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Ron Gibson on allodial title via your land patent

Bigjon

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#1

Bigjon

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Do ya have Cliff Notes on this?
Now wouldn't that be nice?

He says he has written a book, but I have not found out where to buy it.
 

snoop4truth

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THE LAND PATENT AND ALLODIAL TITLE HOAX

Ron Gibson recommends that you create and file a "land patent" which he claims will give your real property "allodial title" and make it exempt from foreclosure and absolve you of the obligations to pay property taxes and fines from code violations. But, none of this is so.

A "land patent" is a document reflecting the VERY FIRST transfer of real property from a sovereign government to a private person or entity. No subsequent transfer of that real property involves a land patent. All subsequent transfers of that real property involve a deed. The maximum amount of land patents for a parcel of real property is ONE. No land patent or deed transfers real property free from the risk of eminent domain (governmental purchasing of that real property for a public purpose in exchange for "just compensation").

Likewise, no land patent or deed transfers real property free of the obligation to pay real property taxes to pay for government services which benefit the real property owner (building roads, road maintenance, drainage, fire protection, police protection, public schools, etc.). Finally, no land patent or deed makes it impossible for the owner to voluntarily encumber his/her real property with a mortgage transferred to a lender as security for a loan made to the owner. So, no land patent or deed protects real property from the risk of imminent domain or property taxes and does not render real property foreclosure

CONCLUSION: Land patents are completely useless and irrelevant as defenses to imminent domain, taxes and foreclosure. Land patents are only relevant to the very first party in the chain of title as they convey clear title, unlike title that has gone through dozens of hands.

READ ONLY THE BOLD TYPE IN THE LAW BELOW

153 Ill. App.3d 605 (1987)505 N.E.2d 387 GEORGE M. BRITT et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
FEDERAL LAND BANK ASSOCIATION OF ST. LOUIS et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 86-0248.
Illinois Appellate Court — Second District.
Opinion filed March 11, 1987.
606*606 Robert L. Collins, of Carol Stream, for appellants.
George F. Mahoney III, of Herschbach, Tracy, Johnson, Bertani & Wilson, of Joliet, for appellees.
Judgment affirmed, and motion allowed in part, and denied in part and remanded.
PRESIDING JUSTICE LINDBERG delivered the opinion of the court:
On November 8, 1985, plaintiffs, George M. Britt and Anita C. Britt, filed suit against defendants, the Federal Land Bank Association of St. Louis (bank or defendant), Yorkville National Bank, John Doe, Jane Doe, and all unknown parties, seeking to quiet title to property they formerly owned. Plaintiffs alleged in their verified complaint that the documents labeled "Land Patents" signed and recorded by them, conveyed or vested in them title superior to any other claims, including that which was acquired by defendant bank in the foreclosure proceeding concluded in the circuit court of Kendall 607*607 County. Plaintiffs' complaint further alleged that the bank was wrongfully placed in possession of the foreclosed-upon property by order of the circuit court of Kendall County entered May 6, 1985, nunc pro tunc April 24, 1985.
It appears that on April 25, 1985, plaintiffs filed documents bearing the caption of a "Land Patent" in the office of the Kendall County recorder of deeds. The "Land Patents" begin, "I, George M. Britt & Anita C. Britt, bring up this land patent in my name." Attached as an exhibit to each of the documents entitled "land patents" is a copy of a land patent issued on July 1, 1841, by the General Land Office wherein the grantees were "Francis Evans" and "James Evans."
On December 13, 1985, defendant bank filed its motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice pursuant to sections 2-619(a)(4) and 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, pars. 2-619(a)(4), 2-619(a)(9)), alleging plaintiffs' action was barred under the theories of res judicata and collateral estoppel. On January 21, 1986, plaintiffs filed their motion for a change of venue from the Honorable John Peterson. On January 27, 1986, plaintiffs' change of venue motion was granted, and the cause was transferred and assigned to the Honorable James Wilson for hearing. On February 28, 1986, the trial court heard arguments, and the plaintiffs' complaint was dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiffs contend on appeal of the dismissal of their complaint that: (1) "American farmers under the acts of Congress of 1818, 1821 and 1823, have set up a solid basis made for [sic] the validity of Land Patent over all other titles and where these titles clash with local title, the Land Patent is superior"; (2) "it is well-settled that a Land Patent which has been recorded prior to a foreclosure sale gives a fee simple title to plaintiffs, and the title arising out of a foreclosure is not a real title at all, but only a color of title, inferior in every way to the plaintiffs' Land Patent"; and (3) plaintiffs' Land Patent can only be attacked in Alexandria, Virginia, and not in the circuit court of Kendall County.
Defendant bank maintains that: (1) the judgment of foreclosure was entered March 22, 1985, the property was sold at a sheriff's sale May 8, 1985, and the order confirming the sale was entered May 24, 1985, and that plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from claiming superior title and that the foreclosure procedure was res judicata as regards plaintiffs' rights in the property; (2) the theories of res judicata and collateral estoppel underlying defendants' sections 2-619(a)(4) and 2-619(a)(9) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, pars. 2-619(a)(4), 2-619(a)(9)) 608*608 motion preclude relitigation of claims to the property; (3) in addition to the theories relied upon by the trial court, plaintiffs' claim of superior title is unsupported by any Illinois case law and has been rejected when raised in the Federal courts; and (4) attempts to gain superior title by the filing of land patents have been met by criminal sanctions.
• 1 Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) (103 Ill.2d R. 341(e)(7)) provides, among other things, that an appellant's brief must contain citations to the relevant authority supporting the argument advanced on appeal. (See Village of Cary v. Jakubek (1984), 121 Ill. App.3d 341, 345, 459 N.E.2d 651; Michalek v. Village of Midlothian (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 1021, 1039, 452 N.E.2d 655.) A court of review is entitled to have the issues clearly defined and to be cited pertinent authority. (Fuller v. Justice (1983), 117 Ill. App.3d 933, 943, 453 N.E.2d 1133; Pecora v. Szabo (1982), 109 Ill. App.3d 824, 825-26, 441 N.E.2d 360.) A contention that is supported by some argument but by no authority whatsoever does not satisfy the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7). (Fuller v. Justice (1983), 117 Ill. App.3d 933, 942-43, 453 N.E.2d 1133; Wilson v. Continental Body Corp. (1981), 93 Ill. App.3d 966, 969, 418 N.E.2d 56.) The well-established rule is that bare contentions without argument or citation of authority do not merit consideration on appeal. Deckard v. Joiner (1970), 44 Ill.2d 412, 419, 255 N.E.2d 900, cert. denied (1970), 400 U.S. 941, 27 L.Ed.2d 244, 91 S.Ct. 232; Fuller v. Justice (1983), 117 Ill. App.3d 933, 942-43, 453 N.E.2d 1133.
While purporting to cite authority, generally, for what is set forth in their briefs as issues on appeal, plaintiffs have failed to comply with Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) (103 Ill.2d R. 341(e)(7)). We do not view the inclusion of citations to irrelevant authority scattered throughout their brief to constitute even an attempt to comply with the rule. In fact, plaintiffs' briefs are nothing more than a compilation of disjointed and nonsensical claims and legal conclusions totally unsupported by citations to the record or relevant legal authority. We may treat the issues raised as having been waived for failure to cite authority. (103 Ill.2d R. 341(e)(7).) However, as the question of the legal significance of "land patents" on land titles may arise again, we undertake an analysis of the issue.
• 2, 3 Defendant's motion to dismiss was based upon the bar of a prior adjudication, the foreclosure proceeding. Section 2-619(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a defendant may, within the time for pleadings, file a motion for dismissal of the action on the ground that the claim or demand asserted against defendant is barred 609*609 by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim or demand. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2-619(a).) An affirmative matter under this section is something in the nature of a defense that negates an alleged cause of action completely or refutes crucial conclusions of law or conclusions of material fact unsupported by allegations of specific fact contained or inferred from the complaint. (Illinois Housing Development Authority v. Sjostrom & Sons, Inc. (1982), 105 Ill. App.3d 247, 252, 433 N.E.2d 1350.) Generally, the doctrine of res judicata is that an existing final judgment rendered upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of rights, questions, and facts in issue as to the parties and their privies and all other actions in the same or any other court of competent jurisdiction. (Housing Authority v. YMCA (1984), 101 Ill.2d 246, 251-52, 461 N.E.2d 959.) The principle of res judicata extends not only to questions which were actually litigated but also to all questions which could have been raised or determined. Spiller v. Continental Tube Co. (1983), 95 Ill.2d 423, 432, 447 N.E.2d 834; Kuehner v. Melliere (1969), 118 Ill. App.2d 348, 351, 255 N.E.2d 36.
The parties have disclosed no Illinois authority on whether the filing of what is alleged to be a "land patent" by the former mortgagors of property has any legal effect, much less whether such a document filed after the entry of a judgment of foreclosure would have any significance. However, as defendant ably documents, the courts of other States and the Federal courts have spoken to the issue of the legal sufficiency of "land patents." These courts have rendered decisions upon a variety of issues based upon facts similar to the case at bar, where plaintiffs in a suit to quiet title filed a document described as a land patent and claimed superior title to that of the purchaser at the judicial sale of the property. Hilgeford v. Peoples Bank (7th Cir.1985), 776 F.2d 176; Hilgeford v. Peoples Bank (N.D. Ind. 1985), 607 F. Supp. 536; Nixon v. Phillipoff (N.D. Ind. 1985), 615 F. Supp. 890; Federal Land Bank v. Gefroh (N.D. 1986), 390 N.W.2d 46; Timm v. State Bank (Minn. App. 1985), 374 N.W.2d 588; Wisconsin v. Glick (7th Cir.1986), 782 F.2d 670.
Because of the lack of Illinois case law on what appears to be a procedure without legal foundation in Illinois, we find the analysis of Judge William C. Lee of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana in Hilgeford v. Peoples Bank (Hilgeford v. Peoples Bank (N.D. Ind. 1985), 607 F. Supp. 536) instructive. There, as here, the plaintiffs attempted to establish superior title to the property foreclosed upon by their mortgagee, the Peoples Bank. Judge 610*610 Lee observed:
"The `patent' involved here is not a grant by the United States; it is a grant by the plaintiffs. The `patent' here is not a grant to some other holder so as to pass title on to another party; it is a self-serving document whereby the plaintiffs grant the patent to themselves. This `patent' does not involve or concern `public land;' it relates to plaintiffs' private property. The court cannot conceive how these federal provisions are implicated here, and thus federal question jurisdiction is absent.
Of course, the purported `land patent' in this case fails for reasons independent of jurisdiction. As was noted before, the `land patent' attached to plaintiffs' various filings is a grant of a land patent from the plaintiffs' to the plaintiffs. It is, quite simply, an attempt to improve title by saying it is better. The court cannot conceive of a potentially more disruptive force in the world of property law than the ability of a person to get `superior' title to land by simply filling out a document granting himself a `land patent' and then filing it with the recorder of deeds. Such self-serving, gratuitous activity does not, cannot and will not be sufficient by itself to create good title.
* * *​
Because this cause constitutes the third quiet title suit filed in this court within the past month on the basis of almost identical self-serving land patents (two of which were filed by these same plaintiffs), the court fears that other such suits will be filed unless a signal is sent that this court will not tolerate such obviously frivolous suits based upon documents which on their very face are legal nullities.​
* * *​
This cause falls squarely within the parameters of the type of frivolous claims that Rule 11 allows courts to issue sanctions for. It is based upon a purported land patent which indicates on its face that it is a self-serving document, drafted by the plaintiffs to grant themselves title to land, and which does not invoke any federal law or constitutional provision precisely because it is a blatant attempt by private landowners to improve title by personal fiat. Such lawsuits constitute a gross waste of precious judicial resources, for this court is forced to deal with patently frivolous lawsuits instead of addressing those suits on its docket which have merit and deserve close judicial scrutiny.​
* * * The court finds that a $250.00 fine is an appropriate sanction here. Further this order stands as public notice to all 611*611 future litigants who may seek to file lawsuits based on the same type of self-serving, invalid `land patent:' this court will issue Rule 11 sanctions for such lawsuits. This court stands ready to adjudicate any federal question arising out of a valid federal land patent which has been signed by the Secretary of the Interior (43 U.S.C. sec. 15) and involves a grant of title to public lands. However, this court will not countenance suits based upon self-serving documents and pet theories about land ownership such as this one.​
For the reasons stated above, this action is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rules Civil Procedure 12(h)(3). Plaintiffs are hereby ORDERED to pay $250.00 to the Clerk of this court as a sanction for filing this lawsuit." 607 F. Supp. 536, 538-40.​
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in affirming the judgment of the district court stated, inter alia:
"The conclusion that this appeal is frivolous seems inescapable. The drafting and recordation of the Declaration of Land Patent was a blatant attempt by the Hilgefords to circumvent the Bank's mortgage and improve their title. The district court informed them twice within a month's time that this device did not improve their title or form the basis for federal jurisdiction. On appeal, the Hilgefords have completely failed to support their claim of jurisdiction by citing relevant authority or by refuting the district court's analysis.​
Our review of the briefs and record persuades us that this is vexatious litigation; an appropriate case for the imposition of sanctions. The Hilgefords have no support for their claims of superior title or federal jurisdiction. Their brief was also woefully inadequate. We can think of no other reason for this appeal other than delay, harassment, or sheer obstinancy. Reid, 715 F.2d at 1155. Accordingly, we award the Bank $500 in damages for this frivolous appeal in addition to the costs allowed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39." Hilgeford v. Peoples Bank (7th Cir.1985), 776 F.2d 176, 179.
In Federal Land Bank v. Gefroh (N.D. 1986), 390 N.W.2d 46, a case with facts strikingly similar to the case at bar and the Hilgeford v. Peoples Bank cases, the bank obtained a judgment of foreclosure. The plaintiff failed to redeem. The property was conveyed to the bank by sheriff's deed. The bank was then successful in its suit to remove the plaintiff from the property. On plaintiffs' appeal the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded:
612*612 "Gefroh's assertion that his property was immune from mortgage foreclosure because title stemmed from a federal land patent is completely without merit. Even `an entryman on government lands, holding the same under the homestead laws, may give a valid mortgage thereon,' [citation]. Gefroh mortgaged his property to the Bank in return for a loan. Therefore, his property was subject to foreclosure action." (390 N.W.2d 46, 47.)
The court affirmed the judgment of eviction.
Nixon v. Phillipoff (N.D. Ind. 1985), 615 F. Supp. 890, was another district court case involving an attempt to claim Federal jurisdiction by reason of the plaintiffs' "Land Patent." The district court said: "This court has considered Nixon's land patent and found it to be a frivolous legal nullity that did not and could not affect the title to the mortgaged land at issue in the underlying foreclosure action." 615 F. Supp. 890, 894.
Under common law tradition, all private titles since Norman times have originated from title held by the sovereign.(1 H. Tiffany, Real Property sec. 13 (2d ed. 1920).) The seminal opinion in American jurisprudence analyzing the origin of sovereign titles and setting forth the principles by which conflicting title claims based upon competing sovereignties was authored by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in Johnson v. M'Intosh (1823), 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 5 L.Ed. 681. There, Chief Justice Marshall outlined the means by which sovereigns acquire title (conquest, cession, and treaty) and stated that by the Treaty of Paris in 1783:
"[T]he powers of government, and the right to soil, which had previously been in Great Britain, passed definitively to the states." Johnson v. M'Intosh (1823), 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 584, 5 L.Ed. 681, 691.​
• 4 This sovereign title, which is absolute and encompasses on the part of the sovereign authority both ownership of the land and the right to govern the inhabitants thereof, is "allodial" title. This term is used in contradistinction to the term "fee simple title," which contemplates the highest title which may be privately held. (1 H. Tiffany, Real Property secs. 6, 13 (2d ed. 1920).) Fee simple title may freely be alienated by conveyance, mortgage, or devise but still be subject to some claim of the sovereign. (1 H. Tiffany, Real Property secs. 6, 13 (2d ed. 1920).) In current usage, the holder of fee simple title is still subject to dispossession by the government, through due process of law, for nonpayment of real estate taxes and by eminent domain proceedings.
The only correct premise supported by authority in the Britts' 613*613 brief is that land held by the Federal government is not subject to the acts of the States. (Cf. Gibson v. Chouteau (1871), 80 U.S. 92, 20 L.Ed. 534; Oregon v. McKay (D.C. Cir.1955), 226 F.2d 343.) What is totally incorrect is the implicit foundation of the Britts' position: that the land patent issued to "James Evans" and "Francis Evans" in 1841 conveyed the entire title of the Federal government, such that no interest arising by operation of State law can attach to the title.
• 5 A land patent is merely the deed by which the government passes fee simple title of government land to private persons. (63A Am.Jur.2d Public Lands sec. 70 (1984).) Once fee simple title is passed to an individual from the government, whether by land patent or otherwise, claims arising from conveyance or mortgage by that holder will be enforced against him. (Cf. Stark v. Starr (1876), 94 U.S. 477, 24 L.Ed. 276; United States v. Budd (1891), 144 U.S. 154, 36 L.Ed. 384; see also 63A Am.Jur.2d Public Lands sec. 92 (1984).) Where, as here, a decree of foreclosure and sale has divested title from the former mortgagor, the mere fact that the mortgagor's claim of title may run directly back through his family to a 19th-century patent is of no consequence.
The assertion in the Britts' brief that they hold "fee simple allodial title" is untenable. The Britts have never held sovereign title and now have been divested of their fee simple title by due process of law in the foreclosure action.
The purported "perfected patent" filed by the Britts matches the description of similar documents filed in other States. In Wisconsin v. Glick (7th Cir.1986), 782 F.2d 670, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals described these "new land patents" in the following terms:
"People saddled with mortgages may treasure the idea of having clean title to their homes. The usual way to obtain clean title is to pay one's debts. Some have decided that it is cheaper to write a `land patent' purporting to convey unassailable title, and to file that `patent' in the recording system." 782 F.2d 670, 671.
• 6 The "new patent" or "perfected patent" theory asserted on appeal, as it relates to the original patents, is also defeated by the estoppel effect of the foreclosure judgment. To the extent that the new theory may be construed as a separate and independent claim, it will be accorded the same treatment by this court that it has been accorded by the district courts of Indiana, Wisconsin, and Minnesota and by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. It is frivolous and without basis and should not be raised in the circuit courts of this State.
614*614 Defendant, Federal Land Bank Association of St. Louis, has moved in this court for the imposition of sanctions against plaintiffs and Robert L. Collins, their counsel. The motion, filed August 1, 1986, was ordered taken with the case. No objections to the motions have been filed, and the time for objections has long since passed. 103 Ill.2d R. 361(b)(2).
The gravamen of defendant Bank's motion is:
"That Plaintiff's complaint, as signed by their attorney, alleged allegations which were made without reasonable cause and are frivolous and unwarranted. In substance, the thrust of their complaint to quiet title is purportedly grounded on a [sic] Plaintiffs' `allodial' fee simple title emanating from `land patents' from the Plaintiffs for the benefit of the Plaintiffs.
* * *​
That the Plaintiffs' complaint and attorney Robert L. Collins' conduct in signing, filing and attempting to prosecute it, hinders the judicial process and constitutes a gross waste of judicial resources requiring the court to deal with patently frivolous law suits instead of addressing those suits on its docket which have merit and deserve close scrutiny."​
• 7 Section 2-611 (formerly section 41) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2-611) is an attempt by the legislature to penalize the litigant who pleads frivolous or false matters or brings a suit without any basis in law and thereby puts the burden upon his opponent to expend money for an attorney to make a defense against an untenable suit. (Ready v. Ready (1961), 33 Ill. App.2d 145, 161-62, 178 N.E.2d 650.) One of the purposes of section 2-611 is to prevent litigants from being subjected to harassment by the bringing of actions against them which in their nature are vexatious, based upon false statements, or brought without any legal foundation. 33 Ill. App.2d 145, 162, 178 N.E.2d 650.
• 8 While this motion is made for the first time in the appellate court, we hold that it was timely. (Brooks v. Goins (1967), 81 Ill. App.2d 12, 225 N.E.2d 707.) We have held that the claim of plaintiffs to a title superior to that of defendant based upon plaintiffs' filing with the recorder of deeds a document described as a "land patent" is frivolous and brought without any legal foundation. We, therefore, remand this case to the circuit court of Kendall County for a hearing only on the single issue of determining reasonable attorney fees and costs (see Voss v. Lakefront Realty Corp. (1977), 48 Ill. App.3d 56, 365 N.E. 347) expended by defendants in defense of the cause in the trial court. The hearing should be conducted by the judge who heard 615*615 defendant's motion. (Boss v. Coe Investment Co. (1964), 45 Ill. App.2d 417, 195 N.E.2d 735.) The court should also assess reasonable fees and costs for defendant's defense of plaintiffs' appeal as a needless extension of a baseless lawsuit. Manchester Insurance & Indemnity Co. v. Strom (1970), 122 Ill. App.2d 183, 258 N.E.2d 150.
• 9 Defendant included in its motion for sanctions allegations of a violation by counsel, Robert L. Collins, of section 7-102 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (87 Ill.2d R. 7-102), which provides:
"In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not​
* * *​
(2) knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, except that he may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by a good-faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law."​
Defendant contends that the plaintiffs' complaint, and attorney Robert L. Collins' conduct in signing, filing, and attempting to prosecute it, hinders the judicial process and constitutes a gross waste of judicial resources requiring the court to deal with frivolous lawsuits instead of addressing those suits on its docket which have merit and deserve close scrutiny.
The appropriate forum for consideration of this allegation is the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of the supreme court. The supreme court has the exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law; it has the power to impose sanctions for unprofessional conduct so as to protect the public interest and guard the legal profession against reproach. In re Nesselson (1979), 76 Ill.2d 135, 137-38, 390 N.E.2d 857; In re Mitan (1979), 75 Ill.2d 118, 387 N.E.2d 278, cert. denied (1979), 444 U.S. 916, 62 L.Ed.2d 171, 100 S.Ct. 231. Accordingly, we deny that part of the motion.
Defendant's motion, taken with the case, is allowed in part, denied in part and remanded for a hearing and a determination of reasonable attorney fees and costs to be assessed against plaintiffs. The judgment of the circuit court of Kendall County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Motion allowed in part, denied in part and remanded.
UNVERZAGT and INGLIS, JJ., concur


