remarked, the corporation tax act of 1909 was not intended to be and is not, in any proper sense, an income tax law. This court has decided in the Pollock Case that the income tax of 1894 amounted in effect to a direct tax upon property, and was invalid because not apportioned according to population, as prescribed by the Constitution. The act of 1909 avoided this difficulty by imposing not an income tax, but an excise tax upon the conduct of business in a corporate capacity, measuring, however, the amount of tax by the income of the corporation, with certain qualifications prescribed by the act itself." - Stratton's Independence. LTD. v. Howbert, 231 US 399 (1913)
“Whatever difficulty there may be about a precise and scientific definition of 'income,' it imports, as used here, something entirely distinct from principal or capital either as a subject of taxation or as a measure of the tax; conveying rather the idea of gain or increase arising from corporate activities." - Doyle v. Mitchell Brother, Co., 247 US 179 (1918)
"Brief as it is, it indicates the characteristic and distinguishing attribute of income essential for a correct solution of the present controversy. The government, although basing its argument upon the definition as quoted, placed chief emphasis upon the word "gain," which was extended to include a variety of meanings; while the significance of the next three words was either overlooked or misconceived. "Derived from capital;" "the gain derived from capital," etc. Here, we have the essential matter: not a gain accruing to capital; not a growth or increment of value in the investment; but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value, proceeding from the property, severed from the capital, however invested or employed, and coming in, being "derived" -- that is, received or drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and disposal -- that is income derived from property. Nothing else answers the description." - Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 205 -206 (1920).
"...there would seem to be no room to doubt that the word [income] must be given the same meaning in all of the Income Tax Acts of Congress that was given to it in the Corporation Excise Tax Act, and that what that meaning is has now become definitely settled by decisions of this Court." - Merchants Loan & Trust v. Smietanka, 255 US 509 (1921)
"In determining the definition of the word "income" thus arrived at, this Court has consistently refused to enter into the refinements of lexicographers or economists, and has approved, in the definitions quoted, what it believed to be the commonly understood meaning of the term which must have been in the minds of the people when they adopted the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution." - Merchants Loan & Trust v. Smietanka, 255 US 509 (1921)

Hello Cigarlover, my legal scholar friend.

YOUR COMMENT: Definition of income.. I really hate posting the case law here because that opens this up for Snoop to come in with a wall of case law trying to overturn these decisions. And we go around and around in circles.

MY RESPONSE: Brother, the case law that I post is not in conflict with the case law that you post. The case law that I post relates to federal income tax after 1913 and the case law that you post relates to something else entirely, like the right to enter the slaughterhouse market or the right to enter into employment contracts.

YOUR COMMENT: Snoops declares we are all slaves after the 16th was passed even though slavery was outlawed.

MY RESPONSE: I have "declared" nothing of the sort. We are not slaves. I have never "declared" otherwise. All I have done is as follows. In response to a request from you on the subject, I have only provided you with Supreme Court case law which says there is nothing in the Constitution which limits the amount or rate of income taxes. According to the Supreme Court in Pollock, there is only one limit and two conditions on taxes in the entire Constitution. The only limit is that exports cannot be taxed. The two conditions are that direct taxes must be apportioned and indirect taxes are subject to the rule of uniformity.

YOUR COMMENT: Snoops the problem with you and the case law you provide is you claim the lower courts overturned the higher courts

MY RESPONSE: Again you mischaracterize what I have said. Why? I have never said that lower federal court decisions can overtrun higher federal court decisions. They can not and they do not. They never have. They never will.

YOUR COMMENT: but in your words, it is just the lower courts interpretation of the higher courts which makes it all ok.

MY RESPONSE: Lower federal courts make decisions in strict conformity to the decisions of the higher federal courts WHICH ARE ON THE SAME LEGAL SUBJECT. But, lower federal courts do not apply inapplicable case law on OTHER LEGAL SUBJECTS to the law on income taxes. There is no "interpreting" to it. The reason that you mistakenly believe otherwise, is that you mistakenly believe to law ON ONE LEGAL SUBJECT applies to the law ON OTHER, UNRELATED LEGAL SUBJECTS. For example, you mistakenly believe that the law on the right to enter the slaughterhouse industry makes federal income tax illegal. Likewise, you mistakenly believe that the law on the right to enter into employment contracts makes federal income taxes illegal. But, neither is the case. The one and only type of law which applies to federal income taxes IS FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAW.

YOUR COMMENT: But, since the higher courts are now in the pocket of government, we will never get clarification from them.

MY RESPONSE: The higher federal courts uphold the federal income tax law BECAUSE THAT IS THE LAW UNDER THE CONSTITUTION (INCLUDING THE SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT) AND UNDER TITLE 26. The higher federal courts do not uphold the federal income tax law because they are in the pocket of government. The higher federal courts uphold the federal income tax law BECAUSE THEY HAVE NO CHOICE. THAT IS THE LAW.

YOUR COMMENT: It's also obvious that congress has no desire to provide clarification or simplification of the tax laws.

MY RESPONSE: Congress should make the income tax law more understandable.

YOUR COMMENT: They like things just as they are, 350 million slaves with income as defined in an ordinary sense of everything that comes in, as being taxable.

MY RESPONSE: This is partly correct. But, not everything that comes in is income. For example, your receipt of a loan is not taxable income.

YOUR COMMENT: I read your case law snoop. I understand what you are saying with it but I still don't agree with it although to your credit, it makes your case if you understand income to be everything that comes in.

MY RESPONSE: Respectfully, it is not just the case law which says that wages are income. Title 26 says it too.

THE DEFINITION OF INCOME :

CONGRESS PROVIDED A SHORT FORMULA FOR DETERMINING TAXABLE "INCOME" FOR CHAPTER 1 PURPOSES (applicable to citizens and resident residents of the United States) IN CHAPTER 1(which applies to citizens and resident residents of the United States)

Title 26 U.S.C 63(a) OF CHAPTER 1(which applies to citizens and residents of theUnited States) reads:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/63

FIRST:
((BEGIN QUOTE)

(a) In general
... THE TERM “TAXABLE INCOME" MEANS GROSS INCOME [SEE BELOW] MINUS THE DEDUCTIONS [SEE BELOW] ALLOWED BY THIS CHAPTER (other than the standard deduction).


SECOND:
Then, Title 26 U.S.C. section 61 OF CHAPTER 1(applicable to citizens and resident residents of the United States) reads:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/61
((BEGIN QUOTE)

(a) General definition
... GROSS INCOME MEANS ALL INCOME FROM WHATEVER SOURCE DERIVED, including (BUT NOT LIMITED TO) the following items:

(1) COMPENSATION FOR SERVICES [SUCH AS WAGES AND SALARIES], including fees, commissions, fringe benefits, and similar items;
(2) Gross income derived from business;
(3) Gains derived from dealings in property;
(4) Interest;
(5) Rents;
(6) Royalties;
(7) Dividends;
(8) Annuities;
(9) Income from life insurance and endowment contracts;
(10) Pensions;
(11) Income from discharge of indebtedness;
(12) Distributive share of partnership gross income;
(13) Income in respect of a decedent; and
(14) Income from an interest in an estate or trust.

THIRD
THEN, CONGRESS PROVIDES A LIST OF ALLOWABLE DEDUCTIONS. CLICK HERE: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/63

FOURTH:
THE REMAINING AMOUNT IS "TAXABLE INCOME." SEE PROOF BELOW.

65 T.C.M. 1803 (1993)T.C. Memo. 1993-29Patricia B. Farr
v.
Commissioner.
Docket No. 6347-91.
United States Tax Court.​

Filed January 27, 1993.
Patricia B. Farr, pro se. John M. Altman, for the respondent.

..
Opinion

Issue 1. Deficiency in Income Tax

[Referring to Title 26 U.S.C.] Section 1 [Of CHAPTER 1] of subtitle A IMPOSES AN INCOME TAX ON THE TAXABLE INCOME OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL WHO IS A CITIZEN OR RESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. Sec. 1; sec. 1.1-1(a)(1), Income Tax Regs. TAXABLE INCOME MEANS GROSS INCOME LESS THOSE DEDUCTIONS SPECIFICALLY ALLOWED BY THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE. Sec. 63(a).
...
(END QUOTE)



YOUR COMMENT: "As has been repeatedly remarked, the corporation tax act of 1909 was not intended to be and is not, in any proper sense, an income tax law. This court has decided in the Pollock Case that the income tax of 1894 amounted in effect to a direct tax upon property, and was invalid because not apportioned according to population, as prescribed by the Constitution. The act of 1909 avoided this difficulty by imposing not an income tax, but an excise tax upon the conduct of business in a corporate capacity, measuring, however, the amount of tax by the income of the corporation, with certain qualifications prescribed by the act itself." - Stratton's Independence. LTD. v. Howbert, 231 US 399 (1913)

MY RESPONSE: The very fact that the Corporation Tax Act of 1908 did not involve income taxes MEANS THAT NOTHING ABOUT THIS ACT APPLIES TO INCOME TAXES UNDER THE SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT, UNDER TITLE 26 OR THE CASE LAW ON INCOME TAXES, with the exception of the definition of "income". OTHERWISE, THE CORPORATION TAX ACT OF 1908 IS COMPLETELY IRRELEVANT TO THE SUBJECT OF INCOME TAXES, whom it applies and so forth.

As I explained to you on another thread:

(BEGIN QUOTE)

The Corporation Excise Tax Act of August 5, 1909, c. 6, 36 Stat. 11, 112, was not an income tax law, but a definition of the word "income" was so necessary in its administration that in an early case it was formulated as "THE GAIN DERIVED FROM CAPITAL, FROM LABOR, OR FROM BOTH COMBINED. " Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415.

This definition, frequently approved by this court, RECEIVED AN ADDITION, in its latest income tax decision, which is especially significant in its application to such a case as we have here, so that it now reads: "INCOME MAY BE DEFINED AS THE GAIN DERIVED FROM CAPITAL, FROM LABOR, OR FROM BOTH COMBINED, PROVIDED IT BE UNDERSTOOD TO INCLUDE PROFIT GAINED THROUGH A SALE OR CONVERSION OF CAPITAL ASSETS." Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207.

(END QUOTE)


YOUR COMMENT: “Whatever difficulty there may be about a precise and scientific definition of 'income,' it imports, as used here, something entirely distinct from principal or capital either as a subject of taxation or as a measure of the tax; conveying rather the idea of gain or increase arising from corporate activities." - Doyle v. Mitchell Brother, Co., 247 US 179 (1918).

MY RESPONSE: You continue to send me duplicates of cases which you have already sent to me and to which I have already responded. This is just another one of them. As I explained to you the first time you brought this case up:

Doyle v. Mitchell Brother, Co., 247 US 179 (1918)
“We must reject in this case . . . the broad contention submitted in behalf of the Government that all receipts—everything that comes in—are income within the proper definition of the term ‘income’ .

(BEGIN QUOTE)

This case was NOT ultimately an income tax case. This case involved a corporate excise tax of 1% of the net income of doing business. Mitchell Brothers was a lumber company in the business harvesting timber, cutting it into usable lumber and selling it for profit. Incident to this business, Mitchell Brothers bought land for its timber, clear cut it and sold the remaining "stump land" to recoup some or all of the costs of the land's original purchase price. But, Mitchell Brothers was NOT in the real estate business, as such. Doyle was a collector for the IRS and levied the corporate excise tax against the income that Mitchell Brothers derived from the sale of this "stump land". [Mitchell Brothers agreed that it owed income taxes on income received from from the sale of its lumber, but disputed that it owed income taxes on income received from the sale of "stump land". (At the time, income received from the sale of a capital asset was not taxable as income.).] The Supreme Court held that these receipts were "not income", but were instead an indirect tax on property, not subject to the tax citing Flint v. Stone, another case which distinguished property taxes from income taxes. In so doing, the Supreme Court wrote, “We must reject in this case . . . the broad contention submitted in behalf of the Government that all receipts—everything that comes in—are income within the proper definition of the term ‘income’.

SO, THIS CASE WAS NOT ULTIMATELY AND INCOME CASE CASE! IT WAS A PROPERTY TAX CASE!

(END QUOTE)

YOUR COMMENT: "Brief as it is, it indicates the characteristic and distinguishing attribute of income essential for a correct solution of the present controversy. The government, although basing its argument upon the definition as quoted, placed chief emphasis upon the word "gain," which was extended to include a variety of meanings; while the significance of the next three words was either overlooked or misconceived. "Derived from capital;" "the gain derived from capital," etc. Here, we have the essential matter: not a gain accruing to capital; not a growth or increment of value in the investment; but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value, proceeding from the property, severed from the capital, however invested or employed, and coming in, being "derived" -- that is, received or drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and disposal -- that is income derived from property. Nothing else answers the description." - Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 205 -206 (1920).

MY RESPONSE: You continue to send me duplicates of cases which you have already sent to me and to which I have already responded. This is just another one of them. As I explained to you the first time you brought this case up:

(BEGIN QUOTE)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_...77270424&q=Eisner+Macomber&hl=en&as_sdt=40003
EISNER, AS COLLECTOR OF UNITED STATES INTERNAL REVENUE FOR THE THIRD DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
v.
MACOMBER.
No. 318.
Supreme Court of United States.

Argued April 16, 1919.Reargument May 19, 1919. Reargued October 17, 20, 1919.Decided March 8, 1920.ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.
​

FACT SUMMARY: In this case, a stockholder in Standard Oil challenged a federal income tax on his stock dividends on the grounds that the tax was not apportioned. Under the sixteenth amendment, the federal government may lay and collect an income tax on income without apportionment. Elsewhere, the Constitution requires that any direct property tax be subject to the requirement of apportionment. The Supreme Court held that shares of stock in a corporation WAS "PROPERTY" such that any federal tax on dividends derived from such"PROPERTY" were subject to the requirement of apportionment in accordance with Pollock decision above. That is, The Supreme Court held that the tax in question WAS NOT A TAX ON INCOME, but was instead A TAX ON PROPERTY and therefore was subject to the rule of apportionment.

(BEGIN QUOTE FROM THE CASE)

This case presents the question whether, by virtue of the Sixteenth Amendment, Congress has the power to tax, as income of the stockholder and without apportionment, a stock dividend made lawfully and in good faith against profits accumulated by the corporation since March 1, 1913.
...

That Congress has power to tax shareholders upon their PROPERTY interests in the stock of corporations is beyond question; and that such interests might be valued in view of the condition of the company, including its accumulated and undivided profits, is equally clear. But that this would be taxation of PROPERTY because of ownership, and hence WOULD REQUIRE APPORTIONMENT under the provisions of the Constitution, is settled beyond peradventure by previous decisions of this court.

Thus, from every point of view, we are brought irresistibly to the conclusion that neither under the Sixteenth Amendment nor otherwise has Congress power to tax without apportionment A TRUE STOCK DIVIDEND made lawfully and in good faith, or the accumulated profits behind it, AS INCOME of the stockholder [BECAUSE SUCH WOULD BE A DIRECT PROPERTY TAX SUBJECT TO THE REQUIREMENT OF APPORTIONMENT]. The Revenue Act of 1916, in so far as it imposes a tax upon THE STOCKHOLDER because of such dividend, contravenes the provisions of Article I, § 2, cl. 3, and Article I, § 9, cl. 4, of the Constitution, and to this extent is invalid notwithstanding the Sixteenth Amendment.

(END QUOTE FROM CASE)

The Supreme Court held that shares of stock in a corporation WAS "PROPERTY" such that any federal tax on dividends derived from such"PROPERTY" were subject to the requirement of apportionment in accordance with Pollock decision above. That is, The Supreme Court held that the tax in question WAS NOT A TAX ON INCOME, but was instead A TAX ON PROPERTY and therefore was subject to the rule of apportionment.

Nothing about this decision above applies TO ANY OTHER TYPE INCOME FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE. This ruling is limited to its facts and DOES NOT APPLY TO WAGES, SALARIES, BONUSES AND SO FORTH. It ONLY applies to "DIVIDENDS" from stock!


YOUR COMMENT: "...there would seem to be no room to doubt that the word [income] must be given the same meaning in all of the Income Tax Acts of Congress that was given to it in the Corporation Excise Tax Act, and that what that meaning is has now become definitely settled by decisions of this Court." - Merchants Loan & Trust v. Smietanka, 255 US 509 (1921).


MY RESPONSE: Your continue to send me cases which you have already sent to me and to which I have already responded. This is just another one of them. As I explained to you the first time you brought this case up:

(BEGIN QUOTE)

In this case, Ryerson created a trust to provide support for his wife and children after his death. Merchants Loan & Trust was the trustee of the Ryerson trust. Then, Ryerson died. Among the property in the trust was stock Ryerson bought for $500,000, but which the trust later sold for $1,200,000, or a $700,000 profit. Smietanka was a collector for the IRS who sought to tax the $700,000 profit as income, despite that neither the wife nor the children received any of those funds.

The Trust argued that "the sum charged as 'income' represented appreciation in the value of the capital assets of the estate which was not "income" within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment and therefore could not, constitutionally, be taxed, without apportionment... ."

In upholding the income tax on the trust's $700,000 profit from the sale of stock, the Supreme Court wrote as follows:

The question is one of definition and the answer to it may be found in recent decisions of this court.The Corporation Excise Tax Act of August 5, 1909, c. 6, 36 Stat. 11, 112, was not an income tax law, but a definition of the word "income" was so necessary in its administration that in an early case it was formulated as "THE GAIN DERIVED FROM CAPITAL, FROM LABOR, OR FROM BOTH COMBINED. " Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415.This definition, frequently approved by this court, RECEIVED AN ADDITION, in its latest income tax decision, which is especially significant in its application to such a case as we have here, so that it now reads: "INCOME MAY BE DEFINED AS THE GAIN DERIVED FROM CAPITAL, FROM LABOR, OR FROM BOTH COMBINED, PROVIDED IT BE UNDERSTOOD TO INCLUDE PROFIT GAINED THROUGH A SALE OR CONVERSION OF CAPITAL ASSETS." Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207.

THUS, IT IS NOT TRUE THAT THIS DECISION STATES THAT "INCOME, AS DEFINED BY THE SUPREME COURT MEANS, 'GAINS AND PROFITS' AS A RESULT OF CORPORATE ACTIVITY AND 'PROFIT GAINED THROUGH THE SALE OR CONVERSION OF CAPITAL ASSET.'" THIS QUOTE IS FAKE! IT IS A LIE!

(END QUOTE)


CONCLUSION:

THUS, THERE IS NOTHING IN ANY OF THE SUPREME COURT CASES ABOVE WHICH RENDERS THE CURRENT FEDERAL INCOME TAX UNCONSTITUTIONAL!

LIKEWISE, THERE IS NOTHING IN ANY OF THE SUPREME COURT CASES ABOVE WHICH LIMITS THE INCOME TAX TO CORPORATIONS OR TO CORPORATE ACTIVITY!

FINALLY, THERE IS NOTHING ABOUT ANY OF THE SUPREME COURT CASES ABOVE WHICH MAKES THEM INCONSISTENT WITH ANY LOWER FEDERAL COURT DECISION ON INCOME TAXES!


THE STATUTE DEFINING WAGES AND SALARIES AS "INCOME" IS POSTED ABOVE. THE CASE LAW DEFINING WAGES AND SALARIES AS "INCOME" IS POSTED BELOW.

YOUR COMMENT: A simpler way to put it is, you cant just say I am taxing your labor. You have to say I am taxing you on the profits you made on the labor. Since this was dealing with the corporate tax act of 1909 then it really means, when a corporation has someone work for them at 10 dollars an hour and sells their labor for 30 dollar an hour, there is a profit, separate from the capital investment made of 10 dollars an hr. That profit is 20 dollars an hr minus other deductions.

MY RESPONSE: Then, show me just one case that supports this tax protester argument. The truth is, this claim is not so.

“GAIN” is NOT the difference in the VALUE of what is exchanged, IT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN the "COST" of what is given up and the "VALUE" of what is received.

So, if I sell my own labor for $100, I must calculate THE GAIN based on THE DIFFERENCE between WHAT I PAID for my own labor (not what it is worth) AND WHAT I RECEIVED FOR IT.

BECAUSE I "PAID" NOTHING FOR MY OWN LABOR, EVERYTHING I RECEIVE FOR MY LABOR IS TAXABLE INCOME UNDER THE LAW.

“Even if wages are, in effect, an exchange of equal value for value, THEY [WAGES] ARE TAXABLE AS INCOME Rowlee v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1111, 1121-1122 (1983); Rice v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1982-129. And even if we apply section 1001 to determine petitioner’s gain, his basis is defined under sections 1011 and 1012 IS HIS COST, not fair market value. Since he PAID NOTHING for his labor, his COST and thus his basis ARE ZERO. Rice v. Commissioner, supra. Consequently, even under section 1001, his taxable income from his labor IS HIS TOTAL GAIN REDUCED BY NOTHING, i.e., his wages. ... Petitioner’s argument fails for the same reason that other protesters’ arguments fail; the worker’s COST for his services--and thus his basis--IS ZERO, NOT their fair market value.”

Talmage v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-114, aff’d 101 F.3d 695 (4th Cir. 1996).

This tax protester argument would also be inconsistent with an opinion of the Supreme Court in 1913. Addressing an argument that a mine owner should be allowed to deduct as a form of depreciation the value of the ore that is in the ground before it is extracted, the Supreme Court stated:

“As to the alleged inequality of operation between mining corporations and others, it is of course true that the revenues derived from the working of mines result to some extent in the exhaustion of the capital. But the same is true of the EARNINGS OF THE HUMAN BRAIN AND HAND when unaided by capital, YET SUCH EARNINGS ARE COMMONLY DEALT WITH IN LEGISLATION AS INCOME .”

Stratton’s Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913).

So, even if human time and effort could be considered a kind of “capital,” the compensation for that capital has still been considered a form of income throughout history.

And so the federal courts have uniformly and repeatedly rejected the claim that compensation for labor is an exchange that does not result in income.

“The taxpayer next argues that wages are not income but an exchange of property. As money is property and labor is property, so his argument goes, his work for wages is a non-taxable exchange of property. WRONG AGAIN. WAGES ARE INCOME. See, e.g., Schiff v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 116, 117 (2d Cir. 1984). The argument that wages are not income has been rejected so frequently that the very raising of it justifies the imposition of sanctions [MEANS "PENALTIES"].”

Connor v. Commissioner, 770 F.2d 17, 20 (2nd Cir. 1985), (the court not only ruled against the taxpayer, but also imposed sanctions [MEANS "PENALTIES"] of $2,000 for making a frivolous appeal).

“Appellant’s contention that the amounts he received from his employers constituted an equal, nontaxable exchanges of property rather than taxable income IS CLEARLY WITHOUT MERIT. This court specifically rejected this argument in United States v. Lawson, 670 F.2d 923, 925 (10th Cir. 1982), as did the Tax Court in Rowlee v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1111, 1119-22 (1983).... Merely raising the argument that value received for labor does not constitute taxable income, but rather constitutes a nontaxable exchange of property, justifies the imposition of sanctions [MEANS "PENALTIES"].”

Casper v. Commissioner, 805 F.2d 902, 906 (10th Cir. 1986).

“According to Buras, income must be derived from some source. Wages cannot be taxed because the wage earner enjoys no gain from that source. Since the wage earner exchanges his labor and personal time for its equivalent in money, he derives no gain and therefore cannot be taxed. ... Appellant’s argument is refuted by one of the cases he cites. In Stratton’s Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415, 34 S.Ct. 136, 140, 58 L.Ed. 285 (1913), the Court did define income as gain derived from labor. The Court went on to explain, however, that ‘THE EARNINGS OF THE HUMAN BRAIN AND HAND WHEN UNAIDED BY CAPITAL ARE COMMONLY TREATED AS INCOME".
]
United States v. Buras, 633 F.2d 1356, 1361 (9th Cir. 1980).

“Furthermore, Olson’s attempt to escape tax by deducting his wages as ‘cost of labor’ ... illustrate the frivolous nature of his position. THIS COURT HAS REPEATEDLY REJECTED THE ARGUMENT THAT WAGES ARE NOT INCOME AS FRIVOLOUS... ."

Olson v. United States, 760 F.2d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 1985).

“DeMoss contends that the compensation he received from his employers is not taxable because his basis in his labor is equal to the amount of compensation he received. THE TAX COURT PROPERLY REJECTED THIS FRIVOLOUS CONTENTION. See Carter v. Commissioner, 784 F2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1986); Olson v. United States, 760 F.2d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 1985).”

DeMoss v. Commissioner, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 2672, 75 A.F.T.R.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1995), (unpublished; sanctions imposed for filing a frivolous appeal).

“Appellant’s second argument is that his compensation in exchange for labor is property, not income. ... AGAIN HE IS WRONG. The Third Circuit unequivocally has stated that ‘WAGES ARE INCOME WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT.’ United States v. Connor, 898 F.2d 942, 944 (3rd Cir. 1990). The Third Circuit then warned that ‘nless subsequent Supreme Court decisions throw any doubt on this conclusion, we will view arguments to the contrary as frivolous, which may subject the party asserting them to appropriate sanctions.’ Id. Such authority is neither cited nor found, and appellant’s arguments will be dismissed as frivolous. WAGES ARE INCOME ”

Angstadt v. Internal Revenue Service, 84 AFTR2d ¸99-5455, 1999 WL 820866, at 2 (U.S.D.C. E.D.Pa. 1999).

“[Peth] states that the income taxes are directed to taxable gain. Because he receives a paycheck for his labor, and because the paycheck is equal to the fair market value of his labor, he argues there is no gain. No court has ever accepted this argument for the purpose of determining taxable income. Indeed, it has always been rejected. FOR ONCE AND FOR ALL, WAGES ARE INCOME."

Talmage v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-114, aff’d 101 F.3d 695 (4th Cir. 1996).

“Petitioner submitted to the Internal Revenue Service documents purporting to be 1995 and 1996 Federal income tax returns. The documents reported petitioner’s compensation earned in each year and then deducted the equivalent amount as ‘Property (money) exchanged for property (labor not subject to tax).” ... The only dispute that petitioner raised with respect to the amounts of compensation IS HIS FRIVOLOUS ARGUMENTS THAT HIS WAGES ARE NOT TAXABLE. THESE ARGUMENTS, as petitioner was advised in the District Court order, citing United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 1986), HAVE BEEN CONSISTENTLY AND THOROUGHLY REJECTED AND MAY BE THE BASIS FOR SANCTIONS [MEANS "PENALTIES"].

Wheelis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2002-102, 2002 TNT 74-14, (sanctions of $10,000 imposed for frivolous arguments raised primarily for delay); aff’d 2003 TNT 108-7, No. 02-73119 (9th Cir. 5/16/2003).

“In effect, Ms. Sumter attempts to claim that the deduction (her total salary) was a necessary expense for the production of that same salary. She provides no support or credible justification for her untenable position. Ms. Sumter tries to cite case law in support of her “even exchange” argument; however, none of the cases she cites justify her position. In fact, the cases are contrary to her .position. [Discussion of cases omitted] Thus, courts have clearly rejected the “even exchange” argument, which erroneously asserts that no taxes are owed on employment wages, since the income from the services rendered was a fair market value and, therefore, no profit or gain occurred as a result of the work performed.”

Sumter v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 517, 518 (2004).

“[A] review of the pleadings indicates that Mr. Ledford bases his entitlement to this relief ON HIS VIEW THAT THE FEDERAL TAX CODE DOES NOT TAX COMPENSATION RECEIVED FOR PERSONAL LABOR. MR. LEDFORD'S VIEW OF THE TAX LAW IS MISTAKEN, AS THE TAX CODE PLAINLY DEFINES INCOME TO INCLUDE AMOUNTS RECEIVED IN COMPENSATION FOR SERVICES RENDERED. 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (2000) (“[G]ross income means all income from whatever source derived including (but not limited to) the following items: (1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions, fringe benefits, and similar items . . . .”). Indeed, every court that has considered the matter has found this argument to be wholly without merit -- so much so that merely raising it is considered sanctionable.”

Ledford v. United States, 297 F.3d 1378, 1381, 2002 TNT 153-6, No. 02-5027 (Fed. Cir. 8/6/2002).

See also, Brown v. U.S., 35 Fed. Cl. 258, 269 (1996) (explaining that Lonsdale v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 661 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1981) rejected the “even exchange” argument), aff’d, 105 F.3d 621 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g denied (1997); Granzow v. Commissioner, 739 F.2d 265, 267 (7th Cir. 1984).

The claim that “[w]ages, tips, and other compensation received for the performance of personal services ARE NOT TAXABLE INCOME or are offset by an equivalent deduction for the personal services rendered, including an argument that a taxpayer has a “claim of right” to exclude the cost or value of the taxpayer’s labor from income or that taxpayers have a basis in their labor equal to the fair market value of the wages they receive,” or similar arguments described as frivolous in Rev. Rul. 2004-29, 2004-12 I.R.B. 627, or Rev. Rul. 2007-19, 2007-14 I.R.B. 843, HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A "FRIVOLOUS POSITION" THAT CAN RESULT IN A PENALTY OF $5,000 WHEN ASSERTED IN A TAX RETURN OR INCLUDED IN CERTAIN COLLECTION-RELATED SUBMISSIONS. Notice 2007-30, 2007-14 I.R.B. 883.


Best Regards,

Snoop

 

[Cigarlover]

Just when I thought I was catching up. LOL.. Anyway, see the other thread. This debate is over now. I won and you provided the case law for my win. :).
Thank you.

 

[ZZZZZ]

now i'ma gona have to whatch that mooovie...shit my things 2 do list is ever ex-spanding

The young, silly Woody Allen is far superior to his latter day serious self.

 

[Cigarlover]

So building upon the Foster case

there is NO UNCERTAINTY as to the legislative purpose TO TAX POST-1913 CORPORATE EARNINGS. We must NOT give effect to any contrivance WHICH WOULD DEFEAT A TAX CONGRESS PLAINLY INTENDED TO IMPOSE. " [Foster v. U.S., 303 U.S. 118, 120-1 (1938)

it could not be more clear what the congressional intent was with the 16th.
You contention that all previous cases prior to the 16th became invalid because of the 16th is now invalid. In fact all of the case law you have presented between 1913 and this case in 1938 you now have to apply the definition in this case. So in other words you have to view the income tax exactly as I have described before. As a profit or gain separate from capital as it applies to corporations.
We now see why 96% of the people were not paying income taxes after the passage of the 16th. The 16th changed nothing for private citizens and any income taxes that congress wanted to collect from them still needed to be apportioned and even til this day, still needs to be apportioned.

Now that you understand the intent of the legislature you have to apply this to other cases you have cited. In doing so you see that many of those cases still make sense as long as you apply them to corporations.

It should also be clear that unless congress has passed some other amendment to bypass the apportionment clause in the constitution, that any case law purporting to apply to private citizens is wrong. So when I say the courts got it wrong in many cases, thats what I am referring to.

 

[Cigarlover]

Now we can see that many of my previous cases do indeed have merit. Time to stop listening to the tax honesty deniers Snoop.

“Hale v. Henkle, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) 201 U.S. 43, The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the state or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors to an investigation, so far as it may tend to criminate him. He owes no such duty to the state, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property. His rights are such as existed by the law of the land long antecedent to the organization of the state, and can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under a warrant of the law. He owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights.”

 

[Cigarlover]

Stapler v U.S., 21 F Supp 737 AT 739 (1937): "Income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment and the Revenue Act, means 'gain'... and in such connection 'Gain' means profit...proceeding from property, severed from capital, however invested or employed, and coming in, received, or drawn by the taxpayer, for his separate use, benefit and disposal... Income is not a wage or compensation for any type of labor."..... Helvering v Edison Bros. Stores, 133 F2d 575 (1943): "The Treasury cannot by interpretive regulations,
make income of that which is not income within the meaning of the revenue acts of Congress, nor can Congress, without apportionment, tax as income that which is not income within the meaning of the 16th Amendment."

 

[Cigarlover]

This was a case that you cited previously Snoop.
So in 1918, what was the common everyday meaning of income? Now apply Foster to this and you can see the error in this case.

The Supreme Court early established the principle that the word "income", as it is used in the Sixteenth Amendment, is to be construed according to its common, everyday meaning. In Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339, 344 (1918), the Court stated, "* * * Congress was at liberty under the [Sixteenth] Amendment to tax as income, without apportionment, everything that became income, in the ordinary sense of the word * * * ." Under this principle, the ordinary, and perhaps most common, meaning of "income" has been wages. Thus, when a coal company argued before the Supreme Court that the proceeds from its sale of ore, which it had dug from its properties, were the return of depleted capital, not income, the Court dismissed the argument, observing, "the same is true of the earnings of the human brain and hand when unaided by capital, yet such earnings are commonly dealt with in legislation as income." Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, * * * [231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913)]. This quote illustrates that whether or not wages can be characterized as the product of an exchange, they are still income within the Constitutional embrace.
Mr. Rice misconstrues the oft-cited phrase that income is "gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined" to mean that wages are not income. Wages are "derived" from labor or services in the sense that they cannot be gained without such labor. Although the wages received by Mr. Rice may represent no more than the time-value of his work, they are nonetheless the fruit of his labor, and therefore represent gain derived from labor which may be taxed as income.
Even if we were to agree with Mr. Rice's contention that wages are, in effect, an exchange of equal value for value, he would still be taxable upon the wages he and Mrs. Rice received in 1978. The general doctrine that 1122*1122 receipts representing a return of capital are not taxed does not apply when a taxpayer has a zero basis in the property he exchanged for the receipts. * * *[7]

 

[Cigarlover]

Keep the fundamentals of Foster in your mind and everything becomes clearer.

"What is or is not "income" within the meaning of the 16th Amendment must be determined in each case according to truth and substance, without regard to form.
Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, including profit gained through sale or conversion of capital.
Mere growth or increment of value in a capital investment is not income; income is essentially a gain or profit in itself of exchangeable value, proceeding from capital, severed from it, and derived or received by the taxpayer for his separate use, benefit and disposal." ~ Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)

Is it clear yet why 96% of people in the US did not pay an income tax even after the passage of the 16th? Back on page 1 here you will also see the revenue act of 1918. Very clear to read and understand as to whom the income tax is imposed on. It wasn't private citizens because congress couldn't impose a tax on private citizens without the use of the apportionment clause. Congress couldn't just impose an unapportioned tax on private citizens when the intent of the 16th was to tax corporate earnings. To do so would obviously be unconstitutional.

 

[Cigarlover]

Snoop, you can now go back to post 41 from the congress.gov website I cited in the other thread. Again, apply foster and it all becomes clear. Foster has it correct.

So now hopefully you can see, when you start with legislative intent, it all becomes clear.

 

[Cigarlover]

"Gain" is not the operation in the definition stated by SCOTUS;
"By 1921, the article was revised to reflect the Eisner v. Macomber decision. The definition of income parroted Macomber. Income was defined as "The gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets. T.D. 3146, 23 Treas. Dec. 358 (1921)" because the 16th amendment gives power to lay an "excise" tax due to the phrase "without apportionment". The operation is derived, an activity.
The form of this "deriving" is the crux.
The foundation of a "tax on income" is found in the August 1909 Revenue Act passed 3 weeks after the 16th Amendment was sent off to the States for ratification. This type of tax was declared a "Normal Tax" in the October 1913 legislation. It comes forward today by being imposed at 26 USC sections 1, 3, 11, 55, 1401, 3101, and 3201.
For taxing statutes to be legitimate there must be a "subject", a "measure" and a "statement of liability". In the above mentioned sections the "subject" is the "distinctive privilege" of "doing or carrying on of business in the corporate or quasi-corporate capacity." which, being granted as privilege, is an activity taxable by an excise tax. The "measure" is "income", being revenue via the corporate funnel (in the name of a State Created Entity), minus expenses and other applicable deductions. The statement of liability is upon "withholding agents" which were originally stamped as "president and treasurer and other officers having like duties".
This concept is buttressed by section 701 "The partnership [a defined term for a form of doing business] as such shall not be subject to the income tax imposed..." The term partnership comes from Flint v Stone Tracy being a "private firm" which like the "private individual" is immune from a "tax on income" aka "shall not be subject to the income tax imposed" because those "private people" cannot enjoy the "distinctive privilege" of carrying on business in the corporate capacity even though the "buying, selling and handling of goods" may be transacted in exactly the same fashion.
The definition of an individual Taxpayer antonym is "Nontaxpayer".as reiterated in note 3 of the Economy Plumbing and Heating case. paraphrased as: "A Nontaxpayer is not subject to pay personal income tax." See it all ties together once one seeks the foundation using the three pylons "subject", "measure" and "liability".

 

[Cigarlover]

Actually i see now that i did provide foster in my 1st post here.

Just when I thought I was catching up. LOL.. Anyway, see the other thread. This debate is over now. I won and you provided the case law for my win. :).
Thank you.

 

[snoop4truth]

So building upon the Foster case

it could not be more clear what the congressional intent was with the 16th.
You contention that all previous cases prior to the 16th became invalid because of the 16th is now invalid. In fact all of the case law you have presented between 1913 and this case in 1938 you now have to apply the definition in this case. So in other words you have to view the income tax exactly as I have described before. As a profit or gain separate from capital as it applies to corporations.
We now see why 96% of the people were not paying income taxes after the passage of the 16th. The 16th changed nothing for private citizens and any income taxes that congress wanted to collect from them still needed to be apportioned and even til this day, still needs to be apportioned.

Now that you understand the intent of the legislature you have to apply this to other cases you have cited. In doing so you see that many of those cases still make sense as long as you apply them to corporations.

It should also be clear that unless congress has passed some other amendment to bypass the apportionment clause in the constitution, that any case law purporting to apply to private citizens is wrong. So when I say the courts got it wrong in many cases, thats what I am referring to.

Hello Cigarlover,

YOUR COMMENT: I provided you the information you need on the 16th in post 41. You have your beliefs on it based on flawed case law that says anything that comes in is income derived. If you cant understand what derived means I can no longer help you. :)

MY RESPONSE: The case law is not flawed. You call the case law flawed because it does not carve out an exception which would exempt individuals from paying income taxes The case law would only be flawed if it did carve out an exception which would exempt individuals from paying income taxes. Playing word games with the word "derived" will not create an exception which would exempt individuals from paying income taxes;.

YOUR COMMENT: So building upon the Foster case

there is NO UNCERTAINTY as to the legislative purpose TO TAX POST-1913 CORPORATE EARNINGS. We must NOT give effect to any contrivance WHICH WOULD DEFEAT A TAX CONGRESS PLAINLY INTENDED TO IMPOSE. " [Foster v. U.S., 303 U.S. 118, 120-1 (1938)​

​

it could not be more clear what the congressional intent was with the 16th.

​

MY RESPONSE: It could not be more clear that Congress intended to impose an income tax BOTH individuals AND AND AND AND (NOT "OR") corporations with the sixteenth amendment. The Foster case reads as follows:

Petitioners' right (as executors) to an income tax refund depends upon whether a dividend paid by the Foster Lumber Company in 1930 is tax exempt as representing corporate earnings accumulated before March 1, 1913. This dividend is taxable under the Revenue Act of 1928[1] if paid from earnings accumulated after 1913. The Court of Claims found the dividend taxable.​

​

Foster v. U.S., 303 U.S. 118 (1938)


(BEGIN QUOTE)

SEVENTIETH CONGRESS. SESS. I. CH. 852. 1928. 791
CHAP. 852.-An Act To reduce and equalize taxation, provide revenue, and My 29,1928.
for other purposes. [Public, No. 562.]
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act,
divided into titles and sections according to the following Table
of Contents, may be cited as the "Revenue Act of 1928 ":​

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TITLE I-INCOME TAX

SUBTITLE A-INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS
Sec. 1 . Application of title.
Sec. 2. Cross references.
Sec. 3. Classification of provisions.
Sec. 4. Special classes of taxpayers.

SUBTITLE B-GENERAL PROVISIONS
PART I--RATES OF TAX
Sec. 11. normal tax ON INDIVIDUALS.
Sec. 12. surtax ON INDIVIDUALS.
Sec. 13. Tax on corporations.
Sec. 14. Taxable period embracing years with different laws.


PART II-COMPUTATION OF INCOME
Sec. 21. Net income.
Sec. 22. Gross income.
Sec. 23. Deductions from gross income.
Sec. 24. Items not deductible.
Sec. 25. Credits of INDIVIDUAL against income
Sec. 26. Credits of corporation against income

PART III-CREDITS AGAINST Tax
Sec. 31. Earned income credit.
Sec. 32. Taxes of foreign countries and possessions of United States.
Sec. 33. Taxes withheld at source.
Sec. 34. Erroneous payments.

PART IV-ACCOUNTING PERIODS AND METHODS OF ACCOUNTING
Sec. 41. General rule.
Sec. 42. Period in which items of gross income included.
Sec. 43. Period for which deductions and credits taken.
Sec. 44. Installment basis.
Sec. 45. Allocation of income and deductions.
Sec. 46. Change of accounting period.
Sec. 47. Returns for a period of less than twelve months.
Sec. 48. Definitions.

PART V-RETURNS AND PAYMENT OF TAX
Sec. 51. INDIVIDUAL returns.
Sec. 52. Corporation returns.
Sec. 53. Time and place for filing returns.
Sec. 54. Records and special returns.
Sec. 55. Publicity of returns.
Sec. 56. Payment of tax.
Sec. 57. Examination of return and determination of tax.
Sec. 58. Additions to tax and penalties.
Sec. 59. Administrative proceedings.

(END QUOTE)

THUS, IT COULD NOT BE MORE CLEAR THAT CONGRESS INTENDED TO TAX BOTH INDIVIDUALS AND CORPORATIONS, NOT ONE OR THE OTHER.


YOUR COMMENT: You contention that all previous cases prior to the 16th became invalid because of the 16th is now invalid.

MY RESPONSE: My contention was correct that the sixteenth amendment was passed to effectively overrule the holding in Pollock (that all direct taxes, including income taxes, must be apportioned). After the sixteenth amendment, this was no longer the case. The sixteenth amendment DID NOT CARVE OUT AN EXCEPTION THAT WOULD HAVE EXEMPTED INDIVIDUALS FROM PAYING INCOME TAXES. So, the sixteenth amendment applies to income taxes on BOTH individuals AND AND AND AND (NOT "OR") corporations.

YOUR COMMENT: In fact all of the case law you have presented between 1913 and this case in 1938 you now have to apply the definition in this case [referring to Foster above]. So in other words you have to view the income tax exactly as I have described before. As a profit or gain separate from capital as it applies to corporations.

MY RESPONSE: This tax protester argument has been shot down hundreds, if not thousands of times in the courts.

THE MYTH: The income tax applies ONLY to corporations.

As noted above, Congress enacted taxes on the incomes of corporations from manufacturing and other industries after the Supreme Court held in Pollock that an income tax on incomes from property was unconstitutional unless apportioned, and the Supreme Court held that those corporate excise taxes were constitutional. See, for example, Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911).