2d 670 (1986)STATE OF WISCONSIN, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Andrew F. GLICK, Joseph Birkenstock, Donald Leist, Michael Dewane, and Samuel S. Misenko, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 85-2035, 85-2036, 85-2043, 85-2044 and 85-2258.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Submitted January 8, 1986.Decided January 24, 1986.Rehearing Denied March 21, 1986.
671*671 Charles D. Hoornstra, Asst. Atty. Gen., Madison, Wis., for plaintiff-appellee.
Andrew F. Glick, Whitelaw, Wis., Joseph Birkenstock, Michael Dewane, Manitowoc, Wis., Samuel S. Miseko, Newton, Wis., for defendants-appellants.
Before POSNER, COFFEY and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge.
People saddled with mortgages may treasure the idea of having clean title to their homes. The usual way to obtain clean title is to pay one's debts. Some have decided that it is cheaper to write a "land patent" purporting to convey unassailable title, and to file that "patent" in the recording system. For example, Samuel Misenko, one of the appellants, drafted a "declaration of land patent" purporting to clear the title to an acre of land of all encumbrances. He recorded that "patent" with the appropriate officials of Manitowoc, Wisconsin. He attached to his "patent" a genuine patent, to a quarter section of land, signed by President Fillmore in 1851.
672*672 The theory of Misenko's new "patent" is that because the original patent from the United States conveyed a clear title, no state may allow subsequent encumbrances on that title. The patent of 1851 grants title to "Christian Bond and to his heirs and assigns forever." Misenko apparently thinks that this standard conveyancers' language for creating a fee simple "forever" bars all other interests in the land. We have held to the contrary that federal patents do not prevent the creation of later interests and have nothing to do with claims subsequently arising under state law. See Hilgeford v. Peoples Bank, 776 F.2d 176 (7th Cir.1985).
We have consolidated five pro se cases arising from home-drawn "patents." All five began as criminal complaints charging the appellants with criminal slander of title, in violation of Wisc.Stat. § 943.60(1). The state's theory is that the "patents" are frivolous documents that confuse the system of recording interests in real property. Each appellant removed the criminal proceeding to federal court, invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1443. The district court remanded the cases to state court, and the appellants promptly sought review.[*]
If self-drafted "land patents" are frivolous gestures, as we held in Hilgeford, then the removal of the state's prosecutions is frivolity on stilts. (Apologies to Jeremy Bentham.) Section 1443(1), which the appellants invoke, permits the removal of an action against a person "who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of [the] State a right under any law providing for the equal rights of citizens of the United States...." A "law providing for the equal rights" means, in § 1443(1), a law guaranteeing racial equality. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 786-94, 86 S.Ct. 1783, 1786-91, 16 L.Ed.2d 925 (1966). "Denied or cannot enforce" means that the frustration of the right to racial equality is "manifest in a formal expression of state law" (id. at 803, 86 S.Ct. at 1796) — that a statute or authoritative decision announces that claims of the sort asserted are untenable within the state's judicial system. See also Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213, 219-22, 95 S.Ct. 1591, 1595-96, 44 L.Ed.2d 121 (1975); City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 86 S.Ct. 1800, 16 L.Ed.2d 944 (1966).
Of the five appellants, only Glick asserts that he is the victim of racial discrimination. Glick, who is white, does not explain the nature of this discrimination. None of the appellants explains how the prosecutions for criminal slander of title offend any specific federal law securing racial equality. None explains how any state law frustrates all hope of implementing the federal right. The appellants say that the state courts are biased against them and that they are being prosecuted on account of the exercise of federal rights, but it has been established since City of Greenwood v. Peacock, supra, 384 U.S. at 827, 86 S.Ct. at 1812, that a person may not obtain removal just by alleging that "federal equal civil rights have been illegally and corruptly denied by state administrative officials in advance of trial, that the charges against the defendant are false, or that the defendant is unable to obtain a fair trial in a particular state court." Unless a federal statute provides "that no State should even attempt to prosecute [appellants] for their conduct" (id. at 826, 86 S.Ct. at 1811-12), they may not remove. No federal statute authorizes the filing of bogus "land patents" that confound recording systems. There is no colorable argument for removal. The district court properly remanded these cases.
673*673 Hilgeford held that the effort to use federal land patents to override subsequent interests in property was sufficiently frivolous to support an award of damages under Fed.R.App.P. 38. See 776 F.2d at 179. The combination of the claim found frivolous in Hilgeford with a frivolous effort to remove also supports a penalty. The difference is that these are criminal prosecutions.
We have been unable to find an award of attorneys' fees, or damages in lieu of attorneys' fees, against the defendant in any criminal case. Several considerations support a general reluctance to award attorneys' fees in criminal cases. First, most rules and statutes authorizing awards of fees — e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 — apply only to civil litigation. Second, courts have tolerated arguments on behalf of criminal defendants that would be inappropriate on behalf of civil litigants. Many rules, starting with the special burden to show guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt," recognize the social interest in having a bias against conviction. Novel arguments that may keep people out of jail ought not to be discouraged by the threat of attorneys' fees. Third, the statute authorizing the imposition of costs against criminal defendants, 28 U.S.C. § 1918(b), implies that the costs are to be part of the sentence (if the defendant is convicted), and an appellate court therefore cannot use this grant of power. Section 1918(b) also uses "costs" in the usual sense, which excludes attorneys' fees. Compare United States v. Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921 (4th Cir.1980), with United States v. Glover, 588 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.1978). Fourth, when a defendant seriously misbehaves in the trial court, the judge may take the misconduct into account in imposing sentence. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978). This reduces the need for a separate penalty in the form of attorneys' fees. Finally, there are practical and constitutional limits on the monetary sanctions that may be employed against indigent criminal defendants. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983).
Although it is therefore no surprise that courts do not award attorneys' fees against criminal defendants who assert frivolous positions, we have not found any case suggesting that an award of fees, or of damages under Rule 38 in lieu of fees, is prohibited. Criminal defendants and their lawyers must abide by the rules that apply to other litigants, see Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458-60, 95 S.Ct. 584, 590-92, 42 L.Ed.2d 574 (1975), including the principle that litigating positions must have some foundation in existing law or be supported by reasoned, colorable arguments for change in the law. See Rule 11 and, e.g., In re TCI, Ltd., 769 F.2d 441 (7th Cir.1985); Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 775 F.2d 177 (7th Cir.1985); Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir.1985). Cf. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 1400, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983). An argument in the teeth of the law is vexatious, and a criminal defendant who chooses to harass his prosecutor may not do so with impunity. The time of prosecutors is valuable. If a defendant multiplies the proceedings, this takes time that could more usefully be devoted to other prosecutions. When a defendant makes an argument so empty that no responsible lawyer could think the argument supportable by any plausible plea for a change in the law the court may reply with a penalty.
We need not consider whether and when a court should impose sanctions on a criminal defendant who simply makes unsupportable arguments during the regular course of trial and appeal. (Perhaps sanctions imposed on counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 would be more appropriate than sanctions on defendants.) These appellants have wrenched their cases from the regular course. Wisconsin filed simple criminal complaints. Instead of arguing their positions in the courts of Wisconsin, these appellants removed the cases, imposing costs on a new set of courts. These removals have distracted judges from serious cases and delayed the consideration of more substantial claims. The prosecutors must deal 674*674 not only with three levels of review in state court but also with two (so far, and potentially three) tiers of federal courts.
These removals vexatiously multiplied the proceedings in the original sense of that phrase. And federal courts lack the principal weapons available to the state courts to prevent harassing litigation. Because the appellants will not be sentenced in federal court, the court cannot impose the costs of prosecution as part of the sentence or augment any sentence of incarceration under the principle of Grayson. It is attorneys' fees and damages under Rule 38 or nothing.
An award of damages under Rule 38 in these cases will not stifle the vigorous defense of criminal charges. It will, however, ensure that the appellants and others like them think twice before removing to federal court criminal prosecutions that belong in state court. These petitions for removal had no conceivable foundation. Each defendant therefore is assessed $500 in damages under Fed.R.App.P. 38, in addition to double costs.
AFFIRMED.
[*] Although orders remanding cases are ordinarily not reviewable by appellate courts, see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) and Gravitt v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 430 U.S. 723, 97 S.Ct. 1439, 52 L.Ed.2d 1 (1977), that statute permits appellate review when the removal was based on § 1443. Our jurisdiction is not defeated by the fact that Glick has been tried and convicted in the state court while the cases were pending here; a decision that the remand was improper would require Glick's conviction to be set aside. Cf. Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 205-07, 92 S.Ct. 2308, 2309-10, 33 L.Ed.2d 293 (1972); Fosdick v. Dunwoody, 420 F.2d 1140, 1141 n. 1 (1st Cir.1970).




776 F.2d 176 (1985)Arnold W. HILGEFORD and Martha A. Hilgeford, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
The PEOPLES BANK, Portland, Indiana, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 85-1744.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Submitted August 22, 1985.[*]Decided October 31, 1985.
177*177 Arnold W. Hilgeford, Portland, pro se.
Robert E. Grant, Shoaff, Parker & Keegan, Ft. Wayne, Ind., for defendant-appellee.
Before WOOD, CUDAHY, and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Pro se plaintiffs-appellants Arnold and Martha Hilgeford (the Hilgefords) commenced a quiet title action against their mortgagee, The Peoples Bank (the Bank), claiming that their "federal land patent" gave them superior title to certain real estate over the Bank's interest. The Bank had apparently made a loan to the Hilgefords, secured by a mortgage on the Hilgefords' property. This mortgage was subsequently foreclosed and the property sold to satisfy the debt when the Hilgefords defaulted on the loan. The land patent upon which the Hilgefords assert a superior interest was drafted and signed by them, and recorded after the Hilgefords mortgaged their property in favor of the Bank, but apparently before the state foreclosure proceedings commenced. The Hilgefords seek to have title to the property and the interests of the parties determined by the court, and the Bank enjoined from asserting any rights in the land. No diversity of citizenship was alleged, rather jurisdiction in the district court is predicated on the existence of a federal question.[1] 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The district court sua sponte dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 178*178 and imposed a fine of $250.00 as a sanction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.[2] Hilgeford v. Peoples Bank, 607 F.Supp. 536, 539 (N.D.Ind.1985). The Hilgefords appeal.
On appeal, the Hilgefords have submitted a two-page brief containing a jurisdictional summary along with their argument that a land patent from the United States government is absolute and immune from collateral attack. While this court may hold a pro se litigant's briefs to a lower standard than those prepared by counsel, McCottrell v. E.E.O.C., 726 F.2d 350, 351 (7th Cir.1984), the Hilgefords' brief is woefully inadequate. However, it is sufficient, along with the record, for us to determine the jurisdictional question, the only issue on appeal.
The Hilgefords premise jurisdiction on the existence of a federal question by reason of their land patent, 28 U.S.C. § 1331,[3] specifically asserting that the action arises under article IV, section 3, clause 2 of the United States Constitution[4] and an 1820 Act of Congress, 3 Stat. 540.[5] It is well settled, however, that a controversy regarding land has never been regarded as presenting a federal question simply because one of the parties to it has derived his title from a patent or under an act of Congress. See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 676, 94 S.Ct. 772, 781, 39 L.Ed.2d 73 (1974); Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 570, 32 S.Ct. 704, 706, 56 L.Ed. 1205 (1912); Joy v. City of St. Louis, 201 U.S. 332, 342-43, 26 S.Ct. 478, 481, 50 L.Ed 776 (1906); State of Wisconsin v. Baker, 698 F.2d 1323, 1327 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207, 103 S.Ct. 3537, 77 L.Ed.2d 1388 (1983); Standage Ventures, Inc. v. State of Arizona, 499 F.2d 248, 249 (9th Cir.1974); Heirs of Burat 179*179 v. Board of Levee Comm'rs, 496 F.2d 1336, 1339 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049, 95 S.Ct. 625, 42 L.Ed.2d 644 (1974); Kirklin v. Ellerbe, 278 Fed. 168 (5th Cir.1922).
Only if federal law continues to govern the right ... or if the suit is to decide whether the United States did, in fact, originally convey it ... does an action to enforce that right "arise under" federal law. "The federal nature of the right to be established is decisive — not the source of the authority to establish it."​
State of Wisconsin v. Baker, 698 F.2d at 1327 (citations omitted).
Neither the federal constitutional and statutory provisions cited, nor the existence of title derived from a land patent raises a sufficient federal claim or issue upon which to base the jurisdiction of the district court. The instant case does not require the interpretation or construction of these alleged bases of jurisdiction. Rather, the action involves only mortgage foreclosure, proper for state court determination, not federal court. Land title and possessory actions are generally not the business of federal courts, e.g., White v. Burnley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 235, 15 L.Ed. 886 (1857); Beauregard v. New Orleans, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 497, 15 L.Ed. 469 (1855), and this case is no exception.[6]
Finally, the district court's imposition of sanctions under Rule 11 will be upheld absent an abuse of discretion. Frazier v. Cast, 771 F.2d 259, 262 (7th Cir.1985); In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 448 (7th Cir.1985). The Hilgefords fail to enumerate how the district court abused its discretion or to even argue the issue in their appellate brief.
Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, we may award damages, including attorney's fees, and costs if an appeal is both frivolous and an appropriate case for the imposition of sanctions. See Trecker v. Scag, 747 F.2d 1176, 1179 (7th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1066, 105 S.Ct. 2140, 85 L.Ed.2d 498 (1985); Reid v. United States, 715 F.2d 1148, 1154-55 (7th Cir.1983). The conclusion that this appeal is frivolous seems inescapable. The drafting and recordation of the Declaration of Land Patent was a blatant attempt by the Hilgefords to circumvent the Bank's mortgage and improve their title. The district court informed them twice within a month's time that this device did not improve their title or form the basis for federal jurisdiction. On appeal, the Hilgefords have completely failed to support their claim of jurisdiction by citing relevant authority or by refuting the district court's analysis.
Our review of the briefs and record persuades us that this is vexatious litigation; an appropriate case for the imposition of sanctions. The Hilgefords have no support for their claims of superior title or federal jurisdiction. Their brief was also woefully inadequate. We can think of no other reason for this appeal other than delay, harassment, or sheer obstinancy. Reid, 715 F.2d at 1155. Accordingly, we award the Bank $500 in damages for this frivolous appeal in addition to the costs allowed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39.
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
[*] Defendant-appellee has moved to waive oral argument and plaintiffs-appellants have objected. Upon consideration of that request and objection, the briefs, and the record, defendant-appellee's motion is granted. Oral argument is denied, and the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); Circuit Rule 14(f).
[1] This was the second action filed by the Hilgefords against the Bank within two weeks. The first action was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction since the complaint failed to allege any federal question. Hilgeford v. Peoples Bank, No. F85-142 (N.D.Ind. Apr. 11, 1985). With knowledge of this order of dismissal, the Hilgefords filed the instant action, which is nearly identical to the first cause, except that the Hilgefords have made reference to federal constitutional and statutory provisions in an apparent attempt to bolster jurisdiction. Hilgeford v. Peoples Bank, 607 F.Supp. at 537.
[2] Rule 11 governs the signing of pleadings and motions, and requires that each pleading or motion be signed by an attorney or the party if proceeding pro se. The signature on the pleading certifies that "to the best of his knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry [the pleading, motion, or other paper] is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." If a pleading violates Rule 11, the court "shall impose" an "appropriate sanction," which may include costs and attorney's fees.
The district court found sanctions under Rule 11 warranted because of the obvious frivolity of this suit,
based upon a purported land patent which indicates on its face that it is a self-serving document, drafted by the plaintiffs to grant themselves title to land, and which does not invoke any federal law or constitutional provision precisely because it is a blatant attempt by private landowners to improve title by personal fia
t.

Hilgeford, 607 F.Supp. at 539.

[3] The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
[4] Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 gives the Congress the power "to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other property belonging to the United States...."
[5] The Hilgefords' complaint cites the Act of the 16th Congress, Session I, chapter 5 which provides:
the authority given in the eighth section of the above-recited act, to the Secretary of the Treasury, to employ nine additional clerks in the office of the third auditor, and three additional clerks in the office of the second comptroller of the Treasury, be, and the same is hereby, continued until the thirty-first day of December, one thousand eight hundred and twenty, and no longer; and that the sum necessary to carry into effect the provisions of this act, be, and the same is hereby, appropriated, and shall be paid, out of any money in the treasury, not otherwise appropriated.
APPROVED, January 14, 1820.
We fail to discern any relevance this statute (now obsolete) might have to the Hilgefords' claim. While we may assume the citation is incorrect, the Hilgefords have not included a copy of the statute nor have they alluded to its content in their brief. However, the date cited by the Hilgefords in their complaint for the Act is April 24, 1820. An Act of the 16th Congress, Chapter 51, 3 Stat. 566-67, was approved on that date and contains the provision creating the government apparatus for disposing of public lands via issuance of land patents. In any event, neither Act of Congress supports jurisdiction in this case.

[6] The cases cited by the Hilgefords in the jurisdictional summary of their brief are totally irrelevant to the jurisdictional issue in this case and, therefore, warrant no discussion.

ALFRED ALEXANDER FLORES, Plaintiff,
v.
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., et al., Defendants.

No. 12-C-1191.
United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin.
March 22, 2013.