The cases which arose under those corporate tax cases necessarily developed a definition of “income” and, after the adoption of the 16th Amendment and the enactment of general income taxes on BOTH individuals AND AND AND AND (NOT "OR") corporations, courts continued to refer to those definitions of “income” under the corporate excise tax acts. This leads tax protesters to claim that “income” means only “corporate income,” which is ridiculous.

“As the cited cases, as well as many others, have made abundantly clear, the following arguments alluded to by the Lonsdales ARE COMPLETELY LACKING IN MERIT AND PATENTLY FRIVOLOUS: ... (4) THE SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT to the Constitution is either invalid or APPLIES ONLY TO CORPORATIONS....”​

Lonsdale v. United States, 919 F.2d 1440, 1448 (10th Cir. 1990).

“Plaintiff appears to argue that according to the Sixteenth Amendment, federal income tax is not a direct tax on wages or salaries of individuals, but that it is an excise tax on the privilege of engaging in some privileged or regulated activity. Therefore, according to plaintiff, this ‘indirect excise tax’ CAN ONLY BE IMPOSED ON THE INCOME OF CORPORATIONS and the dividend income of stockholders. Despite plaintiff’s many case citations allegedly supporting his argument, the Sixteenth Amendment, valid as described above, CLEARLY AUTHORIZES CONGRESS TO LEVY A DIRECT INCOME TAX ON INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE UNITED STATES CITIZENS [AND RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES].”​

​

Betz v. United States, 40 Fed.Cl. 286, 296 (1998)

“PLAINTIFF ARGUES 'INCOME' SHOULD BE INTERPRETED AS LIMITED TO CORPORATE ACTIVITIES, AND NOT INCLUDE WAGES. He relies on a series of Supreme Court cases rendered shortly after ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, and which define the scope of corporate income. NONE OF THOSE CASES, HOWEVER, STANDS FOR THE PROPOSITION THAT ONLY CORPORATE INCOME IS TAXABLE. TO THE CONTRARY, like Richards, supra, many of these cases state: “income may be defined as gain derived from capital, FROM LABOR, OR FROM BOTH COMBINED”. See, e.g., Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 174 (1926); Merchant’s Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 518 (1921); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1919); Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918); Stratton’s Independence. Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913) (emphasis added). In particular, in Southern Pacific Co. v,. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330, 333-34 (1918), THE SUPREME COURT QUOTED THE INCOME STATUTE AT THE TIME AS IMPOSING A TAX ON "EVERY PERSON RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES... " UPON THE ENTIRE NET INCOME ARISING AND ACCRUING FROM ALL SOURCES. Thus, the plain language of the authorities upon which Plaintiff relies belies his position.” Tornichio v. United States, 81 AFTR2d ¶98-582, KTC 1998-71 (N.D.Ohio 1998), (suit for refund of frivolous return penalties dismissed and sanctions imposed for filing a frivolous refund suit), aff’d 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 5248, 99-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶50,394, 83 AFTR2d ¶99-579, KTC 1999-147 (6th Cir. 1999). In affirming, the 6th Circuit stated that, “TORNICHIO'S LEGAL ASSERTIONS ARE PATENTLY SPURIOUS, AS IT CANNOT BE SERIOUSLY ARGUED THAT AN INDIVIDUAL'S TAXABLE INCOME IS BASED SOLELY ON CORPORATE ACTIVITIES, "and imposed additional sanctions for filing a frivolous appeal.​

​

Tornichio [v. United States, 81 AFTR2d ¶98-582, KTC 1998-71 (N.D.Ohio 1998), aff’d 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 5248, 99-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶50,394, 83 AFTR2d ¶99-579, KTC 1999-147 (6th Cir. 1999)], 1998 WL 381304, at *3 (citations omitted).

“[T]he frivolous argument that wages are not income ‘has been rejected so frequently that the very raising of it justifies the imposition of sanctions.’ Connor v. Commissioner, 770 F.2d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1985); Bey v. New York, 164 F.3d 617, 617 (2d Cir. 1998). Section 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code clearly defines gross income as ‘all income from WHATEVER source derived,’ WHICH INCLUDES WAGES, SALARIES, AND COMPENSATION FOR SERVICES. 26 U.S.C. section 61(a); 26 C.F.R. section 1,61-2(a). THE PLAINTIFFS ERRONEOUSLY RELY ON CASES THAT HAVE DEFINED THE SCOPE OF CORPORATE INCOME TO ARGUE THAT NON-CORPORATE INCOME IS NOT TAXABLE. 'TO THE CONTRARY... MANY OF THESE CASES STATE: "income may be defined as gain derived from capital, FROM LABOR, OR FROM BOTH COMBINED. " Tornichio [v. United States, 81 AFTR2d ¶98-582, KTC 1998-71 (N.D.Ohio 1998), aff’d 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 5248, 99-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶50,394, 83 AFTR2d ¶99-579, KTC 1999-147 (6th Cir. 1999)], 1998 WL 381304, at *3 (citations omitted). The plaintiffs’ claim that they are owed a refund because they had no tax liability for the years 1993 through 1996 is therefore foreclosed by well-established law.”​

Gavigan v. United States, 87 AFTR2d ¶2001-480, No. 3:99CV697 (DJS) (D.Conn. 11/30/2000), (suit for refund of frivolous return penalties dismissed).

“One of the bases for Plaintiff’s position is that he had no taxable income since “income” can ONLY be a derivative of corporate activity. THIS POSITION, HOWEVER, IS SIMPLY UNTENABLE AND DIRECTLY CONTRARY TO THE LAW.”​

Myrick v. United States of America, 217 F Supp 2d 979, 2002-2 US TaxCas 650,487, KTC 2002-457, aff’d Docket: 02-16428, KTC 2003-327 (9th Cir. 2003).​

​

See also, Rennie v. Internal Revenue Service, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1083 (E.D. Cal. 2002), (plaintiff’s “zero” return was frivolous when based on his argument that his wages were not derived from corporate activity); Olson v. United States, 760 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1985); Gattuso v. Pecorella, 733 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1984); Jones v. Commissioner, 338 F.3d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 2003).

The claim that “[O]NLY certain types of taxpayers are subject to income and employment taxes, SUCH AS... CORPORATIONS, ..., or similar arguments described as frivolous in Rev. Rul. 2006-18, 2006-15 IRB 743” has been identified by the IRS as a “frivolous position” that can result in a penalty of $5,000 when asserted in a tax return or included in certain collection-related submissions. Notice 2007-30, 2007-14 I.R.B. 883.​

​

​

YOUR COMMENT: We now see why 96% of the people were not paying income taxes after the passage of the 16th.

MY RESPONSE: Yes, we do. We see that shortly after the ratification of the sixteenth amendment, Congress only taxed the income of the rich and 96$% of Americans were not rich.

Congress re-adopted the income tax in 1913, levying a 1% tax ON NET PERSONAL INCOMES above $3,000 [ABOVE $78,931.52 IN TODAY'S DOLLARS], with a 6% surtax on incomes above $500,000. ​

​

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_taxation_in_the_United_States

https://www.in2013dollars.com/us/inflation/1913?amount=3000#:~:text=$3,000 in 1913 is equivalent in purchasing power,today, producing a cumulative price increase of 2,531.05%.

In the years following the ratification of the sixteenth amendment, ninety-six percent of Americans were not exempt from income taxes because "income taxes ONLY applied to corporations", INSTEAD, IN THE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THE SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT, NINETY-SIX PERCENT OF AMERICANS WERE EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAXES BECAUSE THEY EARNED LESS THAN $3,000 PER YEAR [OR $78,931.52 IN TODAY'S DOLLARS].


YOUR COMMENT: The 16th changed nothing for private citizens and any income taxes that congress wanted to collect from them still needed to be apportioned and even til this day, still needs to be apportioned.

MY RESPONSE: Not so. According to the Supreme Court (WHICH ACTUALLY USED THE RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IN REACHING ITS RESULT), the sixteenth amendment did away with the requirement of apportionment for BOTH individuals AND AND AND AND (NOT "OR") corporations.

YOUR COMMENT: Now that you understand the intent of the legislature you have to apply this to other cases you have cited. In doing so you see that many of those cases still make sense as long as you apply them to corporations.

MY RESPONSE: In determining the intent of Congress, THE FIRST RULE IS TO FOLLOW THE PLAIN LANGUAGE USED BY CONGRESS. That plain language is as follows:

Sixteenth Amendment
"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, WITHOUT APPORTIONMENT among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration."

https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/statutory_construction
THE RULES FOR DETERMINING LEGISLATIVE INTENT:
Overview
1). Any question of statutory interpretation BEGINS WITH LOOKING AT THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE to discover its original intent.
2). To discover a statute's original intent, COURTS FIRST LOOK TO THE WORDS OF THE STATUTE AND APPLY THEIR USUAL AND CUSTOMARY MEANING.
3). IF [AND ONLY IF] after looking at the language of the statute THE MEANING of the statute REMAINS UNCLEAR, courts attempt to ascertain the intent of the legislature BY LOOKING AT THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND OTHER SOURCES.


BUT, IN THE CASE OF THE SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT, THE WORDS OF CONGRESS ARE PERFECTLY CLEAR. THAT MEANS COURTS AND TAX PROTESTERS MAY NOT SEARCH ELSEWHERE FOR AN ALTERNATIVE LEGISLATIVE INTENT (LIKE CASE LAW ON CORPORATIONS).

(Continued)
4). Courts generally steer clear of any interpretation THAT WOULD CREATE AN ABSURD RESULT which the Legislature did not intend.
5). Because legislators may intend different things when they vote for a bill, statutory construction is often fairly difficult.
6). Statutes are sometimes ambiguous enough TO SUPPORT MORE THAN ONE INTERPRETATION. In these cases, courts are free to interpret statutes themselves [BUT SUCH IS NOT THE CASE HERE].
7). Once a court interprets the statute, other courts usually will not go through the exercise again, but rather will enforce the statute as interpreted by the other court, similar to stare decisis.

OTHER RULES FOR DETERMINING LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Rules Often Followed for Statutory Interpretation•
1). STATURES SHOULD BE INTERNALLY CONSISTENT. A particular section of the statute should not be inconsistent with the rest of the statute.•
2). When the legislature enumerates an exception to a rule, ONE CAN ASSUME THAT THERE ARE NO OTHER EXCEPTIONS.•
11). When the legislature includes limiting language in an earlier version of a statute, but deletes it, IT CAN BE PRESUMED THAT THE LIMITATION WAS NOT INTENDED. by the legislature.•
12). The legislature is presumed to act INTENTIONALLY AND PURPOSEFULLY when it includes language in one section but omits it in another.•
13). Where legislation and [PRIOR] case law [ON THE SAME SUBJECT] conflict, courts generally presume that legislation takes precedence over [THE PRIOR] case law.•
14). The Rule of Lenity: in construing an ambiguous [MEANS "UNCLEAR"] criminal statute, a court should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the defendant.•
15). A court may also look at: the common usage of a word, case law, dictionaries, parallel reasoning, punctuation


YOUR COMMENT: It should also be clear that unless congress has passed some other amendment to bypass the apportionment clause in the constitution,

MY RESPONSE: Not so. Congress has no reason to do TWICE what it has already done ONCE in the sixteenth amendment by authorizing Congress to lay and collect taxes on the income of BOTH individuals AND AND AND AND (NOT "OR") corporations "WITHOUT APPORTIONMENT".

YOUR COMMENT: that any case law purporting to apply to private citizens is wrong.

MY RESPONSE: Not so. Even if you and other tax protesters genuinely believe that the case law should have carved out an exception which would have exempted individuals from paying income taxes, such belief would not change the income tax law as it actually is (applying to BOTH individuals AND AND AND AND (NOR "OR") to corporations).

YOUR COMMENT: So when I say the courts got it wrong in many cases, that's what I am referring to.

MY RESPONSE: Even if you genuinely believe that the courts got it wrong in refusing to carve out an exception which would have exempted individuals from paying income taxes, the decisions of the courts remain the law until they are reversed. And, this will never happen because carving out such an exception is inconsistent with the intent of Congress.

Best Regards,

Snoop

 

[snoop4truth]

Snoop wants us to believe we are all slaves and only congress can tell us how much of our labor we can keep. I simply don't buy that argument as it's unconstitutional. Slavery was abolished.

Hello Cigarlover,

YOUR COMMENT: Snoop wants us to believe we are all slaves and only congress can tell us how much of our labor we can keep. I simply don't buy that argument as it's unconstitutional. Slavery was abolished.

MY RESPONSE: Pretending that paying income taxes and slavery are the same thing has failed hundreds if not thousands of times in court.

THE MYTH: Income taxes are prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment.

The Thirteen Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, ratified after the Civil War, states in Section 1:

“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”​

​

It is an insult to every person of African descent to compare the income tax, paid by citizens who are free to work (or not work) for whomever they please and for whatever compensation they are able to negotiate, to the slavery that was imposed on the Africans that were kidnapped and brought to this country in chains, and who (and whose descendants, for more than 100 years) were bought and sold, forced to work back-breaking labor, whipped or beaten, and occasionally murdered.

And the courts have recognized that TAXATION IS NOT A FORM OF SLAVERY.

“If the requirements of the tax laws were to be classed as servitude, they would not be the kind of involuntary servitude referred to in the Thirteenth Amendment.”​

Porth v. Brodrick, 214 F.2d 925, 926 (10th Cir. 1954).

“The specification, that the act violates the Thirteenth Amendment by imposing involuntary servitude upon an employer of domestic servants, seems to us far-fetched, indeed frivolous.”​

​

Abney v. Campbell, 206 F.2d 836, 841 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. den. 346 U.S. 924 (1954). See also, Peeples v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-584, aff’d 829 F.2d 1120 (4th Cir. 1987); Beltran v. Cohen, 303 F.Supp. 889, 893 (N.D.Calif. 1969); Ginter v. Southern, 611 F.2d 1226 (8th Cir. 1979); Wilbert v. Internal Revenue Service (In re Wilbert), 262 B.R. 571, 578, 88 A.F.T.R.2d 6650 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2001).

​

A taxpayer who fails to comply with the tax laws claiming that the Internal Revenue Code violates the Thirteenth Amendment may be assessed a 20 percent penalty under section 6662 for “negligence or disregard of rules or regulations."​

David Anthony Avery v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-418 (1999).

The Internal Revenue Service has therefore ruled that the argument that the federal income tax constitutes “involuntary servitude” is frivolous and that persons failing to file returns or pay taxes based on that argument may face civil and criminal penalties. ​

Rev. Rul. 2005-19, 2005-14 I.R.B. 819.

The claim that “[m]andatory or compelled compliance with the internal revenue laws is a form of involuntary servitude prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment” has been identified by the IRS as a “frivolous position” that can result in a penalty of $5,000 when asserted in a tax return or included in certain collection-related submissions. ​

Notice 2007-30, 2007-14 I.R.B. 883.

Best Regards,

Snoop

 

[snoop4truth]

https://givemeliberty.org/features/taxes/usatoday.htm

Re: Proposition #2

Juries have been acquitting defendants in failure-to-file income tax return cases due to lack of demonstrable evidence that there is any law or regulation that requires it.
An increasing number of employers have stopped withholding taxes from their workers, and stopped filing W-2s and 1099s for the same reason.
Unless one is a foreigner working in the U.S., or a U.S. citizen earning money abroad, one is not liable for the federal income tax.
The OMB Number on Form 1040 is cross-referenced in the Code of Federal Regulations to the section covering taxes by resident aliens, which, therefore, doesn't apply to most Americans.
Responding to an inquiry by a constituent who was a tax consultant, Sen. Daniel Inouye told him that based on research performed by the Congressional Research Service, no provision of the Internal Revenue Code requires an individual to pay income taxes. He then went on to warn that Section 7201 sets forth numerous penalties for not paying income taxes owed. However -
The failure-to-file law applies to alcohol-tobacco-firearms taxes, (Section 7201), not to income taxes, and convictions are based on the mis-application of the alcohol-tobacco- firearm regulations.
No law requires employees to provide a Social Security Number to an employer, nor for an employer to demand one from an employee.
Re: Proposition #3

The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that the filing of an income tax return (Form 1040) and the information on the 1040 is not compelled, and, therefore, the principle that no one may be forced to waive their 5th amendment rights in order to comply with a law is not applicable to federal income tax returns.

Hello Cigarlover,

YOUR POST: https://givemeliberty.org/features/taxes/usatoday.htm

Re: Proposition #2

Juries have been acquitting defendants in failure-to-file income tax return cases due to lack of demonstrable evidence that there is any law or regulation that requires it.

MY RESPONSE: THIS IS A LIE! In willful failure to file cases, the government has to prove that the defendant's failure to file WAS "WILLFUL". The courts have defined "WILLFULNESS" for such purposes as "WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE THAT INCOME TAXES WERE OWED". So, if the defense proves to the jury that the defendant MISTAKENLY BELIEVED THAT NO INCOME TAXES WERE OWED, the jury is required to acquit the defendant of the criminal charges.

BUT, THE DEFENDANT WILL STILL BE CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THOSE INCOME TAXES AND WILL BE FORCED TO PAY THEM ANYWAY, AS PROVEN BY THE TOMMY CRYER CASE WHICH WAS DECIDED AFTER HIS DEATH.

THE MYTH: Nothing in the Internal Revenue Code makes an ordinary citizen liable for the income tax.

Tax protesters claim that, before anyone can be liable for a tax, there must be a statute that specifically says that the person is liable for the tax (and must use the word “liable”). However, that is not what the law requires.

In its various subsections, section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code says that

“There is hereby imposed on the taxable income of every [married individual, surviving spouse, head of a household, unmarried individual, or married individual filing a separate return] a tax determined in accordance with the following table.. ..”​

​

As explained in the regulations:

“Section 1 of the Code imposes an income tax on the income of every individual who is a citizen or resident of the United States ....”​

​

Treas. Reg. § 1.1-1(a)(1).

The word “impose” means “to establish or apply as compulsory; levy.” So how can a tax be “imposed” if no one is compelled to pay it? The answer is that it can’t. If a tax is imposed on a person’s income, then that person is liable for the tax as a matter of law.

In a bankruptcy dispute over the allowance of interest on unpaid taxes as a claim against the estate of the bankrupt, the Supreme Court stated the self-evident proposition that:

“The imposition of a tax is certainly a function of government and creates an obligation....”​

​

U.S. v. Childs, 266 U.S. 304 (1924).

Also, I.R.C. section 6151 directs that any person required to file a return “shall, without assessment or notice and demand from the Secretary, pay such tax to the internal revenue officer with whom the return is filed, and shall pay such tax at the time and place fixed for filing the return.”

The words “shall ... pay” certainly look like an obligation to pay, and the Supreme Court has held that the United States may enforce a stamp tax through a suit to collect the amount of the tax from the person required to pay the tax, even though the statute did not impose any personal liability for the tax, stating:

“When a statute says that a person SHALL PAY A GIVEN TAX, it obviously imposes upon that person THE DUTY TO PAY...”​

​

U.S. v. Chamberlin, 219 US 250 (1910).

As explained below, the obligation to file a return is established by I.R.C. section 6012. A person having more than a stated minimum of income is required to file a return and, according to section 6151, IS REQUIRED TO PAY THE TAX SHOWN ON THE REPORT.

So what have the courts said about the claim that there is no one liable for the tax imposed on their incomes?

“The payment of income taxes is not optional ... and the average citizen knows that payment of income taxes is legally required.”​

​

Schiff v. United States, 919 F.2d 830, 834 (2nd Cir. 1990).

“Purportedly in support of his claim, plaintiff submitted a statement along with the Form 1040, in which he argues that no provision of the IRC establishes an income tax ‘liability.’ The plain language of the IRC, however, belies this assertion, stating in section 1 that a tax is ‘hereby IMPOSED on the taxable income of every individual’ (emphasis added). Although plaintiff attempts to distinguish between ‘imposing’ a tax and creating a ‘liability’ for a tax, there is no difference. EVERY INDIVIDUAL HAS AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO PAY TAXES.​

​

Porcaro v. United States, 84 AFTR2d ¶99-5547, No. 99-CV-60406-AA (U.S.D.C. E.D. Mich. October 25, 1999).

“Sasscer makes the puzzling argument that section 1461 is the only provision in the Internal Revenue Code that imposes liability for payment of a tax on ‘income.’ Without belaboring the issue, the Court notes that 26 U.S.C. section 1 could hardly be more clear IN IMPOSING A TAX ON INCOME.’”​

​

United States v. Sasscer, 86 AFTR2d ¶2000-5317, n. 3, 2000 TNT 186-76, No. Y-97-3026 (D.C. Md. 8/25/2000).

“Plaintiff’s arguments are no less frivolous here. [Footnote omitted.] First, Plaintiff argues the Code does not impose a tax ‘liability’. The plain language of the Code belies this, stating the tax is ‘imposed’. See 96 [sic] U.S.C. section 1. He attempts to distinguish between ‘imposing’ a tax and creating a ‘liability’ for tax. The Court fails to see a difference. INDIVIDUALS HAVE AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO PAY TAXES. ​

​

Tornichio v. United States, 81 AFTR2d ¶98-582, KTC 1998-71 (N.D.Ohio 1998), (suit for refund of frivolous return penalties dismissed and sanctions imposed for filing a frivolous refund suit), aff’d 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 5248, 99-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶50,394, 83 AFTR2d ¶99-579, KTC 1999-147 (6th Cir. 1999), (with sanctions imposed for filing a frivolous appeal).

“Appellants’ argument that the Internal Revenue Code does not define income or impose income tax liability on individuals is also meritless. 26 U.S.C. SECTION 1 CLEARLY IMPOSES INCOME TAX LIABILITY ON INDIVIDUALS.”​

​

Liddane v. Commissioner, KTC 2000-28, No. 99-5499 (3d Cir. 1/14/2000), aff’ng T.C. Memo 1999-330 (referring to “the same partially incomprehensible but thoroughly frivolous arguments that they are not liable for Federal income taxes,” the Tax Court imposed sanctions of $10,000 for each docketed case for filing frivolous petitions).

“As the cited cases, as well as many others, have made abundantly clear, THE FOLLOWING ARGUMENTS alluded to by the Lonsdales ARE COMPLETELY LACKING IN LEGAL MERIT AND PATENTLY FRIVOLOUS: ... (7) NO STATUTORY AUTHORITY EXISTS FOR IMPOSING AN INCOME TAX ON INDIVIDUALS....”​

​

Lonsdale v. United States, 919 F.2d 1440, 1448 (10th Cir. 1990).

“The Plaintiffs further assert, in their Reply Memorandum dated September 12, 2005, that the ‘IRS has repeatedly refused to show [Plaintiffs] where in the [Internal Revenue] Code it makes [Plaintiffs] “liable for” the tax they claim is owed.’ Plfs.’ Reply at p. 7. The Plaintiffs allege that it is ‘abundantly unclear’ what the term taxpayer, as used throughout the IRC, means, and state that ‘when [the United States] can show where [Plaintiffs are] ‘subject to” or “liable for” a so-called tax, at that point [Plaintiff] will gladly pay the tax.’ Id. At 4, 10. However, the Government does not have the burden of showing the Plaintiffs ‘where’ they are ‘subject’ or ‘liable for’ the tax before the tax is paid. The comprehensive administrative enforcement scheme and judicial review process with which the Government is required to proceed under the IRS code is well established and none of it requires the Government to answer the Plaintiffs’ philosophical questions regarding the tax system. For a clear explanation of ‘where in the law subjects the Plaintiffs to tax,’ the court directs the Plaintiffs’ attention to Amendment XVI of the Constitution and the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 1, which is entitled ‘Tax Imposed.’”​

​

Celauro v. United States, 411 F. Supp. 2D 257, 269, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3147, 2006-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P50,168, 97 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 761, No. 05-cv-02245-ADS-WDW (U.S.D.C. E.D. N.Y. 1/28/2006).

See also, United States v. Moore, 692 F.2d 95 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Slater, 545 F.Supp. 179 (Del. 1982).

An attorney named Thomas J. Carley argued before the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that “[n]owhere in any of the Statutes of the United States is there any section of law making any individual liable to pay a tax or excise on ‘taxable income.’” The Second Circuit responded that “Section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C.) (hereinafter the Code) provides in plain, clear and precise language that ‘[t]here is hereby imposed the taxable income of every individual ... a tax determined in accordance with’ tables set-out later in the statute. ... Despite the appellant’s attempted contorted construction of the statutory scheme, we find that it coherently and forthrightly imposed upon the appellant tax upon his income for the year 1980.” Ficalora v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 751 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. den. 471 U.S. 1005 (1985).

Oddly enough, the same attorney raised nearly the identical argument before the Eighth Circuit, arguing that there was “no law imposing an income tax” on his clients. The Eighth Circuit held that the appeal was “frivolous” and imposed a penalty on the appellants of double the Commissioner’s costs of the appeal. Lively v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 705 F.2d 1017, 1018 (8th Cir. 1983).

Even more incredibly, only a year after losing the Lively appeal, and six months after losing the Ficalora appeal, the same attorney, Thomas J. Carley, raises the same idiot issue with the 10th Circuit, questioning “Whether there is any law or statute imposing an income tax on appellants for the year 1977 and, if such a law or statute is claimed to exist, what is the precise citation of such law or statute?” The 10th Circuit quoted from both the Ficalora and Lively opinions in answer to his question, and then spent the rest of the opinion explaining why it was going to impose sanctions on Mr. Carley personally (not his clients).

“It is obvious that despite having full knowledge of the learned opinions of two different Article III courts and the accurate reasoning of the Tax Court in Manley [v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 46 T.C.M. 1359 (1983), another case lost by Mr. Carley)] concerning his arguments, Carley has failed to learn that he has no right to occupy the time of such courts with frivolous, unreasonable and vexatious proceedings, and that if he does so, he exposes not only his clients but also himself personally to sanctions.”​

​

Charczuk v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 771 F.2d 471, 474 (10th Cir. 1985).

The court also referred to Mr. Carley’s arguments as “meritless,” “preposterous,” “nearly silly,” and “thoroughly defy[ing] common sense.”

As silly as this claim might be, the IRS has publicly refuted it.

“The requirement to file an income tax return is explicitly stated in sections 6011(a), 6012(a), and 6072(a) [of the Internal Revenue Code] and corresponding Treasury Regulations. In addition, section 6151 requires taxpayers to submit payment of their taxes with their tax returns. Under these provisions of the Code, any taxpayer who has received more than a statutorily determined amount of gross income during the tax year is required to file a return for the year and pay tax on the income.”​

​

Rev. Rul. 2007-20, 2007-14 IRB 863, 864.

And so the claim that “Nothing in the Internal Revenue Code imposes a requirement to file a return or pay tax” has been identified by the IRS as a “frivolous position” that can result in a penalty of $5,000 when asserted in a tax return or included in certain collection-related submissions. Notice 2007-30, 2007-14 I.R.B. 883.



YOUR POST: An increasing number of employers have stopped withholding taxes from their workers, and stopped filing W-2s and 1099s for the same reason. Unless one is a foreigner working in the U.S., or a U.S. citizen earning money abroad, one is not liable for the federal income tax.

MY RESPONSE: Not so. Chapter 1 of Title 26 U.S.C. imposes an income tax of all "CITIZENS OR RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES", not just foreigners working in the U.S., or a U.S. citizen earning money abroad.

THE MYTH: The income tax only applies to the domestic income of nonresident aliens.

This whacky notion seems to be based on entirely on a document published by the Internal Revenue Service in 1916. In Treasury Decision 2313, issued less than three months after the Supreme Court had upheld the constitutionality of the income tax enacted in 1913, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued a direction to collectors of internal revenue to ALSO COLLECT INCOME TAX on dividends and interest paid by domestic corporations to nonresident aliens, stating (in relevant part):

“Under the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railway Co., decided January 24, 1916, it is hereby held that income accruing to nonresident aliens in the form of interest from the bonds and dividends on the stock of domestic corporations is subject to the income tax imposed by the act of October 3, 1913.”​

From this, tax protesters FALSELY concluded that Frank R. Brushaber (the plaintiff in the Brushaber decision) was a nonresident alien, or was an agent for nonresident aliens. But the opinion of the District Court clearly states that Brushaber was a citizen and resident of New York, and there is nothing in the District Court or Supreme Court opinions or records to suggest that Brushaber was acting for anyone other than himself.

In Treasury Decision 2313, all that the Commissioner was saying is that the income tax is constitutional, and now we are ALSO going to start collecting the tax from nonresident aliens as well citizens or residents. There is nothing in that Treasury Decision, or any other announcement of the government before or since, to suggest that the income tax should not be collected from citizens or residents of the United States.

Furthermore, even if the Commissioner intended to announce that the federal income tax applied only to nonresident aliens, that announcement could not change the purpose or effect of the statutes enacted by Congress, which clearly apply to every citizen or resident of the United States.

The claim that “United States citizens and residents are not subject to tax on their wages or other income derived from sources within the United States, as only foreign based income or income received by nonresident aliens and foreign corporations from sources within the United States is taxable, and similar arguments described as frivolous in Rev. Rul. 2004-30, 2004-1 C.B. 622” has been identified by the IRS as a “frivolous position” that can result in a penalty of $5,000 when asserted in a tax return or included in certain collection-related submissions. Notice 2007-30, 2007-14 I.R.B. 883.

YOUR POST: The OMB Number on Form 1040 is cross-referenced in the Code of Federal Regulations to the section covering taxes by resident aliens, which, therefore, doesn't apply to most Americans.

MY RESPONSE: Not so. Chapter 1 of Title 26 U.S.C. imposes an income tax of all "CITIZENS OR RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES"

AND AND AND AND (NOT "OR")

Chapter 3 of Title 26 U.S.C. ALSO ALSO ALSO ALSO imposes an income tax on "ALL PERSONS" receiving income on behalf of a "NONRESIDENT ALIEN OR FOREIGN CORPORATION".

The fact that income tax liability is imposed ON BOTH TYPES OF PERSONS does not exempt "CITIZENS OR RESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES" of income tax liability under Chapter 1.


YOUR POST: Responding to an inquiry by a constituent who was a tax consultant, Sen. Daniel Inouye told him that based on research performed by the Congressional Research Service, no provision of the Internal Revenue Code requires an individual to pay income taxes.

MY RESPONSE: Regardless of what this alleged Sen. Daniel Inouye allegedly told this alleged "constituent," Chapter 1 of Title 26 U.S.C. imposes an income tax of all "CITIZENS OR RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES".

YOUR POST: He then went on to warn that Section 7201 sets forth numerous penalties for not paying income taxes owed. However -The failure-to-file law applies to alcohol-tobacco-firearms taxes, (Section 7201), not to income taxes, and convictions are based on the mis-application of the alcohol-tobacco- firearm regulations.

MY RESPONSE: Section 7201 may not be the problem.

Believing that the income tax is unconstitutional or invalid is not a crime, and neither is publishing misinformation about the federal income tax. As one court so aptly put it:

“The government may not prohibit the holding of these beliefs, BUT IT MAY PENALIZE PEOPLE WHO ACT ON THEM.”​

​

Coleman v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68, 69 (7th Cir. 1986).


But acting on tax protester beliefs by filing false or frivolous returns, or by failing to file any return at all, can be penalized and the cases against tax protesters usually include one or more of the following civil or criminal penalties:

A failure to file an income tax return when due, or a failure to pay the tax when due, results in a civil penalty of 5% per month(not to exceed a total of 25%). I.R.C. section 6651. It has also been held that a frivolous return (see below) is not be a “return” within the meaning of the tax law, and so the tax protester can end up having to pay penalties for failing to file a return in addition to the penalty for filing a frivolous return (described below).

A willful failure to file an income tax return is a crime punishable a fine of not more than $25,000 and imprisonment of not more than one year, or both. I.R.C. section 7203. This criminal penalty is in addition to the civil penalty under section 6651.

Before 2007, I.R.C. section 6702 allowed the IRS to impose a$500 civil penalty against any individual who files a return which is incorrect on its face, or from which a tax cannot be calculated,if the return is based on “a position which is frivolous.” or a desire to impede the administration of the federal income tax.This penalty was often imposed against tax protesters who file returns with that are blank, contain nothing but zeroes, contain frivolous claims regarding what is “income,” or are not signed under penalties of perjury. Section 407 of Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, 120 Stat. 2922 (2006),amended section 6702 to increase the amount of the penalty for frivolous tax returns from $500 to $5,000 and to impose a penalty of$5,000 on any person who submits a “specified frivolous submission” in connection with a collection due process hearing under section 6320 or 6330 or an application an installment agreement (section 6159), offer in compromise (section 7122), or taxpayer assistance order (section 7811). However, the IRS must publish a list of the positions that are “frivolous” in order to impose the penalty, and the IRS published the first list in Notice 2007-30, 2007-14 I.R.B. 883.

I.R.C. section 6653(a) imposes a penalty of five percent of any underpayment of tax due to “careless, reckless, or intentional disregard” of rules or regulations.

I.R.C. section 6653(b) allows the IRS to assess a civil penalty of 75% of any underpayment of tax due to fraud. If there is a fraud penalty imposed, then there is no penalty for negligence(section 6653(a)) or failure to file or pay (section 6651).

I.R.C. section 6673 allows the Tax Court to assess damages of up to $25,000 against taxpayers who file petitions in Tax Court that are “frivolous or groundless.” All of the arguments described in this FAQ have been described as “frivolous or groundless” by the Tax Court, resulting in penalties against tax protesters.

A willful attempt to evade the income tax is a crime punishable a fine of not more than $100,000 and imprisonment of not more than five years, or both. I.R.C. section 7201. This criminal penalty is in addition to the civil penalty for fraud under section 6653(b).

These penalties are all in addition to the interest that will be imposed on underpayments of tax, and there is also interest on the penalties once the penalty has been assessed.


YOUR POST: No law requires employees to provide a Social Security Number to an employer, nor for an employer to demand one from an employee.

MY RESPONSE: This is another lie. https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4158089263900190963&q="provide+a+social+security+number"+"Income+taxes"+&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=40006

Under federal law, employers are required to withhold certain income taxes and social security taxes and make a report as to each individual employee to the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). THESE REPORTS REQUIRE IDENTIFICATION OF THE EMPLOYEE BY THE EMPLOYEE'S SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER. See 26 U.S.C. § 6109, 26 C.F.R. § 301.6011(b)-2, 301.6109-1; see also Weber v. Leaseway Dedicated Logistics, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1222 (D. Kan. 1998), aff'd by 166 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting "the IRS requires every employee to have a social security number"). Both employees and employers are subject to potential penalties from the IRS for not reporting employees' social security numbers. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6721, 6722, and 6723.​

​

Hill v. PROMISE HOSPITAL OF PHOENIX, INC., Dist. Court, D. Arizona 2010

(BEGIN QUOTE)

26 U.S. Code § 6109 - Identifying numbers

(a) Supplying of identifying numbers
When required by regulations prescribed by the Secretary 1) Inclusion in returns
Any person required under the authority of this title to make a return, statement, or other document shall include in such return, statement, or other document such identifying number as may be prescribed for securing proper identification of such person.
... .
For purposes of paragraphs (1)... THE IDENTIFYING NUMBER OF AN INDIVIDUAL (OR HIS ESTATE) SHALL BE SUCH INDIVIDUAL'S SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT NUMBER.

(END QUOTE)

YOUR POST: Re: Proposition #3

The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that the filing of an income tax return (Form 1040) and the information on the 1040 is not compelled, and, therefore, the principle that no one may be forced to waive their 5th amendment rights in order to comply with a law is not applicable to federal income tax returns

MY RESPONSE: This claim is another lie. If this claim had actually been true, then the author would have provided the case name and court name and provided a link to it. But, the author did none of this, because this claim is a lie.

THE MYTH: You cannot be required to file an income tax return because a tax return is a form of testimony and the 5th Amendment guarantees that you cannot be compelled to testify against yourself.

The 5th Amendment applies to criminal proceedings, not civil proceedings, and collecting taxes is a civil proceeding, not a criminal proceeding. You cannot refuse to file an income tax return because of the 5th Amendment.

The 5th Amendment states (in part) that “No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself....” However, you can be compelled to testify against yourself in a civil case. For example, O.J. Simpson could not be compelled to testify in the criminal case against him, so he never took the witness stand during his murder trial. But in the civil action brought against him by the Goldman family for the same murders, he was called to the stand by the Goldman family, required to testify, and found financially liable for the killings.

Because the 5th Amendment does not apply to civil liabilities, the courts have consistently ruled that you cannot refuse to file an income tax return by reason of the 5th Amendment.

In Sullivan v. United States, 274 U.S. 259 (1927), rev’g 15 F.2d 809, the defendant had earned illegal profits from the sale of alcohol (during Prohibition), failed to file an income tax return reporting the illegal profits, and was convicted of willfully failing to file an income tax return. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that to require a return on illegally earned income would be a violation of the 5th Amendment, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that illegally earned income is still taxable, and that:​

​

“As the defendant’s income was taxed, the statute of course required a return. [Citation omitted.] In the decision [by the lower court] that this was contrary to the Constitution we are of opinion that the protection of the Fifth Amendment was pressed too far. If the form of return provided called for answers that the defendant was privileged from making he could have raised the objection in the return, but could not on that account refuse to make any return at all. We are not called on to decide what, if anything, he might have withheld. Most of the items warranted no complaint. It would be an extreme if not an extravagant application of the Fifth Amendment to say that it authorized a man to refuse to state the amount of his income because it had been made in crime. But if the defendant desired to test that or any other point he should have tested it in the return so that it could be passed upon. He could not draw a conjurer’s circle around the whole matter by his own declaration that to write any word upon the government blank would bring him into danger of the law.”​

​

Sullivan v. United States, 274 U.S. 259, 263-264 (1927).

Federal courts have since followed the Sullivan decision in holding that the 5th Amendment does not allow a taxpayer to refuse to file a return:

“The statutory requirement to file an income tax return does not violate a taxpayer’s right against self-incrimination.”​

​

United States v. MacLeod, 436 F.2d 947, 951 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. den. 402 U.S. 907 (1971).

“It is well settled that the Fifth Amendment general objection [to filing a proper tax return] is not a valid claim of the constitutional privilege.”​

Betz v. United States, 753 F.2d 834, 835 (10th Cir. 1985)

“The Fifth Amendment does not serve as a defense for failing to make any tax return....”​

​

United States v. Stillhammer, 706 F.2d 1072, 1076-77 (10th Cir. 1983)

“t is an illegal effort to stretch the Fifth Amendment to include a taxpayer who wishes to avoid filing a return.”​

United States v. Brown, 600 F.2d 248, 251-52 (10th Cir. 1979)

“t is well established that the Fifth Amendment cannot be stretched so far as to absolve a taxpayer’s duty to file a return.”​

United States v. Irwin, 561 F.2d 198, 201 (10th Cir. 1977)

“Plaintiff next argues the filing of a return violates his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. [Footnote omitted.] He relies on Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 649 (1976). There, the Court held one may invoke the Fifth Amendment as to tax returns that would incriminate one for specific non-tax crimes, provided the privilege was claimed on the return. It does not stand for the proposition that the Fifth Amendment provides general protection against filing tax returns. Indeed, the Court reiterated the long-standing principle that the Fifth Amendment is not a defense to filing a return at all. Id. at 650, citing, United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927). In Brennan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 752 F.2d 187, 189 (6th Cir. 1985), the Sixth Circuit held the blanket assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege as to tax returns is a “frivolous position””​

​

Tornichio v. United States, 81 AFTR2d ¶98-582, KTC 1998-71 (N.D.Ohio 1998), (suit for refund of frivolous return penalties dismissed and sanctions imposed for filing a frivolous refund suit), aff’d 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 5248, 99-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶50,394, 83 AFTR2d ¶99-579, KTC 1999-147 (6th Cir. 1999), (with sanctions imposed for filing a frivolous appeal).

“Plaintiffs provided no information on the numbered lines of their 1982 Form 1040 and provided wage and tax statements for 1980 instead of those for 1982. They claim that the government compelling them to provide the information requested on the form violates their right against self-incrimination guaranteed by the fifth amendment. This claim likewise is without merit. ... “The Supreme Court has held that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination can be invoked only where an individual ‘is confronted by substantial and “real,” and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination.’ Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53, 88 S. Ct. 697, 19 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). See also United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 128, 63 L. Ed. 2d 250, 100 S. Ct. 948 (1980). The Eighth Circuit has also specifically held that the privilege does not excuse a taxpayer’s blanket refusal to answer any questions on his tax return relating to income without some reasonable showing as to how such disclosure could possibly incriminate him. United States v. Daly, 481 F.2d 28 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1064, 38 L. Ed. 2d 469, 94 S. Ct. 571 (1973). Plaintiffs’ purely hypothetical claim does not meet this standard and thus has no basis in law. As such, it is not a valid fifth amendment claim at all and is among those positions taken by tax protestors that have long been labeled ‘frivolous’ by the courts.”​

​

House v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 139, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24565, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ¶9745, 54 AFTR2d ¶5903 (D.C. W.D.Mich. 1984).

See also, United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. den. 447 U.S. 925; Parker v. Commissioner, 724 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Daly, 481 F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. den. 414 U.S. 164 (1973); Ueckert v. Commissioner, 721 F.2d 248, 250 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Porth, 426 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. den. 400 U.S. 824; Boomer v. United States, 755 R2d 696, 697 (8th Cir. 1985).


There are some consequences to claiming the 5th Amendment privilege that tax litigants sometimes overlook.

In enacting an assessable penalty for “frivolous income tax returns,” I.R.C. section 6702, Congress specifically identified 5th Amendment arguments as “frivolous” arguments, and courts have upheld fines against tax protesters who have failed to file income tax returns on 5th Amendment grounds.

In Rev. Rul. 2005-19, 2005-14 I.R.B. 819, the IRS confirmed that refusing to file a federal income tax return based on a claim of 5th Amendment privilege is “frivolous” and can result in civil and criminal penalties.

The claim that “[t]he Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination grants taxpayers the right not to file returns or the right to withhold all financial information” has been identified by the IRS as a “frivolous position” that can result in a penalty of $5,000 when asserted in a tax return or included in certain collection-related submissions. Notice 2007-30, 2007-14 I.R.B. 883.

Best Regards,

Snoop

 

[chieftain]

That doesn't actually answer the question. In the US, if not a single vote was cast anywhere in the land, these people would still be presented to the country as "the government". So keeping that in mind, where would their claim to authority come from?

Remember, even if you don't vote, the system still wants you to comply.

Have you considered my question Snoop?