DECISION AND ORDER

LYNN ADELMAN, District Judge.
Alfred Alexander Flores, proceeding pro se, has filed a complaint with this court against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Discover Bank, three Wisconsin trial-court judges, the sheriff of Racine County, and several practicing attorneys. It is hard to make sense of the plaintiff's complaint when it is read in isolation, mostly because the complaint alleges few facts and instead offers vague legal descriptions of the defendants' supposed misconduct. For example, the complaint alleges that certain defendants "put a fraud on the court by using sham legal process to draw defendants in error Flores' into a void proceeding in an attempt to take property from Flores', theft by deception, which is a felony." (Compl. at p. 5/8, ¶ 4.) However, when the complaint is read along with other documents filed in this case, it becomes clear that the plaintiff claims that the defendants violated his federal constitutional rights in connection with a foreclosure proceeding that took place in Racine County. According to the defendants, the Racine County Circuit Court granted a judgment of foreclosure with respect to the plaintiff's real property in September 2011, the property was sold in a sheriff's sale in October 2012, and the state court subsequently entered an order confirming the sale and issued a writ of assistance to remove the plaintiff from the property. (Br. of Constantine, Flancher, and Ptacek at 1-2. ECF No. 3.)
The defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint for various reasons, including failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). And indeed, the complaint does not state a valid claim. Although the plaintiff accuses the defendants of violating his constitutional rights in connection with the foreclosure proceedings, he does not identify any specific act or acts done by any of them that could plausibly be considered a violation of any constitutional right. Rather, as noted, his complaint consists of a list of vague descriptions of the defendants' supposed misconduct.
When a complaint fails to state a claim for relief, the plaintiff should ordinarily be given an opportunity to amend the complaint to correct the problem. See, e.g., Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 2013). Leave to amend need not be granted, however, if it is clear that any amendment would be futile. Id. Here, the plaintiff has already proposed to amend his complaint (ECF No. 12), but his proposed amendments do not render any of his claims plausible. Moreover, it is clear that any further amendment would be futile. In some of the documents the plaintiff has filed, he reveals that his claims against the defendants are premised on his belief that he holds "allodial title" to the foreclosed property pursuant to a land patent. For instance, in one of his briefs, he writes: "As an American, I have claimed my rights and submitted an Allodial Title, a Lawful Land Patent to the Property known as 2004 Quincy Avenue, Racine, Wisconsin [53403]. I have never surrendered the aforementioned property; it was stolen by gun point, helicopters, and armored vehicles." (Br. in Opp. at 3/4, ECF No. 11.)
Claims involving allodial title and land patents are occasionally advanced by property owners who believe that they can use these devices to prevent foreclosure. See Wisconsin v. Glick, 782 F.2d 670, 671-72 (7th Cir. 1986). One website advises property owners that they can "regain control of [their] land through a Land Patent process." See http://www.landpatent.us/ (visited March 21, 2013). The site claims that the process allows property owners to "[g]ain the highest form of title known in law, superior to ANY other claimant including government attempting to take by eminent domain, a bank with a sheriff's sale deed, a purchaser in a property tax sale with a tax sale deed, or anyone else." The site goes on to claim that a land patent makes one "immune from eviction in the event of foreclosure . . . [e]ven AFTER foreclosure and eviction." Courts have considered these types of claims in other cases and have uniformly rejected them, with most courts deeming the claims frivolous. See, e.g., Glick, 782 F.2d at 671-73; Hilgeford v. Peoples Bank, 776 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Miljus, No. 06-1832-PK, 2007 WL 4287608 (D. Or. Dec. 3, 2007); Britt v. Federal Land Bank, 505 N.E.2d 387 (Ill. Ct. App. 1987). The plaintiff's claims in the present case bear all the hallmarks of these frivolous claims, and for that reason I will not grant him leave to amend. Rather, I will dismiss this action with prejudice.
Before closing, I note that because plaintiff's federal claims are frivolous, I technically do not have jurisdiction to consider them. See, e.g., Beauchamp v. Sullivan, 21 F.3d 789, 790-91 (7th Cir. 1994) ("A frivolous case does not engage the jurisdiction of the court."). For this reason, the plaintiff might contend that I should enter a dismissal without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction rather than a dismissal with prejudice. However, "if the reason there's no federal jurisdiction is the plaintiff's having predicated jurisdiction on a frivolous federal claim, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate." Baba-Dainja El v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 12-3310, slip op. at 4 (7th Cir. March 20, 2013). Thus, whether or not the plaintiff's frivolous federal claims have engaged the jurisdiction of this court, dismissal with prejudice is the appropriate disposition.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the complaint and this action are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk of Court shall enter final judgment.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to amend (ECF No. 12) is DENIED.
FINALLY, IT IS ORDERED that the defendants' motions to dismiss are GRANTED to the extent that this case is dismissed for the reasons stated in this opinion.



615 F.Supp. 890 (1985)Ronnie L.R. NIXON, Plaintiff,
v.
Mark J. PHILLIPOFF, Donald D. Martin and Kendall I. Vail, Defendants.

Civ. No. S 85-177.
United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division.
August 6, 1985.
891*891 Ronnie L.R. Nixon, pro se.
Mark J. Phillipoff, Jones, Obenchain, Johnson, Ford, Pankow & Lewis, South Bend, Ind., for Phillipoff.
Frank A. Baldwin, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, Ind., for Martin.
William J. Boklund, LaPorte, Ind., for Vail.

ORDER

WILLIAM C. LEE, District Judge.
This matter is before the court on motions to dismiss filed by all of the defendants in this cause. For the following reasons, the motions to dismiss will be granted.
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. Pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). The district court's role is to ensure that the claims of pro se litigants are given "fair and meaningful consideration." Matzker v. Herr, 748 F.2d 1142, 1146 (7th Cir.1984); Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir. 1982). This court also recognizes that federal courts have historically exercised great tolerance to ensure that an impartial forum remains available to plaintiffs invoking the jurisdiction of the court without the guidance of trained counsel. Pro se motions and complaints such as the plaintiff's are held to less stringent pleading requirements; rigor in the examination of such motions, complaints and pleadings is inappropriate.
This cause arises out of a dispute in an underlying mortgage foreclosure action in the LaPorte Superior Court of LaPorte County, Indiana. Defendant Phillipoff filed the case with defendant Vail, the clerk of the court, and paid the filing fee in federal reserve notes. The case came before defendant Martin, who is a LaPorte Superior Court judge.
Plaintiff ("Nixon") moved for dismissal of the case on three grounds: (1) that Phillipoff had violated article 1, section 10, clause 1 of the United States Constitution by paying the filing fee with federal reserve notes instead of "lawful money" (i.e., gold and silver coin); (2) that Nixon was entitled to a jury trial, and Martin lacked jurisdiction to determine whether Nixon was entitled to a jury trial; and (3) the LaPorte Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because a federal land patent was involved. Judge Martin denied 892*892 the motion to dismiss, and this suit followed.
Nixon sues under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986, asserting that the cause of action arises under article 1, § 10, cl. 1, article 3, § 2, cl. 3, article 6, §§ 2 and 3, and the first, fifth, sixth, ninth, tenth and fourteenth amendments. Nixon alleges that Phillipoff violated his oath to uphold the constitution by "making a thing other than gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debt, to wit; making false and counterfeit notes a tender in payment of filing fees assessed by the authority and for the use of the state," as well as "conspiring" with Martin to have the Superior Court take jurisdiction of the foreclosure suit. Nixon asserts that Vail violated article 1, § 10 by "receiv[ing] false tokens, to wit; Federal Reserve Notes, giv[ing] false receipts, mak[ing] false documents knowing the same to contain false statements; and makeing (sic) false entries in order to cover up material facts." Nixon sues Judge Martin for his allegedly erroneous rulings concerning his jurisdiction over the foreclosure action.

Motions to Dismiss

The defendants have filed motions to dismiss. Although denominated as motions to dismiss, it is clear that the issues presented by these motions are best addressed after reference is made to the exhibits, pleadings, and other matters of record in this case. When matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, a motion to dismiss will be converted into a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See F.R.Civ.P. 12(b).
Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment may only be granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Thus, summary judgment serves as a vehicle with which the court "can determine whether further exploration of the facts is necessary." Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 464 (1st Cir.1975).
In making this determination, the court must keep in mind that the entry of summary judgment terminates the litigation, or an aspect thereof, and must draw all inferences from the established or asserted facts in favor of the non-moving party. Peoples Outfitting Co. v. General Electric Credit Corp., 549 F.2d 92 (7th Cir.1977). The non-moving party's reasonable allegations are to be accepted as true for purposes of summary judgment. Yorger v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 733 F.2d 1215, 1218-19 (7th Cir.1984). A party may not rest on the mere allegations of the pleadings or the bare contention that an issue of fact exists. Posey v. Skyline Corp., 702 F.2d 102, 105 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 392, 78 L.Ed.2d 336 (1983). See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). See also Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United Transportation Union, 734 F.2d 317 (7th Cir.1984); Korf v. Ball State University, 726 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir.1983). See generally C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts, § 99 (4th ed. 1983); 6 Moore's Federal Practice, § 56.15 (2d ed. 1984).
Stripped to its bare essentials, Nixon's suit is premised on three propositions: (1) that only specie (that is, gold and silver coin) are legal tender for purposes of paying a filing fee; (2) that Nixon's "land patent" divested the LaPorte Superior Court of jurisdiction to hear the mortgage foreclosure case; and (3) that Nixon was entitled to a trial by jury in the foreclosure action. The claims against the individuals flow from these claims. Phillipoff has allegedly violated the constitution by "making false and counterfeit notes a tender in payment of filing fees" and by conspiring with Martin to have the Superior Court take jurisdiction despite the tender of federal reserve notes, while Vail allegedly violated the constitution by accepting the notes as payment for the filing fee. For 893*893 both claims to succeed, proposition (1) must be true. Likewise, the claims against Martin can succeed only if propositions (2) and (3) are true. The converse of this analysis is that, if all three propositions are false, then the actions of the defendants were legally and constitutionally proper. Therefore, instead of analyzing Nixon's claims in terms of elements of a claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, the court will examine these underlying premises each in turn.

Federal Reserve Notes as Legal Tender

Article 1, section 8, clause 5 of the Constitution gives Congress the authority "[t]o coin Money, and regulate the Value thereof...." This clause gives Congress the exclusive ability to determine what will be legal tender throughout the country. The Legal Tender Cases, 110 U.S. 421, 446, 4 S.Ct. 122, 128-29, 28 L.Ed. 204 (1884); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 76 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 548, 19 L.Ed. 482, 488 (1869); United States v. Rifen, 577 F.2d 1111, 1113 (8th Cir.1978). Pursuant to that authority, Congress has declared that
United States coins and currency (including Federal reserve notes and circulating notes of Federal reserve banks and national banks) are legal tender for all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues. Foreign gold or silver coins are not legal tender for debts.​
31 U.S.C. § 5103 (1984) (emphasis supplied). It is therefore clear that federal reserve notes are legal tender for any debt or public charge.
Nixon's argument is based on article 1, § 10, clause 1, which mandates that "No State shall ... make anything but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts...." Nixon asserts that this provision requires a state to accept and recognize only gold and silver coin as legal tender. The argument fails for several reasons.
First, Nixon's interpretation of article 1, § 10 creates a rather curious inconsistency with article 1, § 8, clause 5. If states can only recognize gold and silver coin as legal tender, then Congress does not have complete power to declare what shall constitute legal tender for payment of all debts, for a declaration that a treasury note or federal reserve note was legal tender would fly in the face of the restriction of § 10. While this is the conclusion which Nixon wants this court to reach (in effect declaring federal reserve notes illegal), it flies in the face of the clear import of § 8, clause 5's unrestricted language. The power to coin money necessarily carries with it the power to declare what is money, and the constitution does not limit Congress to gold and silver coin. Section 8 sets forth the powers of Congress, while § 10 imposes a restriction on the states. It strains logic and constitutional interpretation to claim that the framers of the constitution sought to limit Congress' power to coin money via an implication derived from a restriction directed not at Congress but at the states.
This strain in logic suggests the second reason for the failure of Nixon's argument: Nixon has misinterpreted the import of § 10's prohibition. Courts have uniformly interpreted § 10 as prohibiting states from declaring anything other than gold or silver coin as legal tender, The Legal Tender Cases, 110 U.S. at 446, 4 S.Ct. at 129; Rifen, 577 F.2d at 1113; yet these cases do not interpret § 10 as requiring states to accept only gold and silver coin as tender, nor could they, as they both recognize the unrestricted power of Congress to declare what shall constitute legal tender, including bills of credit, treasury notes, and federal reserve notes. In short, § 10 acts only to remove from the states the inherent sovereign power to declare currency, thus leaving Congress the sole declarant of what constitutes legal tender. Thus, the states must abide by the dictates of Congress, and because 31 U.S.C. § 5103 declares that federal reserve notes as legal tender, the states are constitutionally compelled to accept them as legal tender.[1]
894*894 Other reasons compel rejection of Nixon's position. Numerous courts have recognized that federal reserve notes are legal tender. See Birkenstock v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 646 F.2d 1185, 1186 (7th Cir.1981); United States v. Rickman, 638 F.2d 182, 184 (10th Cir.1980); United States v. Ware, 608 F.2d 400, 402-04 (10th Cir.1979); Rifen, 577 F.2d at 1112-13; United States v. Schmitz, 542 F.2d 782 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1105, 97 S.Ct. 1134, 51 L.Ed.2d 556 (1977); United States v. Wangrud, 533 F.2d 495 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818, 97 S.Ct. 64, 50 L.Ed.2d 79 (1976); United States v. Daly, 481 F.2d 28 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1064, 94 S.Ct. 571, 38 L.Ed.2d 469 (1973). In fact, there appears to be no cases since The Legal Tender Cases which undermine this conclusion. Such extensive and long-standing precedent offers a formidable justification for the eminently sensible conclusion that using or accepting federal reserve notes as payment for state court filing fees is completely proper under the constitution.
In short, Nixon's position is illogical and flies in the face of established precedent. The premise underlying the claims against Phillipoff and Vail concerning the type of legal tender for court filing fees is clearly and obviously false. Therefore, the motions to dismiss the claims against Phillipoff and Vail will be granted.

"Land Patents" and State Court Jurisdiction

The premise underlying one of Nixon's claims against Martin is that Judge Martin should have dismissed the state foreclosure action because a federal land patent was involved. This court has considered Nixon's land patent and found it to be a frivolous legal nullity that did not and could not affect the title to the mortgaged land at issue in the underlying foreclosure action. Nixon v. Individual Head of the St. Joseph Mortgage Co., 612 F.Supp. 253 (N.Ind.1985). This court specifically found that it did not have jurisdiction over this dispute by virtue of the "land patent," so that the assumption behind Nixon's motion to dismiss the foreclosure action (that disputes about title involving a land patent must be brought in federal court) is incorrect. Judge Martin acted properly in denying Nixon's motion to dismiss, so that he cannot be held liable here for failing to heed Nixon's spurious arguments. The motion to dismiss this claim against Martin will be granted.

Trial by Jury

The final claim against Martin is that he failed to give Nixon a trial by jury in the foreclosure action. The premise underlying the argument is that Nixon was entitled to a jury trial by virtue of the seventh amendment. That amendment provides that "n suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right to trial by jury shall be preserved...." By its very terms, the amendment does not grant a right to a jury trial in all cases; it grants the right only in "suits at common law." The Supreme Court has stated that 895*895 by common law, [the framers of the amendment] meant ... not merely suits, which the common law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were administered ... In a just sense, the amendment, then, may well be construed to embrace all suits which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction....
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 1007-08, 39 L.Ed.2d 260 (1974) (emphasis added). See also Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 82 S.Ct. 894, 8 L.Ed.2d 44 (1962). In short, the amendment requires a court to look to the traditional distinctions between law and equity in determining whether a claim is "legal" in nature so as to justify invoking the seventh amendment. See Ross v. Bernard, 396 U.S. 531, 90 S.Ct. 733, 24 L.Ed.2d 729 (1970). If the claim is equitable, then no right to a jury trial exists.
Under Indiana law, a mortgage foreclosure proceeding is equitable in nature. Carmichael v. Adams, 91 Ind. 526 (1883); Berkemeier v. Rushville National Bank, 459 N.E.2d 1194, 1197 (Ind.App. 1984); Farmers Bank and Trust Co. v. Ross, 401 N.E.2d 74 (Ind.App.1980). In addition, if a claim is essentially equitable, the presence of a legal issue (such as a counterclaim) is not sufficient to invoke the right to a jury trial; the case must be tried in equity. Jones Drilling Corp. v. Rotman, 245 Ind. 10, 195 N.E.2d 857 (1964); Fish v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 225 Ind. 448, 75 N.E.2d 57 (1947); Berkemeier. See Indiana Trial Rule 38. Thus, under the seventh amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court, Nixon was not entitled to a jury trial in the foreclosure proceeding because that proceeding was equitable in nature. Judge Martin was correct in denying Nixon's motion to dismiss, and thus his actions cannot be the basis of a claim against him.
In summary, Nixon's suit is based on three faulty premises concerning the law, and when the correct interpretation of the law is applied, none of the claims asserted here have any viability. The motions to dismiss will therefore be granted.