 

[snoop4truth]

"Gain" is not the operation in the definition stated by SCOTUS;
"By 1921, the article was revised to reflect the Eisner v. Macomber decision. The definition of income parroted Macomber. Income was defined as "The gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets. T.D. 3146, 23 Treas. Dec. 358 (1921)" because the 16th amendment gives power to lay an "excise" tax due to the phrase "without apportionment". The operation is derived, an activity.
The form of this "deriving" is the crux.
The foundation of a "tax on income" is found in the August 1909 Revenue Act passed 3 weeks after the 16th Amendment was sent off to the States for ratification. This type of tax was declared a "Normal Tax" in the October 1913 legislation. It comes forward today by being imposed at 26 USC sections 1, 3, 11, 55, 1401, 3101, and 3201.
For taxing statutes to be legitimate there must be a "subject", a "measure" and a "statement of liability". In the above mentioned sections the "subject" is the "distinctive privilege" of "doing or carrying on of business in the corporate or quasi-corporate capacity." which, being granted as privilege, is an activity taxable by an excise tax. The "measure" is "income", being revenue via the corporate funnel (in the name of a State Created Entity), minus expenses and other applicable deductions. The statement of liability is upon "withholding agents" which were originally stamped as "president and treasurer and other officers having like duties".
This concept is buttressed by section 701 "The partnership [a defined term for a form of doing business] as such shall not be subject to the income tax imposed..." The term partnership comes from Flint v Stone Tracy being a "private firm" which like the "private individual" is immune from a "tax on income" aka "shall not be subject to the income tax imposed" because those "private people" cannot enjoy the "distinctive privilege" of carrying on business in the corporate capacity even though the "buying, selling and handling of goods" may be transacted in exactly the same fashion.
The definition of an individual Taxpayer antonym is "Nontaxpayer".as reiterated in note 3 of the Economy Plumbing and Heating case. paraphrased as: "A Nontaxpayer is not subject to pay personal income tax." See it all ties together once one seeks the foundation using the three pylons "subject", "measure" and "liability".

Hello Cigarlover,

YOUR COMMENT: "Gain" is not the operation in the definition stated by SCOTUS;

"By 1921, the article was revised to reflect the Eisner v. Macomber decision. The definition of income parroted Macomber. Income was defined as "The gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets. T.D. 3146, 23 Treas. Dec. 358 (1921)" because the 16th amendment gives power to lay an "excise" tax due to the phrase "without apportionment".

The operation is derived, an activity.The form of this "deriving" is the crux.

MY RESPONSE: In Edwards v. Keith, 231 F. 110, 113, the court wrote that, “One does not ‘DERIVE’ income by rendering services and charging for them [BUT, BY ACTUALLY BEING PAID FOR THOSE SERVICES]."

Tax protesters frequently repeat that quote as evidence that wages and salaries for services does not result in income, BUT THAT IS NOT WHAT THE EDWARDS CASE WAS ABOUT. The issue in Edwards was whether the taxpayer was required to report as income amounts that he had “charged” as fees by sending out bills, BUT FOR WHICH HE HAD NOT BEEN PAID. As explained above,this is clear from the court’s own opinion, the court refusing to impose a tax “upon unpaid charges for services rendered and which, for naught any one can tell, MAY NEVER BE PAID.”

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11703963545261704347&q="Edwards+v.+Keith"+"231"&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=40006
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA/ INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Petitioners,
v.
DANIELLE SMIT, Respondent.
Civil No. 12mc18 JCH.
United States District Court, D. New Mexico.

July 13, 2012.​

(BEGIN QUOTE)

THE COURT in Nyhus [Nyhus v. C.I.R., No. 3094, 1980 WL 1233 at *1 (Minn. Tax Dec. 01, 1980)] REJECTED SIMILAR RELIANCE ON Edwards v. Keith, WHICH MS. SMIT CITES IN SUPPORT OF HER CONTENTION THAT HER INCOME IS NOT TAXABLE. see Doc. 31 at 10, stating,

[A]ppellants advance the argument that Mr. Nyhus did not receive any income in 1976 because the case of Edwards v. Keith, 231 F. 110 (2nd Cir. 1916) contains the statement that `one does not "derive income" by rendering services and charging for them.' HOWEVER, THAT STATEMENT IS TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT. The court in Edward v. Keith was addressing the question of when one must report his income if he earns it in one year and is paid in a different year. THE [NYHUS] CASE REAFFIRMS THAT ALL COMPENSATION FOR SERVICES IS INCOME WHEN RECEIVED [AND NOT BEFORE THEN]. ​

(END QUOTE)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18398810209114090718&q="Edwards+v.+Keith"+"231"&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=40006
T.C. Memo. 2009-164EDILBERTO TOMAS GUERRERO AND SALVIE VILLAFLOR GUERRERO, Petitioners,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
No. 27203-07.
United States Tax Court.

Filed July 6, 2009.​

(BEGIN QUOTE)

PETITIONER'S RELIANCE ON Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930), AND Edwards v. Keith, 231 F. 110 (2d Cir. 1916), IS MISPLACED AND REFLECTS A MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED IN THOSE CASES. Both cases involved assignments of income and whether income was attributable to the person who earned it. Neither pertains directly to whether deductions must be substantiated. Thus, it cannot be said petitioners acted reasonably or in good faith. Given this, respondent's determination of the section 6662(a) penalty is sustained.

(END QUOTE)

THUS, THE TERM "DERIVED" SIMPLY MEANS "RECEIVED". NOTHING MORE.


YOUR COMMENT: The foundation of a "tax on income" is found in the August 1909 Revenue Act passed 3 weeks after the 16th Amendment was sent off to the States for ratification. This type of tax was declared a "Normal Tax" in the October 1913 legislation. It comes forward today by being imposed at 26 USC sections 1, 3, 11, 55, 1401, 3101, and 3201.

MY RESPONSE: Not so. The foundation of the "tax on income" is the sixteenth amendment and Title 26 U.S.C. The Revenue Act Of 1909 is only relevant to income tax law because of its generic definition of "income" which applies to BOTH individuals AND AND AND AND (NOT "OR") to corporations.



YOUR COMMENT: For taxing statutes to be legitimate there must be a "subject", a "measure" and a "statement of liability". In the above mentioned sections the "subject" is the "distinctive privilege" of "doing or carrying on of business in the corporate or quasi-corporate capacity." which, being granted as privilege, is an activity taxable by an excise tax. The "measure" is "income", being revenue via the corporate funnel (in the name of a State Created Entity), minus expenses and other applicable deductions. The statement of liability is upon "withholding agents" which were originally stamped as "president and treasurer and other officers having like duties".

MY RESPONSE: Not so. Even if it were true that in order for a tax statute to be "legitimate" it must have a "subject", a "measure" and a "statement of liability", the income tax statute (Title 26 U.S.C.) is legitimate. THE SUBJECT IS "INCOME TAX", THE MEASURE IS "THE TAX TABLE" AND THE STATEMENT OF LIABILITY IS "IT IS HEREBY IMPOSED ON THE TAXABLE INCOMES OF... INDIVIDUALS... A TAX AS DETERMINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING TABLES]"


(BEGIN QUOTE)

26 U.S. Code § 1 - TAX IMPOSED


(a) Married INDIVIDUALS filing joint returns and surviving spouses

THERE IS HEREBY IMPOSED ON THE TAXABLE INCOME OF —

(1) every married INDIVIDUAL (as defined in section 7703) who makes a single return jointly with his spouse under section 6013, and

(2) every surviving spouse (as defined in section 2(a)),

A TAX determined in accordance with THE FOLLOWING TAX TABLE:

If taxable income is:
The tax is:

Not over $36,900
15% of taxable income.
Over $36,900 but not over $89,150
$5,535, plus 28% of the excess over $36,900.
Over $89,150 but not over $140,000
$20,165, plus 31% of the excess over $89,150.
Over $140,000 but not over $250,000
$35,928.50, plus 36% of the excess over $140,000.
Over $250,000
$75,528.50, plus 39.6% of the excess over $250,000.


b) HEADS OF HOUSEHOLD

THERE IS HEREBY IMPOSED ON THE TAXABLE INCOME OF

EVERY HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD (as defined in section 2(b))

A TAX determined in accordance with THE FOLLOWING TABLE:

If taxable income is:
The tax is:

Not over $29,600
15% of taxable income.
Over $29,600 but not over $76,400
$4,440, plus 28% of the excess over $29,600.
Over $76,400 but not over $127,500
$17,544, plus 31% of the excess over $76,400.
Over $127,500 but not over $250,000
$33,385, plus 36% of the excess over $127,500.
Over $250,000
$77,485, plus 39.6% of the excess over $250,000.


(c) UNMARRIED INDIVIDUALS (other than surviving spouses and heads of households)

THERE IS HEREBY IMPOSED ON THE TAXABLE INCOME OF

EVERY UNMARRIED INDIVIDUAL (other than a surviving spouse as defined in section 2(a) or the head of a household as defined in section 2(b)) who is not a married individual (as defined in section 7703)

A TAX determined in accordance THE FOLLOWING TABLE

If taxable income is:
The tax is:

Not over $22,100
15% of taxable income.
Over $22,100 but not over $53,500
$3,315, plus 28% of the excess over $22,100.
Over $53,500 but not over $115,000
$12,107, plus 31% of the excess over $53,500.
Over $115,000 but not over $250,000
$31,172, plus 36% of the excess over $115,000.
Over $250,000
$79,772, plus 39.6% of the excess over $250,000.

(d) MARRIED INDIVIDUALS FILING SEPARATE RETURNS

THERE IS HEREBY IMPOSED ON THE TAXABLE INCOME OF

EVERY MARRIED INDIVIDUAL (as defined in section 7703) who does not make a single return jointly with his spouse under section 6013,

A TAX determined in accordance with THE FOLLOWING TABLE:

If taxable income is:
The tax is:

Not over $18,450
15% of taxable income.
Over $18,450 but not over $44,575
$2,767.50, plus 28% of the excess over $18,450.
Over $44,575 but not over $70,000
$10,082.50, plus 31% of the excess over $44,575.
Over $70,000 but not over $125,000
$17,964.25, plus 36% of the excess over $70,000.
Over $125,000
$37,764.25, plus 39.6% of the excess over $125,000

(END QUOTE)


YOUR COMMENT: This concept is buttressed by section 701 "The partnership [a defined term for a form of doing business] as such shall not be subject to the income tax imposed..."

MY RESPONSE: Unlike a corporation, a partnership is not a separate legal person from its owners. A partnership and its owners are legally one and the same. So, a partnership itself is not taxed because THE PARTNERS OF THE PARTNERSHIP PAY THE INCOME TAXES and if the partnership itself ALSO had to pay income taxes, THAT WOULD EFFECTIVELY DOUBLE THE INCOME TAX LIABILITY OF THE PARTNERS.

The Internal Revenue Code § 1 imposes an income tax on individuals. 26 U.S.C. § 1. Section 701 of that title provides that "[a] partnership as such shall not be subject to the income tax imposed by this chapter"; rather, "[p]ersons carrying on business as partners shall be liable for income tax only in their separate or individual capacities." Id. § 701. With a few exceptions that do not apply here, "[t]he taxable income of a partnership shall be computed in the same manner as in the case of an individual[.]" Id. § 703(a).​

UNIQUEST DELAWARE LLC v. US, 294 F. Supp. 3d 107 - Dist. Court, WD New York 2018. https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7412607427521366232&q="shall+not+be+subject+to+the+income+tax+imposed"&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=40006


YOUR COMMENT: The term partnership comes from Flint v Stone Tracy being a "private firm" which like the "private individual" is immune from a "tax on income" aka "shall not be subject to the income tax imposed" because those "private people" cannot enjoy the "distinctive privilege" of carrying on business in the corporate capacity even though the "buying, selling and handling of goods" may be transacted in exactly the same fashion.

MY RESPONSE: What a load of bullshit!. The term "partnership" does not come from Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. FLINT DID NOT INVOLVE AN INCOME TAX. INSTEAD, FLINT INVOLVED AN EXCISE TAX ON THE PRIVILEGE OF DOING BUSINESS AS A CORPORATION. Flint involved the "Corporate Tax Act" of 1909 AND WAS DECIDED BEFORE THE SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT WAS RATIFIED. The tax in question imposed an excise tax equal to 1% of the gross revenues of corporations. In explaining this holding the 5th Circuit wrote:

Appellant cites Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 31 S.Ct. 342, 55 L.Ed. 389 (1911), in support of his contention that the income tax is an excise tax applicable only against special privileges, such as the privilege of conducting a business, and is not assessable against income in general. Appellant twice errs [means the tax protesters is wrong on BOTH claims]. Flint did not address personal income tax; it was concerned with corporate taxation. Furthermore, Flint is pre-sixteenth amendment and must be read in that light. At this late date, it seems incredible that we would again be required to hold that the Constitution, as amended, empowers the Congress to levy an income tax against ANY source of income, WITHOUT THE NEED TO APPORTION THE TAX EQUALLY AMONG THE STATES, or to classify it as an excise tax applicable to specific categories of activities.​

(END QUOTE)
Parker v. CIR, 724 F. 2d 469 (5th Cir. 1984).
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6717013651529831790&q="Flint+v.+Stone+Tracy"+Parker&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=40006

THE FLINT COURT UPHELD THE TAX IN QUESTION, NOT THE OTHER WAY AROUND. REGARDLESS, FLINT HAS NO APPLICATION TO INCOME TAXES, MUCH LESS TO INCOME TAXES AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF THE SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT with the possible exception of the generic definition of "income" which applies to BOTH individuals AND AND AND AND, (NOT "OR") to corporations. OTHERWISE, FLINT IS IRRELEVANT ON THE SUBJECT OF INCOME TAXES.

YOUR COMMENT: The definition of an individual Taxpayer antonym is "Nontaxpayer".as reiterated in note 3 of the Economy Plumbing and Heating case. paraphrased as: "A Nontaxpayer is not subject to pay personal income tax." See it all ties together once one seeks the foundation using the three pylons "subject", "measure" and "liability".

MY RESPONSE: What a colossal load of bullshit. The term "NON-TAXPAYER" is a term ONLY used to describe a person against whom IRS has "WRONGFULLY LEVIED" property. It has nothing to do with whether every "CITIZEN OR RESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES" is subject to paying income taxes. They all are!

EXAMPLE:
A and B are college roommates. Both own identical 1964 blue Corvettes which they park in their driveway. A owes the IRS a million dollars in income taxes in connection with a lottery he won five years ago. C is a collector for the IRS who seeks to collect A's debt. To satisfy the amount that A owed the IRS, C slipped in one night and accidently towed off B's blue Corvette (the wrong person's car).

THE LAW:
Title 26 U.S.C. section 7426 allows B to sue the IRS for the "WRONGFUL LEVY" of his Corvette, to obtain the return of his car and to recover any damages he might have suffered. SO DURING, AND ONLY DURING, THE "WRONGFUL LEVY" CASE (ONLY), THE IRS AND THE COURT WILL REFER TO B AS THE "NON TAXPAYER" AND A AS THE "TAXPAYER". Below is the newest and most current case on this subject.


https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10618579363547800773&q="non+taxpayer"+"Section+7426"&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1

WALTER G. GOODRICH, ET AL,
v.
USA.
Civil Action No. 17-cv-0610.
United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Shreveport Division.

March 17, 2020.
​

(BEGIN QUOTE)
...
Wrongful Levy
A lien in favor of the United States arises with respect to all property and rights to property of a taxpayer upon failure to pay a tax liability after demand. 26 U.S.C. § 6321. The IRS has broad authority to impose levies on property and rights to property of taxpayers upon which liens have attached. 26 U.S.C. § 6331(a). But that power is not unlimited. For example, "a levy is wrongful if imposed upon property in which the taxpayer had no interest at the time the lien arose...." Oxford Capital Corp. v. United States, 211 F.3d 280, 283 (5th Cir. 2000).

Congress, in 26 U.S.C. § 7426, has waived the sovereign immunity of the United States for suits claiming wrongful levy and has allowed persons OTHER THAN THE TAX PAYER to file suit against the United States for wrongful levy.

"If a levy has been made on property or property has been sold pursuant to a levy, and ANY PERSON (OTHER THAN THE PERSON AGAINST WHOM IS ASSESSED THE TAX OUT OF WHICH SUCH LEVY AROSE) who claims an interest in or lien on such property and that such property was WRONGFUL LEVIED upon MAY BRING A CIVIL ACTION AGAINST THE UNITED STATES in a district court of the United States." 26 U.S.C. § 7426(a)(1)....

To establish a WRONGFUL LEVY claim under Section 7426 a plaintiff must show (1) that the IRS filed a levy with respect to a TAXPAYER'S LIABILITY against property held by the by THE NON-TAXPAYER plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff had an interest in that property superior to that of the IRS and (3) the levy was wrongful. Oxford, 211 F.3d at 283, citing Texas Commerce Bank-Fort Worth v. United States, 896 F.2d 152, 156 (5th Cir.1990).

To prove that a LEVY IS WRONGFUL, (1) a plaintiff must first show SOME [OWNERSHIP] INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY to establish standing, (2) the burden then shifts to the IRS to prove a NEXUS [A CONNECTION] BETWEEN THE PROPERTY [LEVIED UPON] AND THE TAXPAYER, and (3) the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff [THE REAL PROPERTY OWNER] to prove the levy was wrongful, e.g., THAT THE PROPERTY IN FACT DID NOT BELONG TO THE TAXPAYER. Oxford, 211 F.3d at 283, citing Century Hotels v. United States, 952 F.2d 107, 109 (5th Cir.1992). "State law determines the property interests to which federal tax liens attach." United States v. Davis, 681 Fed. Appx 338, 341 (5th Cir. 2017), citing Aquilini v. United States, 80 S.Ct. 1277, 1280 (1960).

(END QUOTE)


But, below are cases on how tax protesters misuse this term in a futile effort to avoid income taxes AND HOW THEY ALWAYS LOSE!

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10798452189292795756&q="non+taxpayer"+frivolous&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
v.
ROBERT N. TAYLOR, III, and PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Defendants.
Civil Action No. 17-3030.
United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.
July 13, 2018.
​

(BEGIN QUOTE)

Rather, he [THE TAX PROTESTER] asserts that he is NOT A TAXPAYER subject to the jurisdiction of the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") and that he is not domiciled within any state or federal area. Defendant's claim that he is NOT A TAX PAYER subject to the jurisdiction of the IRS IS REJECTED AS FRIVOLOUS. See, e.g., United States v. Gardell, 23 F.3d 395, 1994 WL 17097 *1 (1st Cir. 1994) (unpublished opinion); United States v. Sloan [91-2 USTC ¶ 50,388], 939 F.2d 499, 501 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Karlin [86-1 USTC ¶ 9299], 785 F.2d 90, 91 (3d Cir. 1986); Beerbower, 1986 WL 16750, at *2 ("Plaintiff's claim that he is NOT A TAXPAYER is unsupported and frivolous."); United States v. Studley [86-1 USTC ¶ 9390], 783 F.2d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 1985); Drefke, 707 F.2d at 981 ("This is an imaginative argument, but totally WITHOUT arguable merit.); United States v. Sasscer, No. Civ. Y-97-3026, 2000 WL 1479154, at *1 (D. Md. Aug. 25, 2000) ("The federal courts have consistently rejected such `non-taxpayer' status claims as meritless.").

(END QUOTE)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1788105239733493379&q="non+taxpayer"+frivolous&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1
MICHAEL EDWARD BUFKIN, Plaintiff,
v.
SCOTTRADE, INCORPORATED, JACOB J. LEW, Secretary, the Department of the Treasury, TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, Secretary, the Department of the Treasury, JOHN KOSKINEN, Commr, Internal Revenue Service, DOUGLAS SHULMAN, Commr, Internal Revenue Service, STEVEN T. MILLER, Acting Commr, Internal Revenue Service, DANIEL WERFEL, Acting Commr, Internal Revenue Service, WILLIAM J. WILKINS, Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, C.D. BAILEY, Revenue Officer, Internal Revenue Service, CALVIN BYRD, Revenue Officer, Internal Revenue Service, and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendants.
Case No. 2:17-cv-281-FtM-29CM.
United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division.
December 21, 2017.
​

(BEGIN QUOTE)

​

As a preliminary matter, PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENTS THAT HE IS NOT A TAXPAYER, that it has not been proven THAT HE IS A TAXPAYER, and that he did not volunteer to pay taxes ARE PATENTLY FRIVOLOUS AND HAVE BEEN REJECTED by courts at all levels of the judiciary, and, therefore, warrant no further discussion." Biermann v. C.I.R., 769 F.2d 707, 708 (11th Cir. 1985). Any request for injunctive or declaratory relief regarding plaintiff's status as a taxpayer will be dismissed without further discussion. See also Stubbs v. Comm'r of I.R.S., 797 F.2d 936, 938 (11th Cir. 1986) (argument that wages were not taxable income rejected as patently frivolous); Herriman v. C.I.R., 521 F. App'x 912, 913 (11th Cir. 2013) (rejecting as without merit argument that withholding of taxes from wages is an unconstitutional direct income tax without apportionment).

(END QUOTE)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17884905643780348988&q="non+taxpayer"+frivolous&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1
ADOLFO SANDOR MONTERO, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 10-50480. Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Filed: January 27, 2011.
... .​

(BEGIN QUOTE)
Montero argues that these jurisdictional prerequisites APPLY ONLY TO "TAXPAYERS" and, therefore, DO NOT APPLY TO HIM BECAUSE HE IS A "NON-TAXPAYER". THESE ARGUMENTS ARE PATENTLY FRIVOLOUS AND DEVOID OF ANY MERIT WHATSOEVER. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is in all respects AFFIRMED.
... .

The Government's motion for a lump-sum SANCTION OF $8,000, in lieu of calculating the costs and attorney's fees it incurred in responding to Montero's frivolous appeal, is GRANTED. ...

(END QUOTE)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14033039120677011901&q="non+taxpayer"+frivolous&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1
JEFFREY T. MAEHR, Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
Case No. 8:08CV190.
United States District Court, D. Nebraska.
August 13, 2009.
​

(BEGIN QUOTE)

However, the basis for all of Maehr's arguments IS HIS SUPPOSED STATUS AS A "NON-TAXPAYER".

... . Maehr asserts various "tax protestor" arguments concerning the validity of the federal income tax. Such arguments are without merit and the court will not waste time addressing these frivolous claims. Denison v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 241, 242-43 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) ("But we can no longer tolerate abuse of the judicial review process by irresponsible taxpayers who press stale and frivolous arguments, without hope of success on the merits, in order to delay or harass the collection of public revenues or for other nonworthy purposes."); see also Lively v. Commissioner, 705 F.2d 1017 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (rejecting the argument that the federal income tax is an unconstitutional direct tax that must be apportioned).

(END QUOTE)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2308567605912132397&q="non+taxpayer"+frivolous&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1
ROBERT W. DOUGLAS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 08-50916.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Filed April 15, 2009
​

(BEGIN QUOTE)
Douglas finally argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment because he is a "non-taxpayer." According to Douglas, he was born and domiciled in the State of Texas and has refused to "volunteer" to pay income tax, and no federal statute requires him to pay taxes because he is not an employee of the federal government. Douglas unsurprisingly cites no law in support of these claims. As discussed above, the IRS acted properly in levying his funds and Douglas is not entitled to a refund. The judgment of the district court [AGAINST DOUGLAS] is AFFIRMED.

(END QUOTE)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10828838287200906827&q="non+taxpayer"+frivolous&hl=en&scisbd=2&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1


UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ROBERT F. LAIN, Defendant-Appellant, and
AMELIA LAIN; SEPTEMBER LIBERTY TRUST, Defendants.
DOUGLAS J. CARPA, Trustee, Movant.
No. 19-8014.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
September
​

(BEGIN QUOTE)
... .
The district court REJECTED Mr. Lain's argument that he was a NON-TAXPAYER not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as "PATENTLY FRIVOLOUS and contrary to established Tenth Circuit precedent." Id. at 159 (internal quotation marks omitted).

(END QUOTE)

Thus, the government's use of the term "non taxpayer" IN "WRONGFUL LEVY" CASES does NOT create a category of persons who are exempt from income tax liability. Even the "non taxpayer" IN "WRONGFUL LEVY" CASES remains subject to income tax liability.

Listen Cigarlover, there are dozens more cases to this same effect. If you need more proof that calling yourself a "non-taxpayer" (A WRONGFUL LEVY TERM) will not make you exempt from income tax liability, let me know.

Best Regards,

Snoop

 

[snoop4truth]

Now we can see that many of my previous cases do indeed have merit. Time to stop listening to the tax honesty deniers Snoop.

“Hale v. Henkle, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) 201 U.S. 43, The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the state or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors to an investigation, so far as it may tend to criminate him. He owes no such duty to the state, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property. His rights are such as existed by the law of the land long antecedent to the organization of the state, and can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under a warrant of the law. He owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights.”

Hello Cigarlover,

YOUR COMMENT: Now we can see that many of my previous cases do indeed have merit.

MY RESPONSE: YES, EVERY SINGLE CASE ON THE SUBJECT OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXES FOR INDIVIDUALS WHICH HAS NOT BEEN OVERTURNED OR PREEMPTED BY CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT OR STATUTE HAS MERIT. The question is not whether such cases have merit. The question is, WHETHER THE CASE APPLIES TO FEDERAL INCOME TAXES FOR INDIVIDUALS AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF THE SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT. THE FACT THAT CORPORATIONS ARE ALSO TAXED DOES NOT NEGATE THE REALITY THAT INDIVIDUALS ARE TAXED AS WELL. THAT IS A REALITY THAT TAX PROTESTERS CAN NOT GET AROUND.

YOUR COMMENT: Time to stop listening to the tax honesty deniers Snoop.

MY RESPONSE: Calling charlatans and frauds "honest" will not make it so. The truth is that these charlatans are dishonest. And, I will never pretend otherwise.

“Hale v. Henkle, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) 201 U.S. 43, The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the state or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors to an investigation, so far as it may tend to incriminate him. He owes no such duty to the state, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property. His rights are such as existed by the law of the land long antecedent to the organization of the state, and can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under a warrant of the law. He owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights.”

MY RESPONSE: Even if this quote is accurate, I fail to see how a 1906 case on self incrimination applies to federal income taxes on individuals AFTER the ratification of the sixteenth amendment in 1913, SOME SEVEN YEARS LATER.

THE MYTH: You cannot be required to file an income tax return because a tax return is a form of testimony and the 5th Amendment guarantees that you cannot be compelled to testify against yourself.

The 5th Amendment applies to CRIMINAL proceedings, NOT CIVIL proceedings, and collecting taxes is a civil proceeding, not a criminal proceeding. You cannot refuse to file an income tax return because of the 5th Amendment.

The 5th Amendment states (in part) that “No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself....” However, you can be compelled to testify against yourself in a civil case. For example, O.J. Simpson could not be compelled to testify in the criminal case against him, so he never took the witness stand during his murder trial. But in the civil action brought against him by the Goldman family for the same murders, he was called to the stand by the Goldman family, required to testify, and found financially liable for the killings.

Because the 5th Amendment does not apply to civil liabilities, the courts have consistently ruled that you cannot refuse to file an income tax return by reason of the 5th Amendment.

In Sullivan v. United States, 274 U.S. 259 (1927), rev’g 15 F.2d 809, the defendant had earned illegal profits from the sale of alcohol (during Prohibition), failed to file an income tax return reporting the illegal profits, and was convicted of willfully failing to file an income tax return. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that to require a return on illegally earned income would be a violation of the 5th Amendment, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that illegally earned income is still taxable, and that:

“As the defendant’s income was taxed, the statute of course required a return. [Citation omitted.] In the decision [by the lower court] that this was contrary to the Constitution we are of opinion that the protection of the Fifth Amendment was pressed too far. If the form of return provided called for answers that the defendant was privileged from making he could have raised the objection in the return, but could not on that account refuse to make any return at all. We are not called on to decide what, if anything, he might have withheld. Most of the items warranted no complaint. It would be an extreme if not an extravagant application of the Fifth Amendment to say that it authorized a man to refuse to state the amount of his income because it had been made in crime. But if the defendant desired to test that or any other point he should have tested it in the return so that it could be passed upon. He could not draw a conjurer’s circle around the whole matter by his own declaration that to write any word upon the government blank would bring him into danger of the law.”​

​

Sullivan v. United States, 274 U.S. 259, 263-264 (1927).

Federal courts have since followed the Sullivan decision in holding that the 5th Amendment does not allow a taxpayer to refuse to file a return:

“The statutory requirement to file an income tax return does not violate a taxpayer’s right against self-incrimination.”​

​

United States v. MacLeod, 436 F.2d 947, 951 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. den. 402 U.S. 907 (1971).

“It is well settled that the Fifth Amendment general objection [to filing a proper tax return] is not a valid claim of the constitutional privilege.”​

​

Betz v. United States, 753 F.2d 834, 835 (10th Cir. 1985)

“The Fifth Amendment does not serve as a defense for failing to make any tax return....”​

​

United States v. Stillhammer, 706 F.2d 1072, 1076-77 (10th Cir. 1983)

“t is an illegal effort to stretch the Fifth Amendment to include a taxpayer who wishes to avoid filing a return.”​

United States v. Brown, 600 F.2d 248, 251-52 (10th Cir. 1979)

“t is well established that the Fifth Amendment cannot be stretched so far as to absolve a taxpayer’s duty to file a return.”​

United States v. Irwin, 561 F.2d 198, 201 (10th Cir. 1977)

“Plaintiff next argues the filing of a return violates his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. [Footnote omitted.] He relies on Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 649 (1976). There, the Court held one may invoke the Fifth Amendment as to tax returns that would incriminate one for specific non-tax crimes, provided the privilege was claimed on the return. It does not stand for the proposition that the Fifth Amendment provides general protection against filing tax returns. Indeed, the Court reiterated the long-standing principle that the Fifth Amendment is not a defense to filing a return at all. Id. at 650, citing, United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927). In Brennan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 752 F.2d 187, 189 (6th Cir. 1985), the Sixth Circuit held the blanket assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege as to tax returns is a “frivolous position””​

​

Tornichio v. United States, 81 AFTR2d ¶98-582, KTC 1998-71 (N.D.Ohio 1998), (suit for refund of frivolous return penalties dismissed and sanctions imposed for filing a frivolous refund suit), aff’d 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 5248, 99-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶50,394, 83 AFTR2d ¶99-579, KTC 1999-147 (6th Cir. 1999), (with sanctions imposed for filing a frivolous appeal).

“Plaintiffs provided no information on the numbered lines of their 1982 Form 1040 and provided wage and tax statements for 1980 instead of those for 1982. They claim that the government compelling them to provide the information requested on the form violates their right against self-incrimination guaranteed by the fifth amendment. This claim likewise is without merit. ... “The Supreme Court has held that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination can be invoked only where an individual ‘is confronted by substantial and “real,” and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination.’ Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53, 88 S. Ct. 697, 19 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). See also United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 128, 63 L. Ed. 2d 250, 100 S. Ct. 948 (1980). The Eighth Circuit has also specifically held that the privilege does not excuse a taxpayer’s blanket refusal to answer any questions on his tax return relating to income without some reasonable showing as to how such disclosure could possibly incriminate him. United States v. Daly, 481 F.2d 28 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1064, 38 L. Ed. 2d 469, 94 S. Ct. 571 (1973). Plaintiffs’ purely hypothetical claim does not meet this standard and thus has no basis in law. As such, it is not a valid fifth amendment claim at all and is among those positions taken by tax protestors that have long been labeled ‘frivolous’ by the courts.”​

​

House v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 139, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24565, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ¶9745, 54 AFTR2d ¶5903 (D.C. W.D.Mich. 1984).

See also, United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. den. 447 U.S. 925; Parker v. Commissioner, 724 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Daly, 481 F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. den. 414 U.S. 164 (1973); Ueckert v. Commissioner, 721 F.2d 248, 250 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Porth, 426 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. den. 400 U.S. 824; Boomer v. United States, 755 R2d 696, 697 (8th Cir. 1985).

Here are some consequences to claiming the 5th Amendment privilege that tax litigants sometimes overlook.

In enacting an assessable penalty for “frivolous income tax returns,” I.R.C. section 6702, Congress specifically identified 5th Amendment arguments as “frivolous” arguments, and courts have upheld fines against tax protesters who have failed to file income tax returns on 5th Amendment grounds.

In Rev. Rul. 2005-19, 2005-14 I.R.B. 819, the IRS confirmed that refusing to file a federal income tax return based on a claim of 5th Amendment privilege is “frivolous” and can result in civil and criminal penalties.

The claim that “[t]he Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination grants taxpayers the right not to file returns or the right to withhold all financial information” has been identified by the IRS as a “frivolous position” that can result in a penalty of $5,000 when asserted in a tax return or included in certain collection-related submissions. Notice 2007-30, 2007-14 I.R.B. 883.

Best Regards,

Snoop

 

[snoop4truth]

Hello Cigarlover,

YOUR COMMENT: Stapler v U.S., 21 F Supp 737 AT 739 (1937): "Income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment and the Revenue Act, means 'gain'... and in such connection 'Gain' means profit...proceeding from property, severed from capital, however invested or employed, and coming in, received, or drawn by the taxpayer, for his separate use, benefit and disposal... Income is not a wage or compensation for any type of labor.".....

MY RESPONSE: THIS QUOTE IS FAKE! I CALL FOUL! Staples v. U.S., 21 F.Supp. 737 (D. Pa. 1937) (often miscited as "Stapler v. U.S."). This quotation, particularly the last sentence, seems very persuasive. The problem is that most of it is completely made up. It's not from the Staples case or from any other federal case. If you look at the actual case in a real case reporter (not some fabricated Internet version), you will see that the last sentence doesn't exist. Of course, once you start making stuff up, all bets are off. You can provide support for anything if you allow yourself to make up the support. Here's a tip: if someone supports their arguments with fabricated quotations, don't believe anything they say. Income is not a wage or compensation for any type of labor.".....

TAX HONESTY MOVEMENT ? GIVE ME AN EFFIN' BREAK!

Below are the only reported cases in which the first part of this FAKE quote appears. Ironically, the first case UPHOLDS the federal income tax ON AN INDIVIDUAL and the second case upholds the federal income tax on an individual estae WHICH IS NOT A CORPORATION!

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7626196440886977424&q="Income+within+the+meaning+of+the+Sixteenth+Amendment+and+the+Revenue"&hl=en&as_sdt=40006
20 B.T.A. 130 (1930)W. P. FERGUSON, PETITIONER,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT.
Docket No. 34975.
Board of Tax Appeals.

Promulgated June 24, 1930.​

(BEGIN QUOTE)

We perceive no inconsistency in holding that for Federal income-tax purposes an oil and gas lease is not a sale of oil and gas in place, and that the proceeds from the lease are rentals taxable as income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment and the revenue acts, and that for the purpose of determining whether such proceeds are separate or community property, the State law should be controlling. The one is a rule of taxation, the other a rule of property. Stating it in another way, the question in the first instance is whether certain receipts are income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment and the laws of the United States, and in the second the question is as to whom did the receipts belong. As stated by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Rosenberger v. McCaughn, 25 Fed. (2d) 699; certiorari denied; 278 U. S. 67.​

​

(END QUOTE)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4125987844561022130&q="Income+within+the+meaning+of+the+Sixteenth+Amendment+and+the+Revenue"&hl=en&as_sdt=40006
26 B.T.A. 132 (1932)
LEIGHTON M. FORD, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF ALBERT E. FORD, DECEASED, PETITIONER,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT.
Docket No. 54497.
Board of Tax Appeals.
​

(BEGIN QUOTE)

We have then in this case a realization of a gain which is income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment and the Revenue Act. Section 161 of the Revenue Act of 1928 specifically taxes "the income of estates or of any kind of property held in trust.

(END QUOTE)


WHEN CUTTING AND PASTING JUNK FROM TAX PROTESTER SITES AND FROM AMATEUR LEGAL THEORY SITES, CHECK TO SEE IF IT IS INTENTIONAL FRAUD FIRST, BEFORE POSTING IT HERE!


YOUR COMMENT: Helvering v Edison Bros. Stores, 133 F2d 575 (1943):
"The Treasury cannot by interpretive regulations, make income of that which is not income within the meaning of the revenue acts of Congress, nor can Congress, without apportionment, tax as income that which is not income within the meaning of the 16th Amendment."

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10667411908906006440&q="Helvering+v+Edison+Bros"&hl=en&as_sdt=40006
133 F.2d 575 (1943)
HELVERING, Com'r of Internal Revenue,
v.
EDISON BROS. STORES, Inc. EDISON BROS. STORES, Inc.
v.
HELVERING, Com'r of Internal Revenue.
Nos. 12250, 12251.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

February 3, 1943.Rehearing Denied March 3, 1943.​

(BEGIN QUOTE)

The questions presented on these petitions to review a decision of the United States Board of Tax Appeals are whether the taxpayer realized taxable income in either or in both of the years 1935 and 1937 from sales to its employees of shares of its capital stock, previously acquired for that purpose... .​

​

[The Treasury department argued that profits received by the corporation in this manner were income. But, the court disagreed and wrote:]

The Treasury Department cannot, by interpretative regulations, make income of that which is not income within the meaning of the revenue acts of Congress, nor can Congress, without apportionment, tax as income that which is not income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment. ​

​

(END QUOTE)

​

TRANSLATION: A treasury rule may not conflict with the statute it serves and the statute may not conflict with the Constitution.

This language does not make income taxes on individuals illegal or unconstitutional.

Best Regards,

Snoop

 

[snoop4truth]

Actually i see now that i did provide foster in my 1st post here.

YOUR COMMENT: Cigarlover said: This debate is over now. I won and you provided the case law for my win. :).Thank you.

MY RESPONSE: Well, before you run your victory lap, read the federal income tax statutes below bearing in mind the principle of "legislative intent". Keep in mind that the same exact 1913 Congress who wrote and passed the sixteenth amendment also wrote and passed The Revenue Act Of 1913 (below) only days later. That particular 1913 Congress' own words in The Revenue Act of 1913 are the very best evidence of what that same exact Congress "intended" in writing and passing the sixteenth amendment only days before.

THIS IS THE ACTUAL TEXT OF THE REVENUE ACT OF 1913 (Revenue Act of 1913, Pub.L. 63–16, 38 Stat. 114). You may find this statute here at or about page 53. https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/38/STATUTE-38-Pg114.pdf

This 1913 statute is significant in that it was written and passed by the same exact 1913 Congress which also wrote and passed the sixteenth amendment only days before in 1913. This 1913 statute conclusively proves that the same exact 1913 Congress which also wrote and passed the sixteenth amendment in 1913 only days before always intended, from the very beginning, to impose an income tax on all individuals and citizens and residents of the United States and that this same exact 1913 Congress also intended, from the very beginning, to tax wages, salaries and compensation for personal services as "income". Now, after more than a century later, this remains the law today.

(BEGIN QUOTE)

INCOME TAX .
SECTION II .
One per cent levied A. Subdivision 1 .

That there shall be levied, assessed, collected ON THE NET INCOMES OF CITIZENS
and paid annually upon the entire net income arising or accruing
from all sources in the preceding calendar year TO EVERY CITIZEN OF THE
UNITED STATES, whether residing at home or abroad, AND TO EVERY PERSON
RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES , though not a citizen thereof, A TAX
of 1 per centum per annum UPON THE INCOME , except as hereinafter
provided ; AND a Tike tax shall be assessed, levied, collected, and paid
annually upon the entire net income from all property owned and of
every business, trade, or profession carried on in the United States by
persons residing elsewhere .

Additional tax on Subdivision 2 .
In addition to the INCOME TAX provided under this
section (herein referred to as the NORMAL INCOME TAX) there shall be
levied, assessed, and collected UPON THE NET INCOME OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL
AN ADDITIONAL INCOME TAX (herein referred to as the additional tax) of
1 per centum per annum upon the amount by which the total net income
exceeds $20,000 and does not exceed $50,000, and 2 per centum
per annum upon the amount by which the total net income exceeds
$50,000 and does not exceed $75,000, 3 per centum per annum upon
the amount by which the total net income exceeds $75,000 and does
not exceed $100,000, 4 per centum per annum upon the amount by
which the total net income exceeds $100,000 and does not exceed
$250,000, 5 per centum per annum upon the amount by which the total
net income exceeds $250,000 and does not exceed $500,000, and 6 per
centum per annum upon the amount by which the- total net income
exceeds $500,000 . All the provisions of this section relating to individuals
who are to be chargeable with the normal income tax, so far
as they are applicable and are not inconsistent with this subdivision of
paragraph A, shall apply to the levy, assessment, and collection of the
PERSONAL RETURNS to additional tax imposed under this section .
EVERY PERSON subject to this additional tax shall( for the purpose
of its assessment and collection, make a PERSONAL RETURN of his
TOTAL NET INCOME from all sources, corporate or otherwise, for the
preceding calendar year, under rules and regulations to be prescribed
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

(END QUOTE)

THIS IS THE ACTUAL TEXT OF THE REVENUE ACT OF 1916 (39 Stat. 756 U.S. Statutes at Large).
You may find this statute here. https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/39/STATUTE-39-Pg756.pdf
,
(BEGIN QUOTE)

Revenue Act, 1916.
Income tax.

TITLE I.-INCOME TAX.
ON INDIVIDUALS.

PART I.-ON INDIVIDUALS .
Two per cent levied Sec. 1 . (a) That there shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid
annually UPON THE ENTIRE NET INCOME RECEIVED in the preceding calendar
year from all sources BY EVERY INDIVIDUAL, CITIZEN OR RESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
A TAX of two per centum UPON SUCH INCOME from united states
sources. And a like tax shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid annually UPON
THE ENTIRE NET INCOME RECEIVED in the preceding calendar year from
all sources within the United States BY EVERY INDIVIDUAL, A NON RESIDENT
ALIEN, including interest on bonds, notes, or other interest-bearing
obligations of residents, corporate or otherwise .

Additional Tax (b)
In addition to the INCOME TAX imposed by subdivision (a) of
this section (herein referred to as the normal tax) there shall be levied,
assessed, collected, and paid UPON THE TOTAL NET INCOME OF EVERY
INDIVIDUAL, or, in the case of a nonresident alien, THE TOTAL NET INCOME
RECEIVED FROM ALL SOURCES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES an additional
income tax (herein referred to as the additional tax) of one per
centum per annum upon the amount by which such total net income
exceeds $20,000 and does not exceed $40,000, two per centum per
annum upon the amount by which such total net income exceeds
$40,000 and does not exceed $60,000, three per centum per annum
upon the amount by which such total net income exceeds $60,000
and does not exceed $80,000, four per centum per annum upon the
amount by which such total net income exceeds not exceed $100,000,
five per centum per annum upon the amount by which such total net
income exceeds $100,000 and does not exceed
$150,000, six per centum per annum upon the amount by which such
total net income exceeds $150,000 and does not exceed $200,000,
seven per centum per annum upon the amount by which such total
net income exceeds $200,000 and does not exceed $250,000, eight per
centum per annum u on the amount by which such total net income
exceeds $250,000 and does not exceed $300,000, nine per centum per
annum upon the amount by which such total net income exceeds
$300,000 and does not exceed $500,000, ten per centum per annum
upon the amount by which such total net income exceeds $500,000,
and does not exceed $1,000,000, eleven per centum per annum upon
the amount by which such total net income exceeds $1,000,000 and
does not exceed $1,500,000, twelve per centum per annum upon the
amount by which such total net income exceeds $1,500,000 and does
not exceed $2,000,000, and thirteen per centum per annum upon the
amount by which such total net income exceeds $2,000,000 .