Motion for Attorney Fees

Defendant Phillipoff has moved for an award of attorney's fees as a sanction against Nixon for filing this lawsuit. The court interprets this motion as a motion under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and under the equitable powers of this court.
The American Rule is that absent specific statutory or other expressed authorization, attorney fees are not recoverable by the prevailing party in a lawsuit. International Union v. J. Pease Construction Co., 541 F.Supp. 1334, 1337 (N.D.Ill.1982). An exception to this rule has been recognized where a losing party has "acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons...." Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 1622-23, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975). See McCandless v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 697 F.2d 198 (7th Cir.1983).
The Seventh Circuit has made clear that bad faith can include the pursuit of meritless suits. In Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983), the court held that insistence on litigating a question in the face of controlling precedents which removed every colorable basis in law for the litigant's position amounted to bad faith justifying an award of fees. Id. at 1269-70. In Reid v. United States, 715 F.2d 1148 (7th Cir.1983), the Seventh Circuit stated that "the law may be so clear and well established that persistence in a course of litigation could be evidence of bad faith." Id. at 1154. Thus, this court has sufficient equitable power to assess sanctions for fees and costs if it finds that plaintiff's claim is meritless and in bad faith. See Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy Industries, 728 F.2d 820, 828 (7th 896*896 Cir.1984); Benner v. Negley, 725 F.2d 446, 449 (7th Cir.1984).
A second source of power to impose sanctions is found in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 11, which governs the signing of pleadings and motions, requires that each pleading or motion be signed by an attorney or the party (if the party is proceeding pro se). The rule then provides:

The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
If a pleading violates this rule the court "shall impose" an "appropriate sanction," which may include the amount of reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred by the other party because of the filing of the pleading or motion.
The Notes of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules makes it clear that Rule 11's provisions are designed to "discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and [to] help streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses." The rule applies to anyone who signs a pleading, motion, or other paper, and the same standards apply to pro se litigants, although the concerns of Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), can be taken into account.
The core of Rule 11 is that the signature on the pleading certifies that "to the best of his knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it [the pleading, motion or paper] is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law ..." (emphasis added). What is important to note is that this language requires more than just a belief that the law is or should be a certain way; as the Advisory Committee states, "what constitutes a reasonable inquiry may depend on ... whether the pleading, motion, or other paper was based on a plausible view of the law," and is thus a "more stringent" standard than good faith.
The Seventh Circuit has made it clear that it now applies an objective standard to the determination of bad faith in motions for fees. See Glick v. Koenig, 766 F.2d 265, 270 (7th Cir.1985). With these principles in mind, the court now turns to the issues raised in this case.
Nixon has argued the article 1, § 10 issue about the illegality of federal reserve notes quite strenuously. He did so despite a nearly one hundred year old unbroken lines of cases which indicate that federal reserve notes (or paper money in general) can be declared legal tender. This is the kind of insistence on litigating a question in the face of controlling precedent which amounts to bad faith. In addition, this failure to discover such overwhelming precedent suggests a lack of reasonable inquiry into the law as required by Rule 11.
This court has previously found that Nixon's claims concerning his purported "land patent" were legally incorrect and frivolous, and deserving of Rule 11 sanctions. Nixon v. The Individual Head of St. Joseph Mortgage Co., 612 F.Supp. 253 (N.Ind. 1985). The court notes this prior decision for the purpose of indicating that the second premise of the lawsuit was also litigated in bad faith.
The third and final premise of Nixon's suit concerns the right to a jury trial. While Supreme Court doctrine on the issue has been somewhat obtuse, it is clear under Indiana law that mortgage foreclosure actions are equitable in nature, and thus not deserving of a jury trial. Nixon's filing of this lawsuit in light of such clear precedent is the type of bad faith litigation which the Seventh Circuit finds deserving of sanctions.
897*897 Other facts in this case buttress the conclusion that Nixon's suit was brought in bad faith. The record is replete with motions and strange filings of record that obfuscate the issues presented here. Nixon filed a Lis Pendens to encumber the property of the defendants; a "writ of mandate" demanding that Judge Martin vacate the judgment in the foreclosure action; and a "bill of information caveat and notice" to the local sheriff explaining that Martin's refusal to grant a trial by jury was unconstitutional and therefore the trial was void, thereby justifying his refusal to obey the court's orders. Nixon filed requests for admissions which sought admissions on such propositions as: "The 16th Amendment in common law means the same in merchant law"; "the law merchant is subject to the negative aspects and summary judgments of the lex mercatoria which operates as a state granted privilege or franchise" (Request for Admissions to Martin, April 10, 1985); "You studied the United States Constitution in High School"; "You can read." (Second Request for Admissions to Vail, May 28, 1985). Despite the wide latitude given discovery in the federal courts, these requests seek totally irrelevant information, and suggest of attempts to prolong this suit (and thus to block the execution of the foreclosure judgment by virtue of this suit's continuing legal cloud over it) and harass the defendants.
Perhaps the most egregious act was Nixon's filing of a thirty-four page "Memorandum of Law." The Memorandum was obviously not written by Nixon — the type is different from all other filings in this case, and more revealing, was written for a "Defendant", not a plaintiff such as Nixon. The Memorandum spends twenty pages reciting the holdings of cases decided prior to The Legal Tender Cases, but few (if any) cases after. It rails against the Federal Reserve System as some kind of private corporation, and concludes by calling for a metallic currency. It may act as a policy statement for some ghost writer who seeks to change Congress' view of what is legal tender, but it is hardly a memorandum of law on any issues pertinent to this case. It is but one more attempt to force this court to waste precious judicial resources while examining irrelevant and spurious arguments. Even in light of Haines v. Kerner, which requires that this court recognize the difficulties of a pro se litigant, this lawsuit and Nixon's actions are dilatory, frivolous, and an attempt to harass the defendants. Such conduct is bad faith justifying an award of attorney's fees. Glick v. Koenig, 766 F.2d 265, 270 (7th Cir.1985).
Examination of the court file in this case reveals over twenty-six motions, affidavits, notices, requests for admissions and memoranda of law filed by Nixon. These filings required the attorneys for each defendant to read, analyze, and respond to these filings. Each of these tasks required counsel to expend significant amounts of time to develop intelligent responses. In addition, counsel had to attend two conferences on this case, one in person in Fort Wayne, and one by phone. A very conservative estimate of the fees incurred in dealing with this frivolous lawsuit is seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00) per defendant. The court will therefore award such an amount to each defendant under Rule 11.
The burden on this court in dealing with Nixon's numerous filings, and the responsive filings of each defendant is as great as that on defense counsel. The docket sheet in this case indicates no less than 82 different entries reflecting filings received and docketed by the court and other actions required by the court or its employees. This suit has forced a significant expenditure of judicial resources in order to fairly deal with a groundless claim. Certainly an "appropriate sanction" under Rule 11 can include a fine payable to the Clerk of this court. The court finds that a fine of five hundred dollars ($500.00) is an appropriate and justified sanction under Rule 11.
This opinion stands as public notice that this court will not tolerate baseless claims about the currency system or about the recognition of legal tender. Such suits will invoke Rule 11 sanctions just as surely as Nixon's suit did here.
898*898 For the above stated reasons, the motions to dismiss are hereby GRANTED, and this cause is hereby DISMISSED in its entirety. Plaintiff is hereby ORDERED to pay each defendant seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00) in attorney's fees as a Rule 11 sanction for filing this lawsuit. In addition, plaintiff is also hereby ORDERED to pay a fine of five hundred dollars ($500.00) to the Clerk of this court as an additional Rule 11 sanction.
[1] In various filings, Nixon also makes reference to article 11, §§ 3 and 7 of the Indiana Constitution. Yet it is impossible to see how these sections would indict the defendants' actions. Section 3 provides that
If the General Assembly shall enact a general banking law, such law shall provide for the registry and countersigning, by an officer of State, of all paper credit designed to be circulated as money' and ample collateral security, readily convertible into specie, for the redemption of the same in gold and silver....
Section 7 requires that "all bills or notes issued as money shall be, at all times, redeemable in gold and silver...." Neither of these sections are implicated here. Section 3 applies only if the state General Assembly passes a banking law and issues paper money. It dovetails with the article 1, § 10 restriction discussed above in that § 10 removes state power to declare paper money as currency, so that § 3's requirement of conversion into gold and silver satisfies § 10. Section 7 is likewise directed to state-issued paper money. Yet state-issued paper money is not at issue here — federal paper money is. It would be a perversion of constitutional principles to believe that a section in a state constitution could somehow limit Congress' power under article 1, § 8 to declare what shall constitute legal tender by requiring that it be convertible into specie.




July 16, 1986.
47*47 Anderson & Dobrovolny, Minot, for plaintiff and appellee.
Shelley Lashkowitz, Lashkowitz Law Offices, Fargo, for defendant and appellant.
MESCHKE, Justice.
Gordon G. Gefroh appeals from a judgment evicting him from his farm and granting possession of it to the Federal Land Bank of Saint Paul, and from an order denying his motion to vacate the judgment. Gefroh asserts that the Bank is barred by § 10-22-19, N.D.C.C., from maintaining this action in state court; and that, because title to the property stems from a federal land patent, it was immune from mortgage foreclosure. We reject both contentions and affirm.
During February 1984, the Bank obtained a judgment of foreclosure on Gefroh's property. Gefroh failed to redeem and the property was conveyed to the Bank by sheriff's deed in April 1985. The Bank then sued to remove Gefroh and to obtain possession of the property. Following a hearing, the county court decreed "the restitution and immediate possession" of the property to the Bank. The county court also denied Gefroh's subsequent motion to vacate this judgment.
Gefroh contends that the Bank is a "foreign corporation" within the meaning of § 10-22-19, N.D.C.C., and since it has not been issued a certificate of authority to do business in this state, it cannot bring this action.
Federal land banks are "federally chartered instrumentalities of the United States." 12 U.S.C. § 2011. See also Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 62 S.Ct. 1, 86 L.Ed. 65 (1941). Each federal land bank is a "body corporate" which has the power to "ue and be sued." 12 U.S.C. § 2012(4). It is well settled that "[c]orporations created by the authority of the United States are not foreign corporations but have a legal existence in every state in which they may transact business pursuant to the authority conferred upon them by Congress." Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Felt, 368 N.W.2d 592, 595 (S.D.1985). See generally 17 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 8291 (1977). Thus, we conclude that the Bank, as a federally chartered corporation, is not a "foreign corporation" subject to § 10-22-19, N.D.C.C., and therefore it is not required to obtain a certificate of authority in order to maintain this action. Felt, supra. See also § 10-22-01, particularly subsections (7) and (8), N.D.C.C.
Gefroh's assertion that his property was immune from mortgage foreclosure because title stemmed from a federal land patent is completely without merit. Even "an entryman on government lands, holding the same under the homestead laws, may give a valid mortgage thereon, ..." Adam v. McClintock, 21 N.D. 483, 488, 131 N.W. 394, 396 (1911). Gefroh mortgaged his property to the Bank in return for a loan. Therefore, his property was subject to foreclosure action.
The judgment evicting Gefroh is affirmed.

48*48 ERICKSTAD, C.J., and LEVINE, VANDE WALLE and GIERKE, JJ., concur.
 
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Cigarlover

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#6
Those cases from a quick scam all involve loans against the property. I never dug very deep into this issue but am aware of people who have successfully obtained land patents. An older deceased member here claimed to have had success in oregon and also removed himself from the tax assessors office.
One of the 1st things stated was that there could not be a mortgage on the property. Since I do not have a mortgage on my home I tried to get info on getting off the tax assessors list as well. Never found anything credible other than Ponces claim that it was possible.
 

Goldhedge

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So why can't one get a land patent any more? Or allodial title??
 

Cigarlover

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#8
So why can't one get a land patent any more? Or allodial title??
you can but I'm not so sure it gives you the rights some claim it does.
A few years ago there was an article in the local paper about a storage place or something that found a bunch of old records from an out of business bank. There were a bunch of land patents in there.
I have heard some extraordinary claims by some that the land patents makes you king of your land and as king you can make your own rules. Others say no more taxes.. Hard to find any real information on it though.

Intodays world what is real? A gazillion books with words in them describing how every man and women in the US I supposed to conform to the words in those books? Even if you had enough time to read them all in your lifetime, chances are some judge is going to come along and make up his or her own rules anyway.
 

snoop4truth

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#9
Those cases from a quick scam all involve loans against the property. I never dug very deep into this issue but am aware of people who have successfully obtained land patents. An older deceased member here claimed to have had success in Oregon and also removed himself from the tax assessors office.
One of the 1st things stated was that there could not be a mortgage on the property. Since I do not have a mortgage on my home I tried to get info on getting off the tax assessors list as well. Never found anything credible other than Ponces claim that it was possible.
Hello Cigar Lover,

It's good to hear from you again, my old friend.

YOUR COMMENTS: Those cases from a quick scam all involve loans against the property.

MY RESPONSE: Yes. Most of the cases above relate to foreclosure (although some also address property taxes, as well). The rule of law is exactly the same either way. Only the sovereign government can issue a land patent. A private person cannot create, re-create or issue a land patent. The sovereign government only issues a land patent to the FIRST party to whom the government transfers the real property. But, the sovereign government stopped doing this decades ago. So, there are no "new" land patents. Again, no private person can create, re-create or issue a land patent. Land patents do not now (and never did) render a parcel of real property exempt from foreclosure or property taxes. That is a myth.

YOUR COMMENT: I never dug very deep into this issue but am aware of people who have successfully obtained land patents.

MY RESPONSE: A person can only obtain a land patent from a sovereign government, not from a private person or entity. Again, no private person or entity can create, re-create or issue a land patent to anyone.

YOUR COMMENT: An older deceased member here claimed to have had success in Oregon and also removed himself from the tax assessors office.

MY RESPONSE: Then, that claim is a bold-face lie. The law is crystal clear on this. When a private person purports (means pretends) to file a land patent, such is a "legal nullity" (means it never occurred).

YOUR COMMENT: One of the 1st things stated was that there could not be a mortgage on the property.

MY RESPONSE: That is bullshit. Even a private property owner who receives a REAL land patent from the sovereign government can mortgage his property and that property remains subject to that mortgage thereafter until payment in full or foreclosure. Even a private property owner who receives a REAL land patent from the sovereign government must pay property taxes to pay for governmental services which benefit the property owner and the property itself (building and maintaining the roads, providing for drainage, providing fire protection, providing police protection, providing public schools, sometimes even, providing water and sewage, etc.).

YOUR COMMENT: Since I do not have a mortgage on my home I tried to get info on getting off the tax assessors list as well. Never found anything credible other than Ponces claim that it was possible.

MY RESPONSE: Whether or not you have a mortgage on your property is completely irrelevant to your obligation to pay for governmental services which benefit you and your property (building and maintaining the roads, providing for drainage, providing fire protection, providing police protection, providing public schools, sometimes even, providing water and sewage, etc.).

The bottom line is line that Ron Gibson's and David Lester Straight's claims about land patents and allodial title are just as true as Eddie Craig's claims that driver's licenses are not required unless the driver is engaged in commerce and Rod Class' claims that he is a "private attorney general" and a "14th amendment, section 4 Bounty Hunter". All of these amateur legal theories are lies. All of them.
 

chieftain

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#10
Snoop, your premise relies upon the legitimacy of the "sovereign government".
 

newmisty

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#11
∆ Those aint cliff notes! :p

Yeah basically there's a lot of wonderful theory and claims and ideas that make a lot of sense and sound quite noble and powerful, but where is the proof of success?

Like all those people touting that your birth certificate is worth some odd millions of dollars and you claim it or some such thing. Not a single one of those people that give talks or paid presentations has done it themselves.
 

Cigarlover

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Here's a link to Ponces claims on another site.
http://gold-silver.us/forum/showthread.php?62918-ALLODIAL-TITLES-amp-PATENTS-by-Ponce/page2

And then post #15 by Ponce
Here ya go.....

I attended the same Certified Processors' training in Chicago for the "Taking Dominion Land Patent class" as Daniel and Abby Flores who won the recent Land Patent Victory announced below. Their dramatic success offers immediate evidence that possessing the land patent on Land really does protect people against tyranny of banks and others who would use de facto legal trickery to steal people's homes and land. Since any sovereign individual who owns land can potentially take possession of the land patent on his/her land, we can all celebrate the Flores's victory as our own.
Many have asked me if I have proof that the land patent is as powerful in court as I was taught in the Certified Land Patent Processors' training. So far, this victory of Daniel and Abby Flores is the most immediate proof I can offer. There are also about 350 cases upholding as SETTLED LAW the absolute ownership conferred by possession of the land patent.
Daniel and Abby Flores' dramatic victory assures anyone who wants to secure their home and land against financial contingencies, that to prevent potential loss of the home due to foreclosure or other potential risks we can confidently rely on possession of the land patent, which puts us on the solid ground of SETTLED LAW.
Then there is this site.
https://thelandpatents.com/entities/by-location/usa

Hey Snoops. I don't disagree with you at all here.
I think I did try to look up the Daniel and Abby Flores case and didn't come up with anything. Like I said there's lots of claims out there and not much if anything backing up those claims.
 

snoop4truth

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#13
Hello Goldhedge,

YOUR COMMENTS: So why can't one get a land patent any more? Or allodial title??

MY RESPONSE: You cannot get a land patent because a land patent is the name of the transfer of land from the government to a private person and the government stopped transferring land to private persons when Congress repealed the statute which authorized it decades ago. A private person cannot create, re-create or issue a land patent to anyone, much less himself. The maximum number of land patents per parcels of land is ONE, the original transfer from the government to a private person.

Likewise, you cannot get allodial title to real property because allodial title is the name for title of a type that only a sovereign government can have. A private person can never have allodial title because a private person is not the government. That means that the government never transfers "allodial title" through the "land patent" to the private person. The private person who receives title from a government only receives "fee simple" title which is ownership subject to eminent domain, property taxes, and mortgages.

THIS IS WHAT EVERY U.S. COURT RULING ON THE SUBJECT HAS SAID ABOUT "LAND PATENTS" AND ALLODIAL TITLE

153 Ill. App.3d 605 (1987)505 N.E.2d 387GEORGE M. BRITT et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
FEDERAL LAND BANK ASSOCIATION OF ST. LOUIS et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 86-0248.
Illinois Appellate Court — Second District.

Opinion filed March 11, 1987.​

"[T]he powers of government, and the right to soil, which had previously been in Great Britain, passed definitively to the states." Johnson v. M'Intosh (1823), 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 584, 5 L.Ed. 681, 691.​
• 4 THIS SOVEREIGN TITLE, which is absolute and encompasses on the part of the SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY both ownership of the land and the right to govern the inhabitants thereof, IS "ALLODIAL" TITLE. This term is used IN CONTRADISTINCTION TO the term "FEE SIMPLE TITLE," which contemplates the HIGHEST TITLE WHICH MAY BE PRIVATELY HELD. (1 H. Tiffany, Real Property secs. 6, 13 (2d ed. 1920).) FEE SIMPLE TITLE MAY BE FREELY ALIENATED BY CONVEYANCE, MORTGAGE, OR DEVISE BUT STILL BE SUBJECT TO SOME CLAIM OF THE SOVEREIGN. (1 H. Tiffany, Real Property secs. 6, 13 (2d ed. 1920).) In current usage, the holder of FEE SIMPLE TITLE IS STILL SUBJECT TO dispossession by the government, through due process of law, for nonpayment of REAL ESTATE TAXES and by EMINENT DOMAIN proceedings.

The only correct premise supported by authority in the Britts' 613*613 brief is that land held by the Federal government is not subject to the acts of the States. (Cf. Gibson v. Chouteau (1871), 80 U.S. 92, 20 L.Ed. 534; Oregon v. McKay (D.C. Cir.1955), 226 F.2d 343.) WHAT IS TOTALLY INCORRECT IS THE implicit foundation of the Britts' POSITION THAT THE LAND PATENT issued to "James Evans" and "Francis Evans" in 1841 CONVEYED THE ENTIRE TITLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, SUCH THAT NO INTEREST ARISING BY OPERATION OF STATE LAW CAN ATTACH TO THE TITLE.

• 5 A LAND PATENT IS MERELY THE DEED BY WHICH THE GOVERNMENT PASSES FEE SIMPLE TITLE OF GOVERNMENT LANDS TO PRIVATE PERSONS. (63A Am.Jur.2d Public Lands sec. 70 (1984).) ONCE FEE SIMPLE TITLE IS PASSED TO AN INDIVIDUAL FROM THE GOVERNMENT, BY LAND PATENT OR OTHERWISE, CLAIMS ARISING FROM CONVEYANCE OR MORTGAGE BY THAT HOLDER MAY BE ENFORCED AGAINST HIM. (Cf. Stark v. Starr (1876), 94 U.S. 477, 24 L.Ed. 276; United States v. Budd (1891), 144 U.S. 154, 36 L.Ed. 384; see also 63A Am.Jur.2d Public Lands sec. 92 (1984).) Where, as here, a decree of foreclosure and sale has divested title from the former mortgagor, the mere fact that the mortgagor's claim of title may run directly back through his family to a 19th-century patent IS OF NO CONSEQUENCE.
The assertion in the Britts' brief that they hold "fee simple allodial title" IS UNTENABLE. THE BRITTS HAVE NEVER HELD SOVEREIGN TITLE and now have been divested of their fee simple title by due process of law in the foreclosure action.

The purported "PERFECTED PATENT" filed by the Britts matches the description of similar documents filed in other States. In Wisconsin v. Glick (7th Cir.1986), 782 F.2d 670, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals described these "NEW LAND PATENTS" in the following terms:

"People saddled with mortgages may treasure the idea of having clean title to their homes. The usual way to obtain clean title is to pay one's debts. Some have decided that it is cheaper to write a `land patent' purporting to convey unassailable title, and to file that `patent' in the recording system." 782 F.2d 670, 671.
• 6 The "NEW PATENT" or "PERFECTED PATENT" theory asserted on appeal, as it relates to the original patents, is also defeated by the estoppel effect of the foreclosure judgment. To the extent that the new theory may be construed as a separate and independent claim, it will be accorded the same treatment by this court that it has been accorded by the district courts of Indiana, Wisconsin, and Minnesota and by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. IT IS FRIVOLOUS AND WITHOUT BASIS and should not be raised in the circuit courts of this State.

Obviously, Ron Gibson and David Lester Straight never read the foregoing law on whether land patents and allodial title can be used as defenses in cases of imminent domain, property taxes and foreclosures.
 
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Goldhedge

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#14
MY RESPONSE: You cannot get a land patent because a land patent is the name of the transfer of land from the government to a private person and the government stopped transferring land to private persons when Congress repealed the statute which authorized it decades ago. A private person cannot create, re-create or issue a land patent to anyone, much less himself. The maximum number of land patents per parcels of land is ONE, the original transfer from the government to a private person.
So you're saying that someone was issued a land patent by the government and it died with the person?

Why can't it be passed on down to the heirs? What's the point of issuing a land patent in the first place?
 

snoop4truth

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Hello Goldhedge,

YOUR COMMENT: So you're saying that someone was issued a land patent by the government and it died with the person?

MY RESPONSE: You are confusing a "land patent" with "allodial title". They are not the same thing. With a "land patent", land is transferred, but "allodial title" is not. A "land patent" IS A DEED by which THE GOVERNMENT (AND ONLY THE GOVERNMENT) transfers land to a private person. "Allodial title" IS THE TYPE OF TITLE THAT ONLY A GOVERNMENT CAN HAVE. No private person can ever have "allodial title" BECAUSE NO PRIVATE PERSON IS A GOVERNMENT. So, a "land patent" does not transfer "allodial title" to a private person. A "land patent" can only transfer "FEE SIMPLE" title to a private person. Fee simple title is subject to imminent domain, property taxes and foreclosure. "Allodial title" NEVER PASSES TO A PRIVATE PERSON TO BE TRANSFERRED TO OTHER PRIVATE PERSONS.

YOUR COMMENTS: Why can't it be passed on down to the heirs?

MY RESPONSE: Because heirs receive land by "wills". "trusts" or by "intestate succession", not by land patents. A land patent IS A DEED by which a government (and only a government) transfers land to a private person. A living private person can only transfer land using deeds or other instruments (EXCEPT FOR LAND PATENTS WHICH ONLY A GOVERNMENT CAN ISSUE). A private person can only transfer "fee simple" title or less, because "fee simple title" is all that the private person receives from the government in the land patent. Allodial title never even gets transferred by the land patent to the first private owner of the land to be transferred to subsequent owners. And, the grantor cannot transfer to the grantee a greater title than he has to transfer. No private person can ever have allodial title because only a government can have allodial title. A private person receiving the land patent receives "fee simple" title, not allodial title. That means that the government TRANSFERS A LESSER TITLE TO THE PRIVATE PERSON IN THE LAND PATENT THAN THE GOVERNMENT ITSELF HAD TO THE LAND.

YOUR COMMENTS: What's the point of issuing a land patent in the first place?

MY RESPONSE: A land patent IS A DEED transferring "fee simple" title from the government (and only from the government) to a private person. Background: The government used the promise of free (or cheap) land to get Americans to leave the over-crowded east coast and to settle the western United States. The only advantage of a person being issued a "land patent" (or other deed from the government) is that there is no possibility of a defect in title higher in the chain of title (because the person receiving a land patent is the first private person in the chain of title).
 
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snoop4truth

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#16
Snoop, your premise relies upon the legitimacy of the "sovereign government".
Hello Chieftain,

YOUR COMMENTS; Snoop, your premise relies upon the legitimacy of the "sovereign government"

MY RESPONSE: Respectfully, it is not my premise. It is the premise of the courts above that made the law which I quoted.
 

snoop4truth

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#17
∆ Those aint cliff notes! :p

Yeah basically there's a lot of wonderful theory and claims and ideas that make a lot of sense and sound quite noble and powerful, but where is the proof of success? T

Like all those people touting that your birth certificate is worth some odd millions of dollars and you claim it or some such thing. Not a single one of those people that give talks or paid presentations has done it themselves.
Newmisty,

Truer words were never spoken!


YOUR COMMENT: Yeah basically there's a lot of wonderful theory and claims and ideas that make a lot of sense and sound quite noble and powerful, but where is the proof of success?

MY RESPONSE: The sole reason there is no proof of success is that there has never been a success to provide proof of. All of these amateur legal theories are lies. All of them.

YOUR COMMENTS: Like all those people touting that your birth certificate is worth some odd millions of dollars and you claim it or some such thing. Not a single one of those people that give talks or paid presentations has done it themselves.

MY RESPONSE: Agreed! Not one of these posers has come close to succeeding at what they are selling. They are charlatans selling hatred for the elected government of "We the People" disguised legal advice for getting rich quick or avoiding debts, all while wrapped in the American flag. It is pathetic.