For the purpose of the additional tax there shall be included as
income the income derived from dividends on the capital stock or chided.
from the net earnings of any corporation, joint-stock company or
association, or insurance company except that in the case of non- Nonresident aliens .
resident aliens such income derives from sources without the United -
States shall not be included.

All the provisions of this title relating to the normal tax ON INDIVIDUALS,
so far as they are applicable and are no, inconsistent with
this subdivision and section three, shall apply to the imposition, levy,
assessment, and collection of the additional tax imposed under this
subdivision .

(c) The foregoing normal and additional tax rates shall apply to the
entire net income, except as hereinafter provided, received by
every taxable person in the calendar year nineteen hundred and
sixteen and in each calendar year thereafter.

INCOME - DEFINED .
Income defined .
SEC. 2. (a) That, subject only to such exemptions and deductions as
are hereinafter allowed, THE NET INCOME OF A TAXABLE PERSON SHALL
INCLUDE GAINS, PROFITS, AND INCOME DERIVED FROM SALARIES, WAGES
OR COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL SERVICES OF WHATEVER KIND AND
IN WHATEVER FORM PAID, OR FROM PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, BUSINESS,
TRADE, COMMERCE OR SALES OR DEALING IN PROPERTY, WHETHER REAL OR PERSONAL
PROPERTY, ALSO FROM INTEREST, RENT, DIVIDENDS, SECURITIES, OR THE
TRANSACTION OF ANY BUSINESS CARRIED ON FOR GAIN OR PROFIT
OR GAINS AND PROFITS AND INCOME DERIVED FROM WHATEVER SOURCE WHATEVER:

Provided, That the term dividends as used in this title shall be held to mean any
distribution made or ordered to be made by a corporation, joint-stock
company, association, or insurance company, out of its earnings or
profits accrued since March first, nineteen hundred and thirteen, and
payable to its shareholders, whether in cash or in stock of the corporation,
joint-stock company, association, or insurance company,
which stock dividend shall be considered income, to the amount of
its cash value.

(END QUOTE)

THIS IS THE ACTUAL TEXT OF THE REVENUE ACT OF 1921. (42 Stat. 227 U.S. Statutes at Large)
https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/42/STATUTE-42-Pg227.pdf

(BEGIN QUOTE)

TITLE II.-INCOME TAX.

PART II.-INDIVIDUALS .
NORMAL TAX.

SEC . 210. That, in lieu of the tax imposed by section 210 of the
Revenue Act of 1918, there shall be levied, collected, and paid for
each taxable year UPON THE NET INCOME OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL
a normal tax of 8 per centum OF THE AMOUNT OF THE NET INCOME
in excess of the credits provided in section 216 : Provided, THAT IN
THE CASE OF A CITIZEN OR RESIDENT OF THE UNTIED STATES
the rate upon the first $4,000 of such excess amount shall be 4 per
centum.

SURTAX.
Sec . 211. (a) That, in lieu of the tax imposed by section 211 of the Revenue Act of 1918,
but in addition to the normal tax imposed by section 210 of this Act,
there shall be levied, collected, and paid e"For calendar year
for each taxable year UPON THE NET INCOME OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL -
(1) For the calendar year 1921, a surtax equal to the sum of the
following : per centum of the amount BY WHICH THE NET INCOME exceeds
$5,000 and does not exceed $6,000 ;

[lengthy tax table omitted here]

NET INCOME OF INDIVIDUALS DEFINED.
Individual net income
SEC . 212 .
(a) That IN THE CASE OF AN INDIVIDUAL the term "net Deductions from
INCOME" means the GROSS INCOME as defined in section 213, less the
deductions allowed by section 214.

(b) The NET INCOME shall be computed upon the basis of the tax-
payer's annual accounting period fiscal year or calendar year, as
the case may be) in accordance with the method of accounting
regularly employed in keeping the books of such taxpayer ; but if
no such method of accounting has been so employed, or if the method
employed does not clearly reflect the income, the computation shall
be made upon such basis and in such manner as in the opinion of
the Commissioner does clearly reflect the income . If the taxpayer's
annual accounting period is other than a fiscal year as defined in
section 200 or if the taxpayer has no annual accounting period or
does not keep books, THE NET INCOME shall be computed on the basis
of the calendar year .

(c) If a taxpayer changes his accounting period from fiscal year
to calendar year,from calendar year to fiscal year, or-from one
fiscal year to another, the net income shall, with the approval of
the Commissioner, be computed on the basis of such new accounting
period, subject to the provisions of section 226 .

GROSS INCOME DEFINED . Gross income
SEC. 213 . That for the purposes of this title (except as otherwise
provided in section 233) THE TERM ""GROSS INCOME" -
a INCLUDES GAINS PROFITS AND INCOME DERIVED FROM SALARIES, WAGES
AND COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL SERVICES (Including in the case of
the President of the United States, the judges of the Supreme and
inferior courts of the Untied States and all other officers and
employees, whether elected or appointed, of the United States,
Alaska, Hawaii, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District
of Columbia, the compensation received as such), OF WHATEVER KIND
AND IN WHATEVER FORM PAID FROM PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, TRADES,
BUSINESSES, COMMERCE, OR DEALINGS IN PROPERTY, WHETHER REAL OR
PERSONAL GROWING OUT OT THE OWNERSHIP OR USE OF AN INTEREST IN
SUCH PROPERTY ALSO FROM INTEREST, RENT, DIVIDENDS. SECURITIES,
OR THE TRANSACTION OF ANY BUSINESS CARRIED ON FOR GAIN OR PROFIT
OR GAINS OR PROFITS AND INCOME DERIVED FROM ANY SOURCE WHATEVER.

The amount of all such items (except as provided in subdivision (e) of section 201)
SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE GROSS INCOME for the taxable year in which
received by the taxpayer, unless, under methods of accounting permitted
under subdivision (b) of section 212, any such amounts are to
be properly accounted for as of a different period ; but

(END QUOTE)


THIS IS THE ACTUAL TEXT FROM THE REVENUE ACT OF 1924 (Pub. L. 68-176 U.S. Law).
You may find this statute here. https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/43/STATUTE-43-Pg253b.pdf

(BEGIN QUOTE)

PART 11
INDIVIDUALS.
NORMAL TAX

SEC. 210. (a) In lieu of the tax imposed by section 210 of the
Revenue Act of 1921, there shall be levied, collected, and paid for
each taxable year UPON THE NET INCOME OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL
except as provided in subdivision (b) of this section) A NORMAL TAX of 6
per centum OF THE AMOUNT OF THE NET INCOME in excess of the credits
provided in section 216, except that in the case of A CITIZEN OR
RESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES the rate upon the first $4,000 of such excess
amount shall be 2 per centum, and upon the next $4,000 of such
excess amount shall be 4 per centum;

(b) In lieu of the tax imposed by subdivision (a), there shall be
levied, collected, and paid for each taxable year on the net income
of every nonresident alien individual, a resident of a contiguous country
a normal tax equal to the sum of the following
(1). 2 per centum of the amount by which this part of the net income
attributable to wages, salaries, professional fees or other amounts
received as compensation for personal services actually performed
in the United States, exceeds the credits provided in subdivisions (d)
and (e) of section 216 ; but the amount taxable at such
2 per centum rate shall not exceed $4,000 ;and
(2). 4 per centum of the amount by which such part of the net income
exceeds the sum of (A) the credits provided in subdivisions
(d) and (e) of section 216, plus (B) $4,000 ; but the
amount taxable at such 4 per centum rate shall not exceed $4,000; and
and
(3). 6 per centum of the amount of the net income in excess
the sum of (A) the amount taxed under paragraph s (1) and (2)
plus (B) the credits provided in 216.

[lengthy tax table omitted)

NET INCOME OF INDIVIDUALS DEFINED.
SEC. 212.
(a) IN THE CASE OF AN INDIVIDUAL THE TERM, "NET INCOME"
MEANS THE GROSS INCOME AS DEFINED IN SECTION 213,
LESS DEDUCTIONS ALLOWED IN SECTIONS 214 AND 216.
(b) The net income shall be computed upon the basis of the tax-
payer's annual accounting period fiscal year or calendar year, as
the case may be) in accordance wit the method of accounting regularly
employed in keeping the books of such taxpayer; but if no
such method of accounting has been so employed, or if the method
employed does not clearly reflect the income, the computation shall
be made in accordance with such method as in the opinion of the
Commissioner does clearly reflect the income . If the taxpayer's
annual accounting period is other than a fiscal year as defined in
section 200 or if the taxpayer has no annual accounting period or
does not keep books, the net income shall be computed on the basis
of the calendar year.
(c) If a taxpayer changes his accounting period from fiscal year
to calendar year, from calendar year to fiscal year, or from one
fiscal year to another, the net income shall, with the approval of the
Commissioner, be computed on the basis of such new accounting
period, subject to the provisions of section 226.

GROSS INCOME DEFINED.
Sec.. 213

For the purposes of this title, except as otherwise provided
in section 233-
(a) THE TERM "GROSS INCOME" INCLUDES GAINS, PROFITS,
AND INCOME DERIVED FROM SALARIES WAGES, OR
COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL SERVICE
(including in the case of the President of the United States, the
judges of the Supreme and inferior courts of the United States,
and all other officers and employees, whether elected or appointed,
of the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, or any political subdivision
thereof, or the District of Columbia, the compensation received as
such), OF WHATEVER KIND AND IN WHATEVER FORM PAID,
OR FROM PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, TRADES, BUSINESS, COMMERCE
OR SALES OR DEALINGS IN PROPERTY, WHETHER REAL OR PERSONAL
GROWING OUT OF THE OWNERSHIP IN SUCH PROPERTY, ALSO FROM INTEREST,
RENTS, DIVIDENDS SECURITIES , OR THE TRANSACTION OF ANY BUSINESS
CARRIED ON FOR GAIN OR PROFIT OR GAINS AND PROFITS
AND INCOME DERIVED FROM ANY SOURCE WHATEVER.

(END QUOTE)

THIS IS THE ACTUAL TEXT FROM THE REVENUE ACT OF 1926 (44 Stat. 9 U.S. Statutes at Large).
You may find this statute here. https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/44/STATUTE-44-Pg9a.pdf

(BEGIN QUOTE)

PART II.-
INDIVIDUALS
NORMAL TAX
Sec. 210. (a) In lieu of the tax imposed by section 210 of the rats, lieu of former
Revenue Act of 1924, there shall be levied, collected, and paid for Vol. 43, p . 264.
each taxable year UPON THE NET INCOME OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL (except
as provided in subdivision (b) of this section) A NORMAL TAX of 5
per centum of the amount OF THE NET INCOME excess of the credits
provided in section 216, except that in the case of A CITIZEN OR RESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES the rate upon the first $4,000 of such excess
amount shall be 11/2 per centum, and upon the next $4,000 of such
excess amount shall be 3 per centum;

(b) In lieu of the tax imposed by subdivision (a), there shall Aliens, residents of
be levied, collected, and paid for each taxable year upon the net contiguous countries .
income of every nonresident alien individual, a resident of a contiguous
country, a normal tax equal to the sum of the following
(1) 11/2 per centum of the amount by which the part of the net on
compensation for personal services in income attributable to wages,
salaries, professional services or other united states amounts received as
compensation for personal services actually
performed in the United States, exceeds the credits provided in
subdivisions (d) and (e) of section 216 ; but the amount taxable Maximum.
at such 11/2 per centum rate shall not exceed $4,000 ;
(2) 3 per centum of the amount by which such part of the net Additional if exceeding family credits and
income exceeds the sum of (A) the credits provided in subdivisions $4,00 °§
(d) and (e) of section 216, plus (B) $4,000 ; but the amount taxable
at such 3 per centum rate shall not exceed $4,000 ; and
(3) 5 per centum of the amount of the net income in excess of If in excess thereof.
the sum of (A) the amount taxed under paragraphs (1) and (2),
plus (B) the credits provided in section 216.

SURTAX
Sec. 211.
(a}. In lieu of the tax imposed b section 211 of the Additional to normal
Revenue Act of 1924, but .IN ADDITION TO THE NORMAL TAX IMPOSED ON INCOMES
exceeding $10,000

(lengthy tax table omitted here)

NET INCOME OF INDIVIDUALS DEFINED
SEC. 212 .

(a) IN THE CASE OF AN INDIVIDUAL THE TERM "MET INCOME"
MEANS THE GROSS INCOME AS DEFINED IN SECTION 213,
LESS DEDUCTIONS ALLOWED IN 214 AND 216.
(b) The net income shall be computed upon the basis of the
taxpayer's annual accounting period (fiscal year or calendar year,
as the case may be) in accordance with the method of accounting
regularly employed in keeping the books of such taxpayer ; but if
no such method of accounting has been so employed, or if the
method employed does not clearly reflect the income, the computation
shall be made in accordance with such method as in the opinion
of the Commissioner does clearly reflect the income . If the taxpayer's
annual accounting period is other than a fiscal year as defined
in section 200 or if the taxpayer has no annual accounting period
or does not keep books, the net income shall be computed on the
basis of the calendar year.

(c) If a taxpayer changes his accounting period from fiscal year to calendar year,
from calendar year to fiscal year, or from one fiscal year to another,
the net income shall, with the approval of the Commissioner, be computed
on the basis of such new accounting period, subject to the provisions of section 226.
(d) Under regulations prescribed by the Commissioner with the approval of the
Secretary, a person who regularly sells or otherwise disposes of personal
property on the installment plan may return as income therefrom in any
taxable year that proportion of the installment payments actually received
in that year which the total profit realized or to be realized when the payment
is completed, bears to the total contract price . In the case (1) of a casual
sale or Casual sales of per- sonal, or real property . other casual disposition
of personal property for a price exceeding $1,000, or (2) of a sale or other
disposition of real property, if in either case the initial payments do not
exceed one-fourth of the purchase price, the income may, under regulations
prescribed by the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary, be returned
on the basis and in the manner above prescribed in this subdivision.
As used in this subdivision the term " initial payments " means the
payments received in cash or property other than evidences of
indebtedness of the purchaser during the taxable period in which
the sale or other disposition is made .

GROSS INCOME DEFINED
Individual net income

SEC. 213 . For the purposes of this title, except as otherwise provided in section 233-
(a) THE TERM "GROSS INCOME INCLUDES GAINS PROFITS AND
INCOMES DERIVED FROM PERSONAL SALARIES
WAGES AND COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL SERVICES
(including in the case of the President of the United States Federal officials in-
, eluded . the judges of the Supreme and inferior courts of the United States,
and all other officers and employees, whether elected or appointed,
of the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, or any political subdivision
thereof, or the District of Columbia, the compensation received as
such), OF WHATEVER KIND AND IN WHATEVER FORM PAID
OR FROM PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, TRADES, BUSINESSES,
COMMERCE OR SALES, OR DEALINGS IN PROPERTY, WHETHER
REAL OR PERSONAL, GROWING OUT OF THE OWNERSHIP OR USE
OF OR INTEREST IN SUCH PROPERTY; ALSO FRO RENT, DIVIDENDS,
SECURITIES, OR THE TRANSACTION OF ANY BUSINESS CARRIED
ON FOR GAIN OR PROFIT OR GAINS OR PROFITS AND INCOME DERIVED
FROM ANY SOURCE WHATSOEVER.

.(END QUOTE)

THIS IS THE ACTUAL TEXT FROM THE REVENUE ACT OF 1928, THE REVENUE ACT UNDER WHICH FOSTER WAS DECIDED (44 Stat. 9 U.S. Statutes at Large.)
You may find this statute here. https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/44/STATUTE-44-Pg9a.pdf

(BEGIN QUOTE)

PART II.
INDIVIDUALS
NORMAL TAX
SEc. 210. (a) In lieu of the tax imposed by section 210 of the rats, lieu of former
Revenue Act of 1924, there shall be levied, collected, and paid for
each taxable year UPON THE NET INCOME OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL (except
as provided in subdivision (b) of this section) A NORMAL TAX of 5
per centum of the amount OF THE NET INCOME in excess of the credits
provided in section 216, except that in the case of a CITIZEN OR RESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES the rate upon the first $4,000 of such excess
amount shall be 11/2 per centum, and upon the next $4,000 of such
excess amount shall be 3 per centum ;
(b) In lieu of the tax imposed by subdivision (a), there shall Aliens, residents of
be levied, collected, and paid for each taxable year upon the net contiguous countries .
income of every nonresident alien individual, a resident of a contiguous
country, a normal tax equal to the sum of the following (1) 11/2 per centum
of the amount by which the part of the net on compensation for
personal services in income attributable to wages, salaries, professional fees, or other
United States amounts received as compensation for personal services actually
performed in the United States, exceeds the credits provided in
subdivisions (d) and (e) of section 216 ; but the amount taxable Maximum.
at such 11/2 per centum rate shall not exceed $4,000
(2) 3 per centum of the amount by which such part of the net Additional if exceed- ing family credits and
income exceeds the sum of (A) the credits provided in subdivisions $4,00 °§
(d) and (e) of section 216, plus (B) $4,000 ; but the amount taxable
at such 3 per centum rate shall not exceed $4,000 ; and
(3) 5 per centum of the amount of the net income in excess of If in excess thereof.
the sum of (A) the amount taxed under paragraphs (1) and (2),
plus (B) the credits provided in section 216.

SURTAX
Sec. 211. (a} In lieu of the tax imposed b section 211 of the
Revenue Act of 1924, but IN ADDITION TO THE NORMAL TAX
IMPOSED ON INCOMES exceeding $10,000

(Lengthy tax table omitted here)

NET INCOME OF INDIVIDUALS DEFINED
SEC. 212 . (a) IN THE CASE OF AN INDIVIDUAL THE TERM
"NET INCOME"MEANS THE GROSS IN COME AS DEFINED
IN SECTION 213, LESS DEDUCTION ALLOWED BY SECTIONS 214 AND 216.
(b) The net income shall be computed upon the basis of the
taxpayer's annual accounting period (fiscal year or calendar year,
as the case may be) in accordance with the method of accounting
regularly employed in keeping the books of such taxpayer ; but if
no such method of accounting has been so employed, or if the
method employed does not clearly reflect the income, the computation
shall be made in accordance with such method as in the opinion
of the Commissioner does clearly reflect the income. If the taxpayer's
annual accounting period is other than a fiscal year as defined
in section 200 or if the taxpayer has no annual accounting period
or does not keep books, the net income shall be computed on the
basis of the calendar year.
(c) If a taxpayer changes his accounting period from fiscal
year to calendar year, from calendar year to fiscal year, or from
one fiscal year to another, the net income shall, with the approval
of the Commissioner, be computed on the basis of such new
accounting period, subject to the provisions of section 226.
(d) Under regulations prescribed by the Commissioner with the
approval of the Secretary, a person who regularly sells or otherwise
disposes of personal property on the installment plan may return
as income therefrom in any taxable year that proportion of the
installment payments actually received in that year which the
total profit realized or to be realized when the payment is completed,
bears to the total contract price .In the case (1) of a casual sale or
Casual sales of personal, or real property. other casual disposition
of personal property for a price exceeding $1,000, or (2) of a sale
or other disposition of real property, if in either case the initial
payments do not exceed one-fourth of the purchase price, the income
may, under regulations prescribed by the Commissioner with
the approval of the Secretary, be returned on the basis and in
the manner above prescribed in this subdivision.
As used in this subdivision the term " initial payments " means the
payments received in cash or property other than evidences of
indebtedness of the purchaser during the taxable period in which
the sale or other disposition is made .

GROSS INCOME DEFINED
Individual net income

SEC. 213 . For the purposes of this title, except as otherwise provided in section 233-
(a) THE TERM "GROSS INCOME" INCLUDES THE GAINS, PROFITS AND
INCOME DERIVED FROM SALARIES, WAGES, OR COMPENSATION
FOR PERSONAL SERVICE (including in the case of the President of the
United States Federal officials included . the judges of the Supreme
and inferior courts of the United States, and all other officers and
employees, whether elected or appointed, of the United States,
Alaska, Hawaii, or any political subdivision
thereof, or the District of Columbia, the compensation received as
such), OF WHATEVER KIND AND IN WHATEVER FORM PAID, OR FROM
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, TRADES, BUSINESS, OR SALES, OR DEALINGS
IN PROPERTY WHETHER REAL OR PERSONAL GROWING OUT OF THE
OWNERSHIP OR USE OF OR INTEREST IN SUCH PROPERTY; ALSO
FROM RENT, DIVIDENDS, SECURITIES OR TRANSACTION OF ANY BUSINESS
CARRIED ON FOR GAIN OR PROFIT OR GAINS OR PROFITS AND INCOME DERIVED
FROM ANY SOURCE WHATEVER.