With Respect

Snoop
 

newmisty

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chieftain

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Hello Chieftain,

YOUR COMMENTS; Snoop, your premise relies upon the legitimacy of the "sovereign government"

MY RESPONSE: Respectfully, it is not my premise. It is the premise of the courts above that made the law which I quoted.
You realise the validity of the courts and the laws they deal with is wholly dependant on the legitimacy of the government. The courts and their actions are not self validating, they never have been.
 

newmisty

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Newmisty,

Plaque?!

You should be awarded the effing "Medal Of Honor", the "Nobel Prize For Legal Excellence" and night with Kim Kardashian in the honeymoon suite at Caesar's Palace in Las Vegas!
"Hehe, this is gonna be cool! Hehe"
 

newmisty

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#23
Another reason for less lawyers...c'mon man!...to quote someone.
Simplicity is the highest form of sophistication.

To me that obviously means that so called lawers ain't sophisticated in the least.
 

arminius

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#24
Snoops long regorgetive diatribe, and of all his posts is "color of law".

Its not real law, it's contrived legal code, built not for justice, but lawyers income.

Ron is exactly correct wi regards to allodial title.

Why don't we hear more about it's successes? In most cases of successes with allodial title, they will leave you alone, but it one makes a big deal out of it and tries to teach others, that's when they'll come after you, and you'll have problems.

This legal system is the fucking devil itself.
 
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snoop4truth

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#25
Simplicity is the highest form of sophistication.

To me that obviously means that so called lawyers ain't sophisticated in the least.
Newmisty,

YOUR COMMENTS: Simplicity is the highest form of sophistication. To me, that obviously means that so called lawyers ain't sophisticated in the least

MY RESPONSE: The reason we simply quote the law so often (rather than simply "winging it") is to make absolutely certain that we are being perfectly accurate. Accuracy matters. When I am trying to communicate what the law is without quoting it, I am only doing so to make it simpler and more understandable by using words that ordinary people use.
 

snoop4truth

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#26
Another reason for less lawyers...c'mon man!...to quote someone.
Hello Engine Ear (great handle).

The value of a lawyer is not just accurately quoting the exact words of the lawmakers. You are right. Anyone can do that. You do not need a lawyer to do that. The real value of a lawyer is knowing how to find the law applicable to the facts of the case and filing it with the court (or posting it online) for all the world to see. So, another real value of a lawyer is PROVING to judges, the parties and to others (like the members here) what the law really is. It's about proof of what the law is. Without proof, the skeptics and haters will not believe it.

Consider this. The charlatans and posers who lie about the law (as they do with land patents and allodial title above) neither quote the law accurately nor know how to find the law applicable to the facts. Therefore, they cannot (and do not) prove what the law actually is. But, that's OK. Amateur legal theorists do not care whether an amateur legal theory is true or not. An amateur legal theory need only incite blind hatred of the elected government of "We the People" and it will be mindlessly accepted as the truth.

With Respect,

Snoop
 
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newmisty

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Newmisty,

YOUR COMMENTS: Simplicity is the highest form of sophistication. To me, that obviously means that so called lawyers ain't sophisticated in the least

MY RESPONSE: The reason we simply quote the law so often (rather than simply "winging it") is to make absolutely certain that we are being perfectly accurate. Accuracy matters. When I am trying to communicate what the law is without quoting it, I am only doing so to make it simpler and more understandable by using words that ordinary people use.
See, perfect example. The words "your comment" and "my response" are completely and utterly unnecessary and absolutely painfully sterile.

At-home the lawyer says, "Son, I'm about to ask you a question, then you, the Respondent, provide me, your Father, with the answer. Do you Understand?
"
"Yes Father, I stand under the body of words you just spoke. Please proceed with your question."
"Thank you Son. MY QUESTION: How was your day at school today?"
 

Bigjon

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#29
Well I'm an interested observer and would like to hopefully make a few points.

Since the takedown of our Constitutional Republic during the never declared civil war, there have been some mighty changes in how law is meted out to the people. The Constitution FOR the United States of America spelled out a third judicial branch. Whether one was implemented or not, I don't know. But it is for certain that there is not one today other than a token court. Most courts we go into are administrative not judicial, with the administrators calling themselves judges, under the executive branch of the govt.

They have a vested interest in the govt. winning their cases. They are not impartial judges. They are on the same team as the prosecutor.

If you walk into court as a US Citizen, with a lawyer representing you, you are the fool.
 

snoop4truth

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#30
You realise the validity of the courts and the laws they deal with is wholly dependant on the legitimacy of the government. The courts and their actions are not self validating, they never have been.
The constitutions of the United States and of all 50 states say otherwise.

THE DESIGN OF THE UNITED STATES LEGAL SYSTEM, THE DEFINITION OF "STATE", THE "SOVEREIGN" AND THE "GOVERNED"

In the state court system in the United States, the head of every law enforcement agency (city, county, state) is ELECTED by "We the People", all of the judges are ELECTED by "We the People", all statutes enforced or otherwise used are written by lawmakers ELECTED by "We the People", all of the prosecutors are ELECTED by "We the People" and all of the public defenders are ELECTED by "We the People", The parties to every case (criminal or civil) even get to pick their own juries (who make the ultimate decision as to guilt or innocence or liability of no liability). The judge is only a referee between two opposing parties until the jury reaches its verdict.

The purpose of this system was to guarantee that "We the People" ELECT every person who is in a position to influence in any aspect of our own justice system, right down to the Clerk Of Court and the Property Appraiser.

The federal court system in the United States is the same except that instead of these public servants being ELECTED by "We the People", they are APPOINTED by those that "We the People" ELECT to make those "APPOINTMENTS". Like the state court system, the parties to every case (criminal or civil) get to pick their own juries (who make the ultimate decision as to guilt or innocence or liability or no liability). The judge is only a referee between two opposing parties until the jury reaches its verdict.

IN THE UNITED STATES, THE "STATE" MEANS ALL OF THE PEOPLE RESIDING WITHIN TERRITORIAL BORDERS

1). SEE THE VERY FIRST DEFINITION OF "STATE" BELOW AT 1:20.

2). https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/state

3). See the third and forth definitions
https://www.definitions.net/definition/state

4). See definition number 5
https://av1611.com/kjbp/kjv-dictionary/state.html

5).. See definitions 3 a.
http://www.learnersdictionary.com/definition/state

6). See definitions 5 a & 5 b.
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/state

7). See definitions 5 a & 5 b
https://www.yourdictionary.com/state

WHEN DID "WE THE PEOPLE" BECOME DIABOLICAL AND TYRANNICAL?

IN A REPUBLIC LIKE OURS, THE TERM "SOVEREIGN" REFERS TO ALL OF THE PEOPLE, COMBINED, COLLECTIVELY, AS A WHOLE, NOT TO ANY INDIVIDUAL PERSON.

DEFINITION OF "SOVEREIGN":
http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/S/Sovereign.aspx#:~:text="... a determinate person,obedience to any human superior."

DEFINITION OF "SOVEREIGNTY"
http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/S/Sovereignty.aspx#:~:text=Sovereignty Definition:,the reach of international law.

DEFINITION OF THE "GOVERNED" (AS IN "CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED"). NOTE THAT THIS TERM ALSO REFERS TO ALL OF THE PEOPLE, COMBINED, COLLECTIVELY, AS A WHOLE, NOT TO ANY INDIVIDUAL.
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/consent-of-the-governed#:~:text=explore dictionary-,consent of the governed,democracy, and John Locke.)


7TH GRADE CIVICS REVIEW:

In a republican form of government such as ours, there are THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT. This prevents tyranny from any single branch of government. This legal principle is called the "SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE" which is found in the constitution of every state and in the constitution of the United States.

Our three branches of government are the ELECTED LEGISLATIVE branch (the ELECTED statutory law makers), the ELECTED EXECUTIVE branch (the ELECTED law enforcement officials and their appointees) and the ELECTED JUDICIAL branch (the ELECTED judges, the ELECTED prosecutors and the ELECTED public defenders of the courts). Through the ELECTION process, "We the People" COLLECTIVELY (not INDIVIDUALLY) control ALL THREE BRANCHES of our own government. But, as INDIVIDUALS, we have no such control.

In a republican form of government such as ours, if "We the People" COLLECTIVELY (not INDIVIDUALLY) do not like our state statutes, then through the ELECTION process "We the People" COLLECTIVELY (not INDIVIDUALLY) have the power and ability to ELECT DIFFERENT ELECTED state LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVES to change or repeal the state statutes that we do not like. This ELECTION process works the same way with our nationally ELECTED LEGISLATORS (our SENATORS and CONGRESSMEN & WOMEN) as well as our locally ELECTED law/ordinance makers (county commissioners, city commissioners and city council members, etc.).

In a republican form of government such as ours, if "We the People" COLLECTIVELY (not INDIVIDUALLY) do not like our ELECTED state law enforcement officials, their appointees or their practices, then through the ELECTION process "We the People" COLLECTIVELY (not INDIVIDUALLY) have the power and ability to ELECT DIFFERENT state ELECTED LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS to change the appointees and/or practices that we do not like (different Governor, different County Sheriffs, different City Police Chiefs, etc.). This ELECTION process works the same way with our nationally ELECTED law enforcement officer (our PRESIDENT ).

In a republican form of government such as ours, if "We the People" COLLECTIVELY (not INDIVIDUALLY) do not like our ELECTED state judges, their practices or their rulings , then through the ELECTION process "We the People" COLLECTIVELY (not INDIVIDUALLY) have the power and ability to ELECT different ELECTED state JUDGES (different Supreme Court Justices, different appellate judges, different circuit judges, different county judges, different city judges, etc.). This ELECTION process works the same way with respect to our ELECTED state prosecutors (state attorneys and district attorneys) and our ELECTED state public defenders. NOTE: In the federal courts, judges are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, both of which are ELECTED by "We the People". But, those ELECTED representatives of "We the People" (who do the nominating and confirming of our federal judges) can be removed from office by the ELECTION process as well. The ELECTED President also appoints the federal prosecutors. But, the President can be removed from office by the ELECTION process too. Some state jurisdictions even use a combination of BOTH systems whereby judges are first APPOINTED to the bench by ELECTED representatives of "We the People", but then must withstand a "retention" vote by "We the People" every single ELECTION cycle thereafter in order to remain on the bench.

Regardless, EVERY single person in a position of power in EVERY single branch of our STATE and FEDERAL government is put into office DIRECTLY or INDIRECTLY by "We the People" COLLECTIVELY through the ELECTION process.


FACT: In a republican form of government such as ours, every conviction of a single INDIVIDUAL involves the efforts of ALL THREE ELECTED BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT (the ELECTED LAWMAKERS who write the statutes, the ELECTED LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS whose appointees make the arrests and who file the charges, the ELECTED JUDGES who preside over proceedings in court AND the ELECTED PROSECUTORS who attempt to convict the statutory violators in court).

In a republican form of government such as ours, NO SINGLE ELECTED BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT CAN CONVICT AN INDIVIDUAL WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF THE OTHER TWO ELECTED BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT.

THE FUNDAMENTAL MISTAKE THAT ALL AMATEUR LEGAL THEORISTS MAKE

The fundamental mistake made by ALL AMATEUR LEGAL THEORISTS is their inability to comprehend the difference between the power of "We the People" COLLECTIVELY (which is almost absolute) and the ABSENCE of power of the SINGLE INDIVIDUAL (which is almost nothing) when opposing the power of "We the People" COLLECTIVELY.

Every single amateur legal theory ever promoted reflects a basic misunderstanding of this simple legal principle, "THE MAJORITY RULES and the INDIVIDUAL DOES NOT." All amateur legal theorists get this simple legal principle exactly BACKWARDS (or OPPOSITE) to what the law really is (a common problem in amateur legal theory).

ABOUT EMPOWERMENT OF OUR ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES AND THE CONFUSION ABOUT "CONSENT"

It is the power of "We the People" COLLECTIVELY (not INDIVIDUALLY) through the ELECTION process that empowers our ELECTED state LAWMAKERS to pass our state statutes and to make them binding upon all of the INDIVIDUALS in the state without the INDIVIDUAL'S "consent" (“contractual” or otherwise), etc.

It is the power of "We the People" COLLECTIVELY (not INDIVIDUALLY) through the ELECTION process that empowers our ELECTED state HEADS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES to ticket, arrest and charge any INDIVIDUAL in the state who violates our state statutes without the INDIVIDUAL'S "consent" (“contractual” or otherwise), etc.

It is the power of "We the People" COLLECTIVELY (not INDIVIDUALLY) through the ELECTION process that empowers our ELECTED state JUDGES to preside over state court proceedings of such an INDIVIDUAL and to order the punishment of such an INDIVIDUAL in accordance with the law without that INDIVIDUAL’S "consent" (“contractual or otherwise”).

This means that in a republican form of government such as ours, an INDIVIDUAL'S "consent” (“contractual” or otherwise) is NOT REQUIRED in such matters. Instead, in a republican form of government such as ours, "CONSENT” COMES FROM “WE THE PEOPLE” COLLECTIVELY, AS A WHOLE, THROUGH THE ELECTION PROCESS, NOT FROM THE SINGLE INDIVIDUAL OUTSIDE THE ELECTION PROCESS.

THROUGH THE ELECTION PROCESS, OUR THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT ALREADY HAVE THE COLLECTIVE “CONSENT” OF “WE THE PEOPLE” TO MAKE OUR LAW, TO ENFORCE OUR LAW AND TO PUNISH FOR VIOLATIONS OF OUR LAW.

Under our federal and state constitutions, OUR THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT DO NOT ALSO NEED THE INDIVIDUAL “CONSENT” OF ANY INDIVIDUAL TO CARRY OUT THOSE FUNCTIONS.

So, every single legal burden placed on the INDIVIDUAL in a republican form of government such as ours is a legal burden that is placed upon the INDIVIDUAL directly or indirectly by the majority of "We the People" COLLECTIVELY through the ELECTION process.

RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL

In a republican form of government such as ours, the power of the INDIVIDUAL is limited to VOTING, RUNNING FOR OFFICE and to enforcing what few INDIVIDUAL rights and protections that "We the People" COLLECTIVELY (not INDIVIDUALLY) allow the INDIVIDUAL to have (such as those INDIVIDUAL rights and protections listed in the Bill Of Rights of the United States Constitution).

In a republican form of government such as ours, these INDIVIDUAL rights and protections of the INDIVIDUAL are determined by the constitution and by the majority of "We the People" COLLECTIVELY (NOT BY THE INDIVIDUAL).

ELECTIONS AND THE VALIDITY OF GOVERNMENT

This is why in a republican form of government, such as ours, ELECTIONS ARE SO IMPORTANT. In a republican form of government such as ours, ELECTIONS (which reflect the will of the majority of "We the People" COLLECTIVELY) DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTROL EVERYTHING ABOUT OUR OWN GOVERNMENT, including any amendments and/or repeals to sections of the constitution..

THESE ELECTIONS DETERMINE WHAT OUR LAWS ARE, WHO OUR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS ARE, WHO OUR JUDGES ARE, WHO OUR PROSECUTORS ARE, WHO OUR PUBLIC DEFENDERS ARE AND THEY DETERMINE WHAT ANY DESIRED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS OR REPEALS MIGHT BE.

FACT: THESE ELECTIONS BY "WE THE PEOPLE" MAKE OUR STATUTES VALID. THESE ELECTIONS BY "WE THE PEOPLE" MAKE OUR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS VALID. THESE ELECTIONS BY "WE THE PEOPLE" MAKE OUR COURTS VALID, OUR JUDGES VALID, OUR PROSECUTORS VALID AND OUR PUBLIC DEFENDERS VALID.

FACT: The people who oppose, defy and seek the overthrow our ELECTED government, our ELECTED legislatures, our ELECTED executive (law enforcement) officials, our ELECTED judges, our ELECTED prosecutors and our ELECTED public defenders ACTUALLY OPPOSE, DEFY AND SEEK THE OVERTHROW OF OUR REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT ITSELF and in so doing, SEEK TO OVERTHROW THE WILL OF THE MAJORITY OF "WE THE PEOPLE" OURSELVES.

BEWARE OF THESE OTHER FAKE LEGAL EXPERTS (all of whom have a 100% failure rate when representing themselves and when pretending to represent others).

For the hoaxes of ROD CLASS (who has LOST 77 consecutive cases in a row), click here.
http://projectavalon.net/forum4/showthread.php?99447-Rod-Class-his-many-hoaxes

For the hoaxes of EDDIE CRAIG (who has LOST every case in which he has ever been involved), click here.
http://projectavalon.net/forum4/showthread.php?99564-Eddie-Craig-the-former-deputy-sheriff-hoax

For the hoaxes of ANTHONY WILLIAMS (who has LOST 90+ consecutive cases in a row), click here.
https://www.waccobb.net/forums/show...x-(Anthony-Troy-Williams)&p=231850#post231850

For the hoaxes of CARL MILLER (who has LOST 28 consecutive cases in a row), click here.https://www.waccobb.net/forums/showthread.php?131638-Carl-Miller-Richard-Champion

For the hoaxes of DEBRA JONES (who have never won or lost a single case), click here.
https://www.waccobb.net/forums/show...uot&highlight=Debra+Jones&p=230352#post230352;\

For the hoaxes of DEBORAH TAVARES (who has never won or lost a single case), click here.
https://www.waccobb.net/forums/show...ather-fires-depopulation)&p=226016#post226016

Best Regards,

Snoop
 
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chieftain

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#31
A wall of text that basically says figureheads are elected...

None of what you've written explains or provides evidence for the legitimacy of the body we the people are told is the government. By corollary, it also doesn't explain or provide evidence for the legitimacy of the legal system (ie courts and legislation). In effect, it is tantamount to the government saying "we're the government because we're the government" or worse "we're the government because we said so".
 

snoop4truth

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#32
Hello Chieftain,

YOUR COMMENT: A wall of text that basically says figureheads are elected...

MY RESPONSE: The wall of text basically says that "We the People" ELECT OUR OWN GOVERNMENT. Through the election process, "We the People" determine WHO our lawmakers are and therefore "We the People" determine determine WHAT our own laws are. Through the election process, "We the People" determine WHO enforces the law (the ELECTED city police chief, the ELECTED county sheriff, the ELECTED state governor). Through the election process, "We the People" determine WHO the judges are. Through the election process, "We the People" also determine WHO our own prosecutors and our public defenders are. It is these elections which legitimize the government, the people who hold governmental office, the laws, our law enforcement and our courts.

YOUR COMMENT: None of what you've written explains or provides evidence for the legitimacy of the body we the people are told is the government.

MY RESPONSE: The Constitution of the United States legitimizes the FEDERAL government. Specifically, Article 1 empowers Congress to pass all of our federal statutes and specifies Congress' powers and the limitations of its powers. Article 2 empowers the President to be the chief FEDERAL executive and specifies his powers and the limitations of his powers. Article 3 empowers the FEDERAL courts to preside over all FEDERAL cases and specifies their powers and the limitation of their powers. The Bill Of Rights also specifies additional limitations on the powers of all three branches of the federal government. The STATE constitutions legitimize the STATE governments and each branch thereof in a similar fashion. Finally, through the election and referendum process, "We the People" also have the power to amend (add) or repeal (delete) provisions of BOTH the FEDERAL and STATE constitutions.

YOUR COMMENT: By corollary, it also doesn't explain or provide evidence for the legitimacy of the legal system (ie courts and legislation). In effect, it is tantamount to the government saying "we're the government because we're the government" or worse "we're the government because we said so".

MY RESPONSE: Not, so. The Constitution of the United States which legitimizes and empowers the FEDERAL government as a whole also legitimizes and empowers each individual branch of government to do its duty. Specifically, Article 1 empowers Congress to pass all of our FEDERAL statutes and specifies Congress' powers and the limitations of its powers. Article 2 empowers the President to be the chief FEDERAL executive and specifies his powers and the limitations of his powers. Article 3 empowers the FEDERAL courts to preside over all FEDERAL cases and specifies their powers and the limitation of their powers. The Bill Of Rights also specifies additional limitations on the powers of all three branches of the FEDERAL and STATE government. The STATE constitutions legitimize the STATE governments and each branch thereof in a similar fashion. Finally, through the election and referendum process, "We the People" also have the power to amend (add) or repeal (delete) provisions of BOTH the FEDERAL and STATE constitutions.

Read the wall of text above in light of this summary.

With Respect,

Snoop
 
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chieftain

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#33
Through the election process, "We the People" determine WHO the judges are. Through the election process, "We the People" also determine WHO our own prosecutors and public defenders are.
Care to share evidence that the people selected any of the judges of the SCOTUS?

Can you point to anything that would indicate the people selected prosecutors and public defenders?

Specifically, Article 1 empowers Congress to pass all of our federal statutes and specifies Congress' powers and the limitations of its powers.
So how is it that Congress routinely passes legislation that is in direct contravention of the constitution of the US. How is it that all three branches of the government routinely ignore the constitution?
 

Bigjon

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#34
We the people are all members of the several States. The several States have names like Texas, Illinois, Iowa and are not in the State of Texas, State of Illinois, State of Iowa.

She has to be talking about a specially defined class of "we the people" as no US Citizen has any elective rights. US Citizens have voting rights.

This is more of the con in the constitution OF the United States.
 
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chieftain

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#35
This is more of the con in the constitution OF the United States.
What's the difference between the one 'for' and the one 'of' Bigjon?
 

snoop4truth

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#37
Hello Chieftain,

YOUR COMMENT: Care to share evidence that the people selected any of the judges of the SCOTUS?

MY RESPONSE: See RED TEXT below.

FROM THE FIRST THREE PARAGRAPHS IN THE WALL OF TEXT ABOVE.

THE DESIGN OF THE UNITED STATES LEGAL SYSTEM, THE DEFINITION OF "STATE", THE "SOVEREIGN" AND THE "GOVERNED"

In the state court system in the United States, the head of every law enforcement agency (city, county, state) is ELECTED by "We the People", all of the judges are ELECTED by "We the People", all statutes enforced or otherwise used are written by lawmakers ELECTED by "We the People", all of the prosecutors are ELECTED by "We the People" and all of the public defenders are ELECTED by "We the People", The parties to every case (criminal or civil) even get to pick their own juries (who make the ultimate decision as to guilt or innocence or liability of no liability). The judge is only a referee between two opposing parties until the jury reaches its verdict.

The purpose of this system was to guarantee that "We the People" ELECT every person who is in a position to influence in any aspect of our own justice system, right down to the Clerk Of Court and the Property Appraiser. .

The federal court system in the United States is the same except that instead of these public servants being ELECTED by "We the People", they are APPOINTED by those that "We the People" ELECT to make those "APPOINTMENTS". Like the state court system, the parties to every case (criminal or civil) get to pick their own juries (who make the ultimate decision as to guilt or innocence or liability or no liability). The judge is only a referee between two opposing parties until the jury reaches its verdict.

FROM ELSEWHERE IN THE WALL OF TEXT ABOVE

In a republican form of government such as ours, if "We the People" COLLECTIVELY (not INDIVIDUALLY) do not like our ELECTED state judges, their practices or their rulings , then through the ELECTION process "We the People" COLLECTIVELY (not INDIVIDUALLY) have the power and ability to ELECT different ELECTED state JUDGES (different Supreme Court Justices, different appellate judges, different circuit judges, different county judges, different city judges, etc.). This ELECTION process works the same way with respect to our ELECTED state prosecutors (state attorneys and district attorneys) and our ELECTED state public defenders. NOTE: In the federal courts, judges are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, both of which are ELECTED by "We the People". But, those ELECTED representatives of "We the People" (who do the nominating and confirming of our federal judges) can be removed from office by the ELECTION process as well. The ELECTED President also appoints the federal prosecutors. But, the President can be removed from office by the ELECTION process too. Some state jurisdictions even use a combination of BOTH systems whereby judges are first APPOINTED to the bench by ELECTED representatives of "We the People", but then must withstand a "retention" vote by "We the People" every single ELECTION cycle thereafter in order to remain on the bench.

YOUR COMMENT: Can you point to anything that would indicate the people selected prosecutors and public defenders?

MY RESPONSE: Certainly, I would be delighted to.

CLICK HERE. https://www.law.com/dailybusinessre...ender-state-attorney/?slreturn=20200807214956

STATE PROSECUTOR (STATE'S ATTORNEY & DISTRICT ATTORNEY) ELECTIONS
https://action.aclu.org/webform/vt_PledgetoVote1
https://theyreporttoyou.org/da-elections/how-they-work
https://law.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/National-Study-Prosecutor-Elections-2020.pdf
https://news.wttw.com/elections/voters-guide/2020/races/states-attorney
https://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local...e-state-attorney-in-primary-election/2279697/
https://www.latimes.com/california/...-vs-tradition-where-does-each-candidate-stand
https://www.local10.com/vote-2020/2...ey-race-one-of-the-most-important-on-primary/
https://www.mynews13.com/fl/orlando...te-attorney-hopefuls-double-down-on-platforms
http://www.chicagotribune.com/subur...0200703-bcdtueqo2jbv5es5daj2y6t35u-story.html

STATE JUDICIAL ELECTIONS.
SCROLL DOWN. https://voterportal.sos.la.gov/candidateinquiry
SCROLL DOWN TO NUMBER 5 HERE. https://dos.myflorida.com/elections/contacts/frequently-asked-questions/faq-candidates/
https://ballotpedia.org/State_judicial_elections,_2020
https://www.wdsu.com/article/mariss...rleans-parish-first-city-court-judge/33610918
https://www.theleafchronicle.com/st...eats-who-is-running-on-the-ballot/3402247001/

STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER ELECTIONS
FIRST LINE IN RED TEXT HERE. https://dos.myflorida.com/elections/candidates-committees/qualifying/
https://www.tennessean.com/story/ne...nashville-public-defender-election/812999001/
https://www.tallahassee.com/story/n...lic-defender-yeary-thomas-dempsey/3381370001/
SCROLL DOWN TO PUBLIC DEFENDERS HERE. https://www.lincoln.ne.gov/both/glance6.htm
https://www.beacononlinenews.com/ne...cle_7f0e5c8e-bf90-11ea-9d3f-7f86963db14b.html
https://www.publicdefenders.us/blog_profile.asp?user=36
https://www.lancaster.ne.gov/664/1979-to-1990

YOUR COMMENT: So how is it that Congress routinely passes legislation that is in direct contravention of the constitution of the US.

MY RESPONSE: I does not. Congress does not "routinely" pass unconstitutional legislation. On rare occasion, it happens. But, that is what the courts are for (to insure that unconstitutional legislation is stricken down). Every branch of government oversees and checks the other.

YOUR COMMENT: How is it that all three branches of the government routinely ignore the constitution?

MY RESPONSE: All three branches never ignore the constitution (routinely or otherwise). This claim is a result of a people misunderstanding the constitution or the legislation in question. The courts take their job seriously as do the legislative and the executive branches.

The people who "We the People" elect to represent us are not converted into demons on election night. They are human, so they make mistakes, but they are not inherently evil or diabolical. Most of them serve us to the very best of their abilities. The ones who do not so serve us are thrown out of office on the next election night.

With Respect,

Snoop
 
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chieftain

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#38
Oh boy...

The people who "We the People" elect to represent us are not converted into demons on election night. They are human, so they make mistakes, but they are not inherently evil or diabolical. Most of them serve us to the very best of their abilities. The ones who do not so serve us are thrown out of office on election night
So how would you explain essentially decades of the same unconstitutional crap that has the American nation and its people in such a diabolical state? Many people have come and gone from public offices (some have overstayed their welcome) and from both sides of the political landscape, so...?

Surely you see the disconnect between the statutes and rules of questionable legitimacy and what is actually happening in the country?