(END QUOTE)

THIS IS THE ACTUAL TEXT OF THE REVENUE ACT OF 1932 (Pub. L. 72-154 U.S. Law)
You may find this statute here. https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/47/STATUTE-47-Pg169b.pdf

(BEGIN QUOTE)

SUBTITLE B-GENERAL PROVISIONS
Rates of tax .
SEC. 11. NORMAL TAX ON INDIVIDUALS.
Rates on net income.

There shall be levied, collected, and paid for each taxable year
UPON THE NET INCOME OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL A NORMAL TAX
equal to the sum of the following
(a) 4 per centum of the first $4,000 OF THE AMOUNT OF NET INCOME
in excess of the credits AGAINST NET INCOME provided in
section 25 ; and
(b) 8 per centum of the remainder of such excess amount.

SEC. 12. SURTAX ON INDIVIDUALS.
(a) RATES of SURTAX.-There shall be levied, collected, and paid
for each taxable year UPON THE NET INCOME OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL
a surtax as follows : . .
UPON THE NET INCOME of $6,000 there shall be no surtax ; UPON
THE NET INCOMES in excess of $6,000 and not in excess
of $10,000, 1 per centum of such excess .
-
$40 UPON THE NET INCOMES of $10,000 ; and UPON THE NET INCOMES
in excess of $10,000 and not in excess of $12,000, 2 per centum in addition of
such excess .
$80 UPON THE NET INCOMES of $12,000 ; and UPON THE NET INCOMES in excess
of $12,000 and not in excess of $14,000, 3 per centum in addition of
such excess.
$140 UPON THE NET INCOMES of $14,000 ; and UPON NET INCOMES excess
of $14,000 and not in excess of $16,000, 4 per centum in addition of
such excess .
$220 UPON NET INCOMES of $16,000 ; and UPON NET INCOMES in excess
of $16,000 and not in excess of $18,000, 5 per centum in addition of
such excess.

Surtax on individuals.
Rates.
Part I-Rates of Tax

[lengthy tax table omitted here]
[section on tax on corporations omoitted here]

SEC. 21. NET INCOME.
"NET INCOME" MEANS THE GROSS INCOME COMPUTED UNDER SECTION 22 LESS DEDUCTIONS ALLOWED BY SECTION 23.

SEC. 22. GROSS INCOME.
General definition .
(a,) GENERAL DEFINITION. "GROSS INCOME" INCLUDES GAINS,
PROFITS, AND INCOME DERIVED FROM SALARIES , WAGES, OR
COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL SERVICE OF WHATEVER KIND
IN WHATEVER FORM PAID, OR FROM PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS,
TRADES, BUSINESS, COMMERCE, OR SALES, OR DEALINGS, IN
PROPERTY, WHETHER REAL OR PERSONAL, GROWING OUT OF
THE OWNERSHIP OR USE OF SUCH PROPERTY; ALSO FROM
INTEREST RENT, DIVIDENDS, SECURITIES OR THE TRANSACTION
OF ANY BUSINESS CARRIED ON FRO GAIN OR PROFIT, OR GAINS
OR PROFITS DERIVED FROM ANY COMPENSATION OR SOURCE
WHATEVER. In the case of Presidents of the United States and
Presidents, judges . judges of courts of the United States taking
office after the date of the enactment of this Act, the compensation
received as such shall be included in gross income ; and all Acts
fixing the compensation of such Presidents and judges are hereby
amended accordingly .

(END QUOTE)


CONCLUSION:
THERE HAS NEVER BEEN A SINGLE REVENUE ACT SINCE 1913 (WHEN THE SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT WAS RATIFIED) WHICH DID NOT IMPOSE AN INCOME TAX ON THE INCOMES OF INDIVIDUALS AND INCOME HAS ALWAYS INCLUDED WAGES, SALARIES AND COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL SERVICES. AN INDIVIDUAL HAS ALWAYS BEEN DEFINED AS A "CITIZEN OR RESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES".

NO "SWITCH" FROM TAXING CORPORATIONS TO TAXING INDIVIDUALS EVER OCCURRED. NO "SWITCH" FROM TAXING CORPORATE PROFITS TO TAXING AN INDIVIDUAL'S WAGES AND SALARIES EVER OCCURRED. IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN THIS WAY AND IT HAS NEVER CHANGED!

WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THE "TAX HONESTY" MOVEMENT NOW? LOL!

 

[arminius]

WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THE "TAX HONESTY" MOVEMENT NOW? LOL!

I think the fact that you liers believe we the people are beneath your thumb peons to your communistic thefts of our work demonstrates your truly absurd claims of whatever portion of we the peoples work you covet for your personal profit.

You're not even smart enough to understand all the lives you destroy with your communistic demands.

 

[skychief]

I have a simple solution to this whole mess:

Repeal Amendment XVI and abolish Income Tax entirely.

There are plenty of other indirect taxes that could provide the necessary funding for an essential government.

(AFAIK, the only downside to eliminating the Income Tax is that millions of tax-preparers will be out of a job).

 

[ZZZZZ]

Thread hijack alert:

"Constitutional money. Do you have any?"

EDIT: Point is, you have to have constitutional money in order to have constitutional income.


.
.

 

[Bigjon]

I think the fact that you liers believe we the people are beneath your thumb peons to your communistic thefts of our work demonstrates your truly absurd claims of whatever portion of we the peoples work you covet for your personal profit.

You're not even smart enough to understand all the lives you destroy with your communistic demands.

She's basically correct, because she's using terms not words, Terms that mean what they define them to mean. We read them in English as they want us to, while they lie away using Terms that make it all legal, but deceive the public masses.

She's a lieyer.

 

[TonyG]

She's basically correct, because she's using terms not words, Terms that mean what they define them to mean. We read them in English as they want us to, while they lie away using Terms that make it all legal, but deceive the public masses.

She's a lieyer.

You mean like the term "trade or business" ? Which is defined as the performance of the function of a public office. Which public office has the same meaning as in another section that they ask you to turn to. When you get to that section it lists the federal public offices as in Snoop4truths rant signifies by using the word including and then describes these federal public offices.

Or you mean in the one section of the code, and most sections, when defining the word United States, says, the term United States shall be construed to mean the 10 square mile area of the district of Columbia where as such definition is required to satisfy the statute. Or some similar words.

Or do you mean the definitions of the words includes and including? When the words includes or including are used in a definition they refer to only the items for class of items being specifically named. The words includes and including does not mean in addition to.

Example the term trade or business includes the performance of the functions of a public office. That does not mean that the performance of the functions of a public office are in addition to the normal meaning which we draw from the word trade and or business. But they are excluding things other than the performance of the function of a (federal) public office.

Or do you mean the difference is between the terms United States and the United States of America as described in instructions on signing and oath of affirmation in section 1746 I think it is?

Just a few examples.

Later.

 

[Bigjon]

Well the word individual for instance. Obviously you can have French or Italian individuals and they don't make the US tax rolls, but a US individual sure does.
I'm too lazy to go into the code and look it up, but individual is a term with a whole lot of baggage attached to the English meaning of the word.

 

[snoop4truth]

Well the word individual for instance. Obviously you can have French or Italian individuals and they don't make the US tax rolls, but a US individual sure does.
I'm too lazy to go into the code and look it up, but individual is a term with a whole lot of baggage attached to the English meaning of the word.

According the the actual, written words of every single revenue statute passed since 1913, the individual U.S. person taxed is:

"EVERY CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES, whether residing at home or abroad, AND EVERY PERSON
RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES"

OR

"EVERY CITIZEN OR RESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES"

It sure looks like trick words and baggage to me.

 

[TonyG]

Well the word individual for instance. Obviously you can have French or Italian individuals and they don't make the US tax rolls, but a US individual sure does.
I'm too lazy to go into the code and look it up, but individual is a term with a whole lot of baggage attached to the English meaning of the word.

You might be referring to the word person?

The word person when referring to who is liable can refer to an individual, a partnership, a corporation etc etc etc. It becomes a custom term that is used to create an allegiance or an alliance to 14th amendment and it's phrase saying all persons born are naturalized in the United States...... etc etc so the question is when is a person not a person? It is when they are a US corporation or us partnership etc.

So when is a person born or naturalized in the United States. The answer is when they file papers to become a US corporation or partnership. There date of incorporation or their date of birth.

 

[TonyG]

I'll not give snoop any more of my time.
But for example the word citizen is defined in 1101 I think it is or 1401? as one who owes his allegiance to a state. A state is a collection of statements and beliefs. We also know that according to the Pennsylvania Constitution no man can be compelled or coerced to support an administration or religion against his conscience. Thus we also know that this allegiance to a state must be voluntary while in complete knowledge and awareness of the facts of the matter. The simple fact that citizen and resident are two different terms confirms that they are not the same thing.

During the early part of the formation of the country there were at least three and maybe four statuses of persons. One was a free man status, the religious colonial resident, then after the revolution, the free man and the Republican state citjizen, this was the was the State national which remained dominant until the civil war. Then, after the war, there were state Nationals and federal , u.s. citizens living in d.c. and federal state citizens of d.c. but living in a (federal) state in which they reside according to the wording of the 14th.

Outside of the federal districts, the word resident is determined by jurisdiction and allegiance. For instance the code says that an alien is considered a non-resident alien by reason of his alienage. Only if he resides within a federal district would an alien ((un-allegienced free man or state national) be considered a resident alien.

People read the federal code in the same way that some people read the Old testament. They read for instance the ten commandments and some even read Leviticus and the book of Deuteronomy saying such things that if we do all these things that are written by Moses we will receive the blessing of God. Well the book of Deuteronomy was a speech given by Moses to a particular group of people at a particular time. It was someone else's letter. Likewise there are parts of the code that though people are taught apply universally to all persons residing within the parameters the Continental United States, they may only apply to some or a few of those people.

Like I said I'll not give any more time or attention to Snoop. It sounds like he has been thoroughly educated and his claims thoroughly rebutted. To have less temptation to interact with him I'll be putting him on ignore.

Yep,snoop is on my ignore list for now.

 

[Bigjon]

According the the actual, written words of every single revenue statute passed since 1913, the individual U.S. person taxed is:

"EVERY CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES, whether residing at home or abroad, AND TO EVERY PERSON
RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES"

OR

"CITIZEN OR RESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES"

OR

"A CITIZEN OR RESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES"

It sure looks like trick words and baggage to me.

None of us are lawfully CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES.

Lawfully we are a State National of one of the several States.

We don't reside, we have a permanent domicile in one of our several States. We are Texan's, Iowan's, etc.

 

[TonyG]

Here's an example of the contrast between the word person and individual. This is from title 18 I

As used in this title, the term “organization” means a person other than an individual.

Thus the word person is revealed to be a corporate entity of which a individual can also be.

 

[TRYNEIN]

Here's an example of the contrast between the word person and individual. This is from title 18 I

As used in this title, the term “organization” means a person other than an individual.

Thus the word person is revealed to be a corporate entity of which a individual can also be.

Ejusdem Generis (eh-youse-dem generous) v adj. Latin for "of the same kind,
" used to interpret loosely written statutes. Where a law lists specific classes of persons or things and then refers to them in general, the general statements only apply to the same kind of persons or things specifically listed.

Example:
if a law refers to automobiles, trucks, tractors, motorcycles and other motor-powered vehicles, "vehicles" would not include airplanes, since the list was of land-based transportation.






“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise— the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”
U.S. Code › Title 1 › Chapter 1 › § 1

 

[snoop4truth]

Every revenue act since 1913 has imposed an income tax on several different categories of taxpayers:

1. Every "individual" defined in the act itself as "every citizen or resident of the United States". So, this category applies only to natural persons.

2. AND (not "or") every United States corporation as defined in the revenue act itself. So, this category applies only to artificial persons.

3. AND (not "or") every "nonresident alien and foreign corporation" receiving income from within the borders of the United States. So, this category applies to both natural and artificial persons residing outside the United States.

4. AND (not "or") every trust or estate over which the United States has income tax jurisdiction as defined in the revenue act itself.


The escape hatches that tax protesters so desperately search for do not exist.

 

[arminius]

What hysterical fantasy just to use the term "tax protester". It creates the narrative that we the people owe their god guv not just their fealty, but as much of their alms as the god desires to procure, and should we protest, why you stupid people, I create the narrative. Your desires of freedom is dependent on my rules and regulations, which I specify.

F.Y.I.: It is an unconstitutional violation of due process of law for any judge or prosecutor to "presume" that one may be a franchisee called a "taxpayer" without any supporting evidence. All such presumptions also amount to the establishment of a religion by the government, because they amount to a belief that either is not supported by evidence or is not required to be supported by evidence.

Further, if Federal courts can’t make declaratory judgments relating to federal taxes, then how can they decide that one may be a "taxpayer" who is subject to the franchise agreement to begin with? If they are enjoined from declaring people "taxpayers", then they can’t enforce the franchise agreement against anyone because they can’t determine who is subject to it.
Understand the legal reality, namely that "taxpayer" means "fiduciary" and that has to be asserted at what may be the one and only time to compel "them" judicially to prove up the basis for their purported claim, namely the necessary trust agreement on which their claim depends.

https://famguardian.org/subjects/ta...ion on the,Federal Reserve and other statutes.

 

[BarnacleBob]

Every revenue act since 1913 has imposed an income tax on several different categories of taxpayers:.

1. Every "individual" defined in the act itself as "every citizen or resident of the United States". So, this category applies only to natural persons.

2. AND (not "or") every United States corporation as defined in the revenue act itself. So, this category applies only to artificial persons.

3. AND (not "or") every "nonresident alien and foreign corporation" receiving income from within the borders of the United States. So, this category applies to both natural and artificial persons residing outside the United States.

4. AND (not "or") every trust or estate over which the United States has income tax jurisdiction as defined in the revenue act itself.


The escape hatches that tax protesters so desperately search for do not exist.

"The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law (1) and Equity (2), arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction (3);-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party ***** -- Article III, section 2, U.S. Constitution (emphasis added)

The U.S. federal constitution of 1787 at Article 3, section 2 authorizes ONLY three federal judicial jurisdictions, 1) Law (common), 2) Equity & 3) Maritime Admiralty

1) Federal (Common) Law pursuant the Erie RR v Thompkins case ruled there is no more federal common law... therefore there can be no civil or criminal penalties for violation of federal tax statutes.

2) Equity is purely a civil jurisdictional matter, hence it does not and cannot carry any criminal penalties for violation of federal tax statutes.

3) Maritime Admiralty is a civil jurisdiction that carries criminal penalties for statutory violations that occur in maritime activities & commerce. This jurisdiction is limited in its scope & application to maritime activities & comnerce.

Agency Regulations:

4) Administrative Law is the body of law that governs the activities of administrative agencies of government and does not carry criminal penalties.

It is easy to observe that there is absolutely no constitutional jurisdiction in Article III power courts to try civil cases with criminal penalties against the accused for violations of tax statutes... there remains in and at law only one civil jurisdiction other than Maritime Admiralty that provides criminal penalties for those accused & found of violating federal tax statutes, and that jurisdiction is the Article I "private" legislative "Law Merchant" (Lex Mercatoria) civil jurisdiction. Law Merchant is a "private voluntary civil commercial jurisdiction" that provides for criminal penalties. This complies with 27 CFR 72.11, where all state & federal crimes are voluntary & private in their nature as civil commercial "law merchant" crimes.

Private Law Merchant which is the system of rules and customs and usages generally recognized and adopted by traders as the law for the regulation of their commercial transactions and the resolution of their controversies is the only standing jurisdiction capable of deciding violations of federal tax statutes. Dont be fooled by the so called stare decisis (case law) cases being bantered as some kind of legitimate public law, its neither constitutional nor positive public law, its private nonpositive law heard & tried in defacto Article I private legislative commercial ad hoc summary proceedings disguised as Article III power courts....

And all of the Title 26 statutes bantered about are private legislative nonpositive law, they are NOT positive public law.... The 1916 public cases, Brushaber v. Union Pacific RR & Stanton v. Baltic Mining, SCOTUS ruled that Amendment XVI gave the federal .gov "no new powers of taxation", the amendment as enacted was seriously flawed & failed to accomplish overturning the premise of the landmark 1895 Pollock decision.... for all intents and purpose, the amendment is a nulity, moot, null & void.... So take any so called jural & juristic cases employing the amendment as moot, for they are distractions being employed by the judiciary & bi-cameral legislature to distract you from the truth, namely the "true" voluntary nature of the tax and the activities required to place a natural person within the scope of the private statutory scheme....

When you hear of judges being accused of writing or making law from the bench, the judge is using, deploying & employing private commercial law merchant... law merchant doesnt require statutes, as statutes are mostly advisory & for show, to hide & cover-up the law merchant scheme. Same can be said of unconstitutional roadside & IRS Civil Asset Forfeiture confiscation schemes, all performed using private Law Merchant as their authoritative basis.

If you are voluntarily dealing in private commercial paper within the commercial credit system, aka accepting bank credit & bills of exchange, etc. you are a merchant and your activities fall within the scope of the taxing authority & statutes.....

Learn What Law Merchant is and What the Judges Know at the link below....

https://famguardian.org/subjects/taxes/Articles/DispatchOfMerchants.htm#:~:text=THE DISPATCH OF MERCHANTS&text=A short presentation on the,Federal Reserve and other statutes.

Sources and Authorities:

Article III U.S. Constitution
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/article/article-iii

Administrative Law
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Administrative_law#:~:text=Administrative law is the body,a branch of public law.

27 CFR 72.11
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/27/72.11

Positive Law Codification
https://uscode.house.gov/codification/legislation.shtml

Law Merchant
https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/law+merchant#:~:text=The system of rules and,the resolution of their controversies.

Article One Legislative Courts
https://ballotpedia.org/Article_I_tribunal#:~:text=An Article I tribunal is,of the United States Constitution.&text=They can be Article I,court judges, or administrative agencies.

USC TITLE 26
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26

Amendment XVI
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendment/amendment-xvi

Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/240/1/

Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1916)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/240/103/

Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/157/429/

 

[TRYNEIN]

1) Federal (Common) Law pursuant the Erie RR v Thompkins case ruled there is no more federal common law... therefore there can be no civil or criminal penalties for violation of federal tax statutes.

Actually BB,
I believe that the Erie R.R. case CONFIRMED that there NEVER WAS any Federal common law, because the Fed only has jurisdiction over commerce.


For those who don't know:
Common law is a 'living man' against a 'living man' ...
whereas the Statutory courts are 'paper against paper' [fictitious entities]


There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or 'general,' be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts. – -
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)



The Common law still exists at the state level.


We, the People, formed our Federal and State Republics for the sole purpose of securing our unalienable rights. In a Republic, the unalienable rights of each individual are superior to the laws

There can be no limitation on the power of the people of the United States. By their authority the State Constitutions were made, and by their authority the Constitution of the United States was established; – U. S. Supreme Court - Hauenstein vs Lynham (100 US 483)

In order to assure the people retained the power to control their several governments, the Founding Fathers firmly established the power of the “People’s Courts” in the 7th Article of the Bill of Rights.

We the People retained all rights to the Common Law, and We made the Common Law Courts Superior to any other court in the land so that We the People could step in at any time and overturn a decision that is not in keeping with the Law that We established in the Federal and State Constitutions.

In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law. –
7th Amendment to the Constitution for the United States of America

 

[BarnacleBob]

Actually BB,
I believe that the Erie R.R. case CONFIRMED that there NEVER WAS any Federal common law, because the Fed only has jurisdiction over commerce.


For those who don't know:
Common law is a 'living man' against a 'living man' ...
whereas the Statutory courts are 'paper against paper' [fictitious entities]


There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or 'general,' be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts. – -
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)



The Common law still exists at the state level.


We, the People, formed our Federal and State Republics for the sole purpose of securing our unalienable rights. In a Republic, the unalienable rights of each individual are superior to the laws

There can be no limitation on the power of the people of the United States. By their authority the State Constitutions were made, and by their authority the Constitution of the United States was established; – U. S. Supreme Court - Hauenstein vs Lynham (100 US 483)

In order to assure the people retained the power to control their several governments, the Founding Fathers firmly established the power of the “People’s Courts” in the 7th Article of the Bill of Rights.

We the People retained all rights to the Common Law, and We made the Common Law Courts Superior to any other court in the land so that We the People could step in at any time and overturn a decision that is not in keeping with the Law that We established in the Federal and State Constitutions.

In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law. –
7th Amendment to the Constitution for the United States of America

For those who don't know:
Common law is a 'living man' against a 'living man' ...
whereas the Statutory courts are 'paper against paper' [fictitious entities]

The only addition to your statement that may require further clarity would be to add:

For those who don't know:
Common law is a 'living man' against a 'living man' ...
whereas the Statutory courts are 'commercial paper against commercial paper' [fictitious entities]

 

[BarnacleBob]

§ 2-104. Definitions: "Merchant"; "Between Merchants"; "Financing Agency".

(1) "Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
(2) "Financing agency" means a bank, finance company or other person who in the ordinary course of business makes advances against goods or documents of title or who by arrangement with either the seller or the buyer intervenes in ordinary course to make or collect payment due or claimed under the contract for sale, as by purchasing or paying the seller's draft or making advances against it or by merely taking it for collection whether or not documents of title accompany the draft. "Financing agency" includes also a bank or other person who similarly intervenes between persons who are in the position of seller and buyer in respect to the goods (Section 2-707).
(3) "Between Merchants" means in any transaction with respect to which both parties are chargeable with the knowledge or skill of merchants.

https://www.law.cornell.edu/ucc/2/2-104

RE: The Commercial Credit System

https://www.goldismoney2.com/threads/the-commercial-credit-system.441169